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The proliferation of social networks and all the personal data that people share brings many
opportunities for developing exciting new applications. At the same time, however, the
availability of vast amounts of personal data raises privacy and security concerns. These
opportunities are even better (and the concerns more serious) if we can correlate the data
that a single individual publishes in different social networks. Additionally, within a single
social network, the terms of service specify that users can only have a single account.
Nevertheless, some users create multiple accounts and malicious users often impersonate
honest users. Both for applications that correlate user info across social networks and for
social networks that fight multiple accounts of a single user, we need matching techniques
to identify the accounts of a single individual.
The main contribution of my thesis is the development and analysis of scalable and reliable
matching schemes to match the accounts that correspond to the same individual in today’s
social networks. Matching accounts across social networks allows applications to work on
more complete user profiles. Aggregating personal data across social networks, however,
also rises privacy concerns, in particular, when we can match the accounts of users that
deliberately change the information in their profiles to maintain separate personas. Finally,
matching accounts within a social network is a powerful tool to detect impersonators.
First, we study how we can exploit the public profiles (e.g., users’ real name, screen name,
location, bio, and profile photo) that users maintain in different social networks to match
their accounts. We identify four important properties – Availability, Consistency, non-
Impersonability, and Discriminability (ACID) – to evaluate the quality of different profile
attributes to match accounts. Exploiting public profiles has a good potential to match
accounts because many users keep their names and other personal information consistent
across different social networks. To demonstrate that matching accounts in real social
networks is feasible and reliable enough to be used in practice, we focus on designing
matching schemes that achieve low error rates even when applied in large-scale networks
with hundreds of millions of users. Matching accounts in real social networks is very
challenging because we have to deal with very large datasets and there are only a limited
number of attributes that we can use to detect the matching account out of more than one
billion. We develop a scheme in three-steps to achieve a good accuracy at scale. Instead of
using one classifier to detect matching and non-matching accounts (which performs poorly
at scale), we use two classifiers sequentially, trained with separate datasets, which better
leverage the power of different attributes. Furthermore, we take advantage of the fact
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that there can only be one matching account on a second social network to increase the
reliability of the matching.
Then, we show that we can still match accounts across social networks even if we only ex-
ploit information about user posts, i.e., their activity on different social networks. Specif-
ically, we show that by only exploiting the location, timing and writing style of a user’s
posts we can match his accounts across social networks. For example, if we use the loca-
tion from where users post, we can match 60% of Flickr accounts with their corresponding
Twitter accounts, while only introducing a small percentage of falsely matching accounts.
This demonstrates that, even if users are privacy conscious and maintain distinct profiles
on different social networks, we can still potentially match their accounts.
Finally, we show that, we can detect impersonators in social networks by firstly identifying
accounts that portray the same person inside the social network and then using a classifier
to detect which are the impersonating accounts in the returned list. Traditional methods
to detect fake accounts perform poorly for detecting impersonators. Our study shows that
detecting impersonators requires to build methods that exploit features that characterize





Today, over 2.4 billion users have access to the Internet and a large fraction of them have
an active account on a social network. There are more than 1.2 billion active users on
Facebook alone (728 million of these users log in daily), 540 million on Google+, 259
million on LinkedIn, and 232 million on Twitter [171]. Back in 2009, a study by Anderson
Analytics [178] showed that 91% of Twitter users and 82% of LinkedIn users also have a
Facebook account. We expect this overlap to be even higher in 2014. Users share all kinds
of information on social networks at an enormous rate. For example Facebook users share
4.75 billion pieces of content daily. Every 60 seconds, users post 510 comments, update
293,000 statuses, and upload 136,000 photos on Facebook [141]. Users often engage in
different activities and reveal information about different aspects of their lives on different
social networks. On Facebook, users communicate with their friends and families and share
aspects of their personal lives. On LinkedIn, users give details about their professional
evolution and aspirations. On Twitter, users tend to post things they are passionate
about.
There is a growing interest in identifying multiple accounts that correspond to a single
individual. First, organizations are interested in correlating user activities and aggregating
information across multiple social networks to develop a more complete profile of individual
users than the profile provided by any single social network. Second, social networks
are interested in finding all the accounts corresponding to a single individual inside a
single social network. Users are supposed to open only one account in a social network
(as stipulated in the Terms of Service), however some users create multiple accounts.
Furthermore, malicious users often impersonate honest users. For both cases, we need
matching techniques to find the accounts of a single individual.
We already see legitimate business models based on such correlation techniques. Many
emerging companies try to automatically match and mine users profiles across different
social networks to help recruiters in their decisions [166]. Modern sales portals com-
bine crowdsourced phone information with social networking posts to present a customer
profile to sales representatives and telephone agents in assisting hotline callers more ef-
fectively [159]. Furthermore, some companies like PeekYou [146] and Spokeo [4] market
themselves as “people search engines”: starting with basic information such as screen names
(i.e., a user’s login) and real names, these services return user profiles collected from dif-
ferent social networks. Matching accounts across social networks also has application for
many research problems. There is a lot of fundamental research on online communities
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2 CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION
such as user influence estimation [188], user expertise estimation [117, 162], community
structure and link analysis [139] and opinion mining [144]. Most prior research, however,
has focused on single social networks and did not analyze social networks in aggregate.
For example, researchers have studied the behavior of users on Facebook or LinkedIn sep-
arately [10, 18, 182]. This only provides, however, a partial view of a user. Interactions
in Facebook will most likely only characterize interactions with friends, and interactions
in LinkedIn will most likely only characterize interactions with co-workers. Knowing the
matching accounts on multiple social networks provides the opportunity to build a better
portrait of a user. Having a deeper understanding of a user can thereafter lead to better
personalized services or better estimations of users’ expertise. One important building
block for any research based on cross-site account matching is to have reliable techniques
to match accounts across social networks.
While the creation of such complete profiles of users has many applications in industry
and research it also rises legitimate and serious concerns about the privacy of users online.
While on a per-site basis, a user may deem fine what she posts to her Facebook, Twitter,
and LinkedIn accounts, she might be revealing much more than she realizes when consid-
ering them in aggregate. As an example, a social engineering attack could first identify
employees of a victim organization on LinkedIn, and then examine their Facebook accounts
for personal background to exploit while also following their tweets to understand travel
patterns.
In this thesis, we develop methods to identify the social networks accounts of a given
user. We first study how we can exploit the public profiles (e.g., users’ real name, screen
name, location, bio, and profile photo) users maintain in different social networks to match
their accounts. We identify four important properties – Availability, Consistency, non-
Impersonability, and Discriminability (ACID) – to evaluate the quality of different profile
attributes to match accounts. Exploiting public profiles has a good potential to match
accounts because a large number of users have the same names and other personal infor-
mation across different social networks. Yet, it remains challenging to achieve practically
useful accuracy of matching due to the scale of real social networks. To demonstrate that
matching accounts in real social networks is feasible and reliable enough to be used in
practice, we focus on designing matching schemes that achieve low error rates even when
applied in large-scale networks with hundreds of millions of users. Then, we show that we
can still match accounts across social networks even if we only exploit what users post,
i.e., their activity on a social networks. This demonstrates that, even if users are privacy
conscious and maintain distinct profiles on different social networks, we can still potentially
match their accounts. Finally, we show that, by identifying accounts that correspond to
the same person inside a social network, we can detect impersonators.
1.1 Personal data sharing in social networks
A large part of the data shared by users is public as the purpose of having a profile in
many social networks is to make an individual more visible. The purpose of a LinkedIn
profile is to have a better visibility to potential recruiters, while the purpose of a Twitter
profile is to reach a large audience to promote ideas and interests. Simply put, the reason
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to make content public is either to reach or be reached more easily by other users. As a
result, however, anyone can easily access this content and mine it in ways that are out of
the control of the user generating it.
Generally, we can find three types of information about users in a social network. First
we have the user profile which is the information users provide about themselves. The
profile information can include attributes like the name of the user, the city where he is
currently living, where he went to school, his current employer, his birthday, or the profile
photo. Beside the user profile we also have information about the user activities in the
social network such as what a user posts or what books, movies, or sports teams a user
likes. The posts of users often come with metadata information. For example, in Facebook
and Twitter posts can be tagged with the exact geo-location from where the message was
sent. On Yelp, users review restaurants, so we have information about the location and
type of restaurant. Other types of metadata include hashtags, the language of the post or
what application was used to post. Finally, we have information about the social graph:
who the user is following and who are his friends.
All social networks allow users to make parts of their content private. Even with the most
restrictive settings, however, there are always some pieces of information that have to be
public. The minimum amount of information that always stays public in any social network
is the the real name, the screen name, and the profile photo of a user.
1.2 Current techniques to match accounts
Today a number of organizations already aggregate information of a single user across
multiple sites. There are four current approaches for matching accounts: (i) sites that allow
users to explicitly show links to their profiles on different social networks; (ii) sites that
support single sign-on services which implicitly match accounts; (iii) people search engines
that use proprietary algorithms that exploit user names; and (iv) algorithms proposed by
researchers that exploit different kinds of informations in users’ profiles. We discuss these
approaches in more detail.
Social networks like Google+ allow users to list their accounts on other social networks.
People, brands, and companies that want to have a strong web presence are often advised
to maintain active accounts on different social networks and link from one account to
another. Linking accounts together increases their visibility and can also increase their
position in Google search [161]. Besides Google+, there are also dedicated sites such as
itsmyurls.com, about.me, and hi.im that allow users to create a page where they publish
links to all their accounts. These sites allow users to better manage their online footprint.
Besides some users that want to maintain a strong web presence, there are not many other
users that use these services to list their accounts.
Single sign-on is a type of user authentication that allows a user to enter one name and
password to connect to multiple sites or applications. OpenID [155] is the traditional
web single sign-on solution. It failed, however, to get large adoption from both sites and
users mainly because of the lack of business incentives [172]. In the past years, Facebook,
Google+, Twitter, and LinkedIn started to allow users to connect to other sites with their
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social networks accounts. This is part of an effort to allow third-party sites and applications
to integrate with social networks. We can see the integration between Facebook, Google+,
Twitter and LinkedIn with third-party sites as an implicit matching of accounts between
the two sites. Facebook integration is already very popular, more than 24.3% of the top
10,000 websites have some form of integration [150]. This solution received a much larger
adoption because the integration is beneficial for both site owners and social networks.
When users log in with their Facebook accounts on a third-party site, Facebook shares
some information about the user such as their age, current city or likes. At the same time,
Facebook benefits by allowing and making it very easy for users to share on Facebook any
activity they do from anywhere on the Internet. Consequently, a few main social networks
could become both aggregators and dispatchers of large parts of data generated by users
online. However, there is no implicit matching between different social networks.
Current people search engines such as peekyou.com, spokeo.com, wink.com, pipl.com,
and zabasearch.com aggregate information about users without their explicit consent or
knowledge. Most people search engines aggregate data from public records, surveys, and
social networks. Usually, when queried, they just return all the accounts of people sharing
the same name. Since in most cases, the names of people are not unique the results can lead
to many false matches. Spokeo explicitly stipulates in their Terms of Use that they do not
guarantee the accuracy of their data. Some people search engines use more sophisticated
algorithms. PeekYou filed a patent [74] for matching people’s names to their accounts on
blogs, social networks, and forums. The algorithm consists mainly in using the information
collected on different sites and assigning empirically different weights to different pieces
of information to match identities. These heuristics are not reliable as pointed out by
Perito et al. [148]. To build effective services it is crucial to understand the limits and the
capabilities of such matching techniques.
Finally, there is a flurry of recent research efforts directed towards matching accounts
across different social networking sites [6, 16, 76, 122, 128, 134, 137, 145, 148, 195]. These
efforts leveraged a variety of account features ranging from public user profile attributes
to user generated content and private data to match accounts. This work allude to the
potential for conducting large-scale account matching, however, most of these studies have
not evaluated their schemes at scale [76,128,134,148,195] and the few that did, found that
their matching schemes tend to be very unreliable [6,122,145], i.e., they have large numbers
of false matches. So the problem of reliable and scalable account matching remains an open
challenge.
1.3 Privacy and security threats in social networks
People are increasingly interested in online privacy with the mediatization of the possible
risks of sharing personal content. We can see strong reactions whenever there is a data
breach and many lawsuits have been launched against Google, Yahoo or Target [176]. As
a consequence, many governments and organizations are proposing ways to regulate online
privacy [175].
The problem of protecting the privacy of people online is hard. Every day, we discover
new attacks on people’s online privacy and we do not have yet a clear view of all possible
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attacks. Thus, it is hard to know what measures to take and how comprehensive they
are. Typically, much of the attention of governments and organizations focuses on how big
players such as Facebook or Google and advertisers such as DoubleClick track our browsing
patterns through cookies. Privacy advocates also monitor for changes in the properties of
individual sites, such as specific sharing settings on Facebook and the new Google’s terms
of service.
What has been overlooked so far is a broader threat of attackers correlating personal
information across site boundaries. Indeed, we can learn much more about a user when we
know his accounts on several social networks. On Facebook, we can learn personal detail
about an individual, for example, his birthday, his favorite movies, and where he went to
school. We can also infer information. For example, on Twitter we can infer the interests
of a person by analyzing the text of his tweets or who he follows [127, 162]. On LinkedIn,
we have all the professional present and past of a user, we can learn the companies he
worked for and what his competences are. On Yelp, we can learn what kind of cuisine the
user likes and where he likes to go out. Hence, it is even more challenging to protect users’
online privacy when attackers can correlate information across site boundaries and infer
new information about users. The first step to mitigate this threat is to be able to measure
the online footprint of a user. Understanding how easily we can match the accounts of
an individual across social networks can provide users with tools to measure their online
footprint and better understand possible privacy risks.
Our discussion so far has focused on the privacy threat of aggregating users’ informa-
tion across social networks. Another class of threats for user’s online image comes from
impersonators. There are more and more anecdotal evidences of celebrities and impor-
tant people being impersonated [126, 160] but other people are potential impersonation
targets too. Since an impersonator can seriously affect the online image of a user, it
is very important to detect such attacks. So far, however, most of the attention of re-
searchers and social network administrators has focused on detecting fake accounts or
spam [17,25,169,183,185,196,200]. Currently, there is no framework to automatically de-
tect impersonators and the only solution is for the victims to manually report the accounts
who are impersonating them [75].
1.4 Contributions
In this thesis, we develop and analyze methods to identify the accounts that refer to the
same person across different social networks or inside a social network. We exploit the
techniques to match accounts inside a social network to detect impersonators online. We
summarize the contributions of the thesis as follows.
1.4.1 Reliable and scalable account matching across social networks
There is lot of interest and concern, both in research and industry, about the potential
for matching the accounts of a user across multiple online social networking sites. We
focus on the challenge of designing account matching schemes that leverage publicly vis-
ible attributes to achieve high reliability, i.e., low error rates, in matching accounts, even
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when applied in large-scale networks with hundreds of millions of users. The main chal-
lenge in achieving a reliable and scalable matching comes from the noise inherent from
publicly available data. We identify four important properties – Availability, Consistency,
non-Impersonability, and Discriminability (ACID) – to evaluate the quality of different at-
tributes to match accounts. Public attributes like name, location, profile photo, and friends
satisfy the ACID properties to different extents which makes the detection of matching
accounts using simple machine learning classifications techniques inaccurate when applied
at scale.
We show that it is possible to leverage multiple attributes to build a reliable and scalable
matching scheme by doing the classification in three-steps: first filter out accounts that
are clearly different, then disambiguate the true matching account out of similar looking
accounts, and finally ensure reliability by measuring how distinct the true matching ac-
counts is from other similar looking accounts. Previous techniques to match entities are
not effective on matching accounts because of the constraints and specifics of our scenario:
(1) we have to deal with very large datasets; (2) we only have a limited number of features
to discriminate the matching account out of more than one billion; and (3) we are sure
that there can only be one true matching account in a social network. We evaluate the per-
formance of matching accounts from Twitter and Facebook, two of the largest real-world
social networks. Our results show that matching accounts at large scale is challenging.
Still, our techniques can match 30% of Twitter accounts with their corresponding Face-
book accounts with 92% precision. Our findings reflect the potential as well as the limits of
reliably matching accounts at scale using only public attributes of user accounts. Besides
the analytical contributions, we also developed an online service that takes as input an
account in Twitter and searches in real-time the matching account on Facebook, which can
be found at at http://matchingaccounts.app-ns.mpi-sws.org/.
In the pursuit of building a reliable and scalable matching scheme, we also make some
methodological contributions. First, we develop an unbiased method to gather ground
truth on matching accounts. We believe this method gives a representative sample of users
in general. Second, we propose a systematic evaluation of matching schemes that reveals
that the accuracy of a scheme at small scale is not indicative of the accuracy of the scheme
at large scale. Last, we evaluate how well humans can match accounts. The accuracy of
humans is a more realistic standard of the accuracy we can expect an automatic matching
scheme to achieve.
1.4.2 Account matching by exploiting innocuous user activities
We study how potential attackers can identify accounts on different social network sites
that all belong to the same user, exploiting only innocuous activity that inherently comes
with posted content. We examine three specific features on Yelp, Flickr, and Twitter: the
geo-location attached to a user’s posts, the timestamp of posts, and the user’s writing style
captured by language models. We show that amongst these three features the location of
posts is the most powerful feature to identify accounts that belong to the same user in
different sites. When we combine all three features, the accuracy of identifying Twitter
accounts that belong to a set of Flickr users is comparable to that of existing attacks that
exploit screen names. Our attack can identify 37% more accounts than using screen names
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when we instead match Yelp and Twitter. Our results have significant privacy implications
as they present a novel class of attacks that exploit users’ tendency to assume that, if they
maintain different personas with different names, the accounts cannot be matched together;
whereas we show that the posts themselves can provide enough information to match the
accounts.
1.4.3 Detection and characterization of impersonators
People are aware that attackers impersonate accounts in social networks. Apart from some
anecdotal evidence, however, there has been no in depth characterizations of impersonation
accounts in today’s social networks. We propose a technique in two steps that detects
impersonating accounts. The first step returns accounts that portray the same person in
a social network. The second step detects which account is an impersonator. Traditional
methods to detect fake accounts perform poorly for detecting impersonators. We show that
for detecting impersonating accounts we have to build methods that exploit features that
characterize pairs of accounts rather than features that characterize single accounts as has
been done so far. We do a characterization study of about 5,693 cases of impersonation
attacks we catch on Twitter. We found that impersonation attacks do not only target
celebrities but also target less popular Twitter users. Furthermore, their main goal is to
evade Twitter fake account detection rather than use the accounts for social engineering
attacks. Our findings reveal a new type of impersonation attacks that can impact negatively
the online image of any user, not just that of celebrities.
1.5 Organization of the thesis
This dissertation is organized as follows. Chapter 2 presents related work on analyzing
social data, privacy and security threats in social networks and methods to match enti-
ties. Chapter 3 presents the account matching framework and the ground truth data for
matching accounts. Chapter 4 presents our method to reliably and salably match accounts.
Chapter 5 shows how we can match accounts using only innocuous user activities. Chap-
ter 6 characterizes impersonators and presents ways to automatically detect them. We
conclude in Chapter 7.
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Chapter 2
State of the Art
The problem of matching accounts across social networks is related to problems tackled
in different research communities ranging from security and privacy to database and data
mining. In this chapter, we first review the state of the art on measuring and characteriz-
ing the information users leave on different social networks. We then give an overview of
the privacy implications of sharing content online. Finally, we review the main matching
techniques proposed in the database, information retrieval, and data mining communi-
ties. Even if there are not many studies that focus on the particular problem of matching
accounts across social networks, these communities have worked on closely related prob-
lems like matching records across databases and anonimizing/de-anonimizing databases.
Finally, we review some of the current efforts to detect fake social networks identities.
2.1 Social networks
This section reviews works on characterizing the amount of information we can learn about
users from their posts and provides the motivation for investigating techniques to match
accounts across social networks. We first discuss related work that measured how much
and what kind of information users leave online, then overview studies that showed how
this information can be exploited to further infer information that is missing or private
and we finally review studies that measured the users’ footprint across different social
networks.
2.1.1 Measurement and characterization of social networks
Many studies have analyzed the content, the structure, and the evolution of social net-
works [7, 10, 11, 18, 65, 96, 98, 107,109,112,129,190]. We first review studies that measured
the type and amount of content users share online and then studies that analyzed the
interactions and the graphs of social networks.
Gross and Acquisti [65] were the first who studied what kind of information users share
on Facebook and what are their privacy implications. Back in 2005, they observed that
users willingly provide many kinds of information ranging from their names, location and
photos to interests (books, music, movies), political views and sexual orientation, including
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even date of births, phone numbers and email addresses. Similarly, Humphreys et al. [73]
analyzed the personal information users provide on Twitter. A quarter of tweets include
information about where a user is or what activity he is doing and most of this information
is publicly accessible. Lampe et al. [111] studied the effect of the types of profile attributes
users provide on Facebook on the number of friends they have. They found that the pres-
ence of profile attributes that help users share common references (e.g., school, employer)
is strongly associated with the number of friends. The association is weaker for attributes
related to the user interests. After almost 10 years, the well publicized debate about users’
online privacy caused users to limit the access to some of their personal data online [119].
However, large parts of personal data still remain accessible to public. So far, most of
the studies have only looked at social networks separately and did not consider them in
aggregate. In contrast, in Chapter 4, we investigate what kind of information users provide
on different social networks and how consistent this information is across social networks.
Our study is useful for both understanding the extent to which we can match accounts
across social networks and also gives insight into the behavior of users on different social
networks.
A number of studies have looked at the structure of social network graphs and patterns
in users activities [10, 18, 98, 129]. More recently, there has been an increased interest in
augmenting the social graph with user attributes – Social Attribute Network (SAN) [62].
Such augmented networks are useful for link prediction, attribute inference, community
detection and potentially accounts matching [16]. In this thesis, we only exploit one-hop
friendship links to match accounts without exploiting the full social graph. We leave such
study for future works.
2.1.2 Inferring additional information about users in social networks
Social networking sites allow users to hide parts of their personal profiles from the public,
however there are always some pieces of information that remain public. This mix of
private and public information can be exploited to infer private attributes of users. In this
section, we first review studies that inferred different kinds of information about users by
exploiting friendship links or other kinds of data in social networks and then we discuss
studies that inferred the location of posts and photos.
Several studies exploited the social network graph to infer private information [71,83,115,
116,130]. The studies are based on the homophily [125] assumption that users tend to relate
to other users sharing similar traits. For example, political affiliations of friends tend to
be similar, or students also have other students as friends. Gayo-Avello [56] showed that
we can determine the political orientation, religious affiliation, race, ethnicity and sexual
orientation of Twitter users with a 95% confidence by exploiting the network neighborhood.
Similarly, Backstrom et al. [13] showed that the location of users can be inferred from the
location of their friends. Zheleva et al. [201] showed that the inference accuracy can be
improved if we also consider group membership besides network neighbors. Finally, Gong
et al. [61] proposed to jointly predict links (friendships between users) and infer attributes
in social network. By combining the two problems, both the accuracy of link prediction
and the accuracy of inferring attributes increases.
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Besides the social graph, researchers have also exploited other types of information present
inside social networks. Chaabane et al. [29] leveraged interests and likes on Facebook to
infer otherwise hidden information about users, such as gender, relationship status, and
age. Calandrino et al. [24] exploited the outputs of collaborative filtering to infer customer
transactions. Popescu et al. [152] used Flickr tags to find the gender and the home location
of users. Lieberman et al. [114] determined the location of Wikipedia users from the articles
they edit. Cheng et al. [32] use the content of tweets to determine the city-level location of a
user. Finally, Staddon [168] showed that we can learn the hidden connection of a LinkedIn
user with a very simple attack using a fake account. More generally, researchers have
inferred extra information from publicly available records. Griffith et al. [64] showed that
it is possible to infer the mother’s maiden name from public records. Farkas and al. [46]
discussed the inference problem across databases. While this body of work is not directly
related to our matching method, it shows that, when we know a piece of information about
a user, we can always infer more. This explains why matching accounts is appealing to
industries and attackers.
In another line of work, researchers used publicly available information from a social net-
work site and other external sources to infer the location of users posts and photos. Hecht
et al. [72] derived user locations from tweets using basic machine learning techniques that
associate tweets with geotagged articles on Wikipedia. Similarly, Kinsella et al. [91] lever-
aged tweets with geotags to build language models for specific places; they found that their
model can predict country, state, and city with similar performance as IP geolocation, and
zip code with much higher accuracy. Crandall et al. [39] located Flickr photos by identify-
ing landmarks via visual, temporal and textual features. In Chapter 5, we will show that
we can match accounts across social networks by exploiting the location of the users’ posts.
So far, our method only uses the posts that have geotags, however we could potentially
expend it to include posts that do not have geotags if we can infer their location.
2.1.3 Aggregating users’ data across social networks
Prior work also studied the aggregate footprint users leave across multiple social net-
works [31, 77]. Irani et al. [77] showed that, in average, users reveal four personal infor-
mation fields (e.g., names, location, school) in one social network. However, users reveal
different attributes on different social networks, thus if we know their accounts on multi-
ple social networks, we can learn more about users. To create aggregate profiles of users,
Pontual et al. [151] proposed to build a crawler that, given a name, is able to collect
information from different social networks and sites. While inferring and aggregating in-
formation across social networks is appealing for building applications and services, it can
also breach the privacy of individual users. We will review in the next section possible
privacy threats.
2.2 Online privacy
In this section we start by overviewing privacy research in two areas: tracking users online
and the privacy of online services. These research areas are not directly related with the
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privacy implications of sharing content online, but, they expose different privacy threats
users encounter online. We then focus on privacy implications of sharing location data
which is related to our work in Chapter 5 that exploits location data to match accounts.
Finally, we overview privacy threats caused by matching data about users across different
sources.
2.2.1 Online tracking and advertising
Discussions on online tracking and advertising became lately very popular in both media
and research communities because users are generally bothered by the fact they do not
have control over what data companies are collecting and aggregating about them.
Websites such as lemond.fr or nytimes.com authorize other third-party websites such as
Google Analytics or DoubleClick to track their users through cookies. Third-party websites
allow (first-party) website to easily implement advertising, provide site analytics or provide
integration with social networks. While third-party websites provide tremendous benefits
for first-party websites, they can also severely affect the privacy of users. Third-party
sites aggregate the browsing activities of users across unrelated first-party sites to create
aggregate browsing profiles for better targeted advertising. Even if the aggregate browsing
profiles are not directly linked to the users real identities, many users consider them a
privacy breach. The creation of aggregate browsing profiles has been criticized by consumer
advocates, policymakers and even marketers themselves. Numerous research efforts have
measured and analyzed the ecosystem of advertising and tracking users online [67, 69,
99–102, 124, 131, 194]. While technology researchers have provided tools to block such
tracking [156], policymakers proposed laws to limit or disclose tracking [132]. If companies
start to massively aggregate and exploit the data users share online it is possible that users
and policymakers will react the same way and claim their privacy rights.
Because online advertising supports the free content on the Internet, blocking all tracking
will significantly affect the economics of the ecosystem. To overcome this issue, researchers
are working on privacy-preserving tracking [49,68,179].
2.2.2 Privacy of online services
We look at the privacy of online services in two situations. First, we assume that users trust
and use a service (e.g., Facebook, Yelp), however, the trusted service may leak personal
information to other untrusted services, either intended or unintended. Second, we assume
users have the ‘big brother syndrome’ and do not trust the service, i.e. they do not feel
comfortable to give their private data to service providers such as Facebook or Twitter.
Personal information can leak from a trusted party to an untrusted party in different
ways: through Wi-Fi networks, from applications (e.g., mobile applications, software, or
browsers) and from social networks. We first review studies that measure such leaks and
we then review studies that propose privacy preserving services.
Whenever we connect to a Wi-Fi network, we are susceptible to leak private informa-
tion. Large portions of the network traffic generated by a computer are unencrypted, and
someone connected to the same Wi-Fi network can see what information is transmitted.
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Consolvo et al. [37] tried to increase the awareness of this type of leakage by proposing a
tool that alerts a user whenever private information such as email address or credit card
number leaves the computer unencrypted. Cunche et al. [41] showed that it is possible
to infer that two users live together by exploiting messages containing the SSIDs of users’
preferred wireless networks in the active service discovery phase. To protect the privacy
of users in wireless networks, Greenstein et al. [63] proposed a link layer protocol that
obfuscates MAC addresses.
Users can grant access to mobile applications to many kinds of private information ranging
from their exact location to the contacts in their address book or their IMEI (International
Mobile Station Equipment Identity). After giving permission, users lose the control of what
the application is doing with this information. Several studies analyzed the application
and network traces generated by smart phones to quantify such leackages [45,87,158,189].
For example, Cox et al. [189] found that half of the applications they tested were sending
location information to advertisers. Browsers are also susceptible to information leakage.
Studies showed that the browsing history of a user can be sniffed through side channel
attacks or caching [79,187].
Private information can leak inside a social network or from a social network to third par-
ties. Thomas et al. [177] showed that information made private by a user can be inadver-
tently made public through conflicting privacy policies of users. Krishnamurthy and Willis
showed that social networks can leak informations such as screen names, IDs and locations
to third parties through referral headers or request-URLs [103, 104]. This has important
privacy implications since advertisers could potentially link the anonymous tracking pro-
files they hold to social network identities. This line of research is complementary to ours
and shows alternate ways in which the privacy of users can be compromised.
A few research efforts proposed distributed social networks to avoid giving up private
information to companies [8,14,23,40,42]. While these solutions will protect the personal
data of users from big companies, it is still possible for a third-party to match the accounts
users have on different ‘private’ social networks. Furthermore, creating aggregate profiles
of users can potentially be easier as there is no central service that detects information
harvesting.
2.2.3 Privacy of location data
Real-time access to users exact location has lead to many innovative and useful ser-
vices. Fine-grained location information enabled the creation of applications to recommend
restaurants around the current user location, call taxis or map the photos taken during a
trip. Sharing location info, however, yields serious privacy concerns. In Chapter 5, we will
show that we can match accounts belonging to the same individual by exploiting only the
location information that comes with posts and photos. In this section, we review studies
that looked at different aspects of location privacy: (1) how to share location data with
service providers in a privacy preserving way; and (2) how to anonymize or de-anonymize
mobility traces.
To guarantee privacy while providing a reasonable level of service when sharing location
information with sites or applications, researchers have proposed both cryptographic [50,
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57] and non-cryptographic [19, 66, 88, 123, 138] techniques. Non-cryptographic techniques
include sharing the location at a coarser grain, cloaking or using a trusted third-party
service that provides k-anonymity. For a comprehensive picture we refer the reader to
existing surveys [82,106,133,157]. Finally, Shokri et al. [163,164] proposed a framework to
formally quantify the location privacy (being able to predict where a user is at a particular
moment) in order to compare the accuracy of different privacy preserving location sharing
techniques. While these techniques were aimed to protect users privacy with respect to
service providers, such obfuscation techniques could be also used to protect users’ privacy
online when publishing posts or photos with geotags. Such obfuscation techniques will not
have a strong impact on our matching scheme because we only need coarse-grain location
data.
A different line of research focuses on privacy implication of publishing anonymized location
datasets. Sharing such datasets is tremendously useful and allows to study human mobility
and behavior. Consequently, many researchers have gathered such datasets and make them
public [97]. Usually, the mobility of a user is represented as series of location-time pairs.
The granularity of the location can be at either cell level or exact latitude and longitude
depending how the data is collected. Researchers have shown that we can use these datasets
to build a location profile for each user in the form of a random walk or a Markovian model
and we can use this location profile to de-anonymize mobility traces very easily with the
help of some auxiliary location data [43, 121]. The techniques proposed to de-anonymize
mobility traces do not apply in our case. Mobility traces contain thousands of location-
time pairs while the median number of such pairs is less than 10 on Twitter for example.
The lack of data makes it impossible to model location profiles with random walks or
Markovian models. Consequently identifying location profiles that correspond to the same
user in social networks is more challenging than de-anonymizing mobility traces. Other
studies showed that we can learn the home and work address of a user from these mobility
traces [51, 105]. The home and work location of a user can then be matched with census
databases to find the real identity of a user. Our matching scheme that exploits location
data is based on a similar concept: we identify the main locations from where a user is
posting and we match them across social networks. Closer to our work is the study of Zang
et al. [199] who studied the k-anonymity of the top locations from where users make phone
calls. They found that, at zip code level, the top three locations are unique for most of the
people. Our results in Chapter 5 confirms their results, but when studying where users
post form. Zang et al. [199] did not further explore how these top three locations could be
matched with social identities. Finally, Srivatsa et al. [167] explored how mobility traces
can be de-anonymized by correlating their contact graph with the friendship graph of a
social network. Rather than correlating the location profiles of users in mobility traces with
location profiles of users in social networks, Srivatsa et al. [167] chose to exploit mobility
traces in a different way by creating a contact graph. We cannot use contact graphs to
match accounts because we only have locations where users post which is a small subset
of the locations a user passes by.
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2.2.4 Privacy implications of matching and exploiting users’ data
Prior work has investigated privacy implications of exploiting users’ data. We first review
works that exposed privacy implications of matching data across different data sources (e.g.,
public records, health records) and across different social networks. We then discuss works
that showed different privacy and security implications of sharing content online.
Researchers have realized long ago that matching data across different data sources can pose
privacy problems [34]. For example, matching different health databases could lead to the
conclusion that a celebrity has a contagious disease [30]. Traditionally, data matching has
been used for “connecting the dots” [174], i.e., for identifying terrorist threats. While this
has clear benefits, falsely matched pairs of records might have severe privacy implications.
If an individual is falsely detected as being involved in a crime or terrorist attack both
his life and credit worthiness could suffer [85]. Furthermore, criminals can match records
to collect enough identifying data to commit identity fraud [89, 143]. In this context,
researchers rose a series of concerns about the privacy of public administrative and medical
records [47,55,113,165].
Focusing on social networks data, Fiedland et al. [52, 54] showed that a malicious user
can use data that is publicly available on the Internet to mount social engineering at-
tacks (cybercasing). They show that it is technically possible to use seemingly innocuous
information to create correlation chains that tell much more about the individuals than
they realize. A possible attack could first identify on Craigslist photos of precious objects
that have geotags attached to them. From geotags we can infer the address of the owner
while on Facebook we can detect when the owner is on vacation. An attacker could use
this online information to mount a real-word robbery. Similar techniques can be used for
economic profiling, espionage targeting, cyberframing or cyberstalking [52].
Several websites highlight privacy risks of sharing data on social networks.1 Sleeptime.org
estimates sleep patterns of Twitter users from their posts. Stolencamerafinder.co.uk
crawls for digital camera serial numbers in online photos in order to find pictures taken with
stolen cameras. Icanstalku.com publishes geotags found in tweets, and pleaserobme.com
uses status updates form social networks to locate users who were currently not at home
but had published their home address. The cree.py application uses geolocation data
from social networks and media hosting services to track a person’s movements.
Finally, researchers showed that personal data can help to crack passwords. Irani et al. [78]
suggested to use personal data collected across multiple social networks to gather answers
for password recovery questions. Castelluccia et al. [27] showed that personal data can
also be used to reduce the number of attempts of brute force password cracking. Finally,
Jagatic et al. [80] show that phishing attacks [81] have a significantly higher success rate
when they consider the victim’s social context.
This section only described a few examples of how public data that users share online
can improve real world attacks. Automated techniques to match user data across social
networks will likely lead to even more sophisticated attacks.
1Some of the sites are no longer working.
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2.3 Matching entities across data sources
There is a large body of research in the database and information retrieval communities
on matching entities across different data sources. Even if they are not directly matching
accounts across social networks, they address similar problems. In this section, we first
present methods used for matching in entity resolution and record linkage, we then discuss
research on anonymization and de-anonymization of databases.
2.3.1 Entity resolution
Entity resolution or record linkage is the task of detecting records that refer to the same
individual across different databases. Because this task has many different application
domains, different research fields adopted different terms for the same task, for example,
duplicate detection, deduplication, reference matching, object identification, merge/purge,
object consolidation, or reference reconciliation. Entities most commonly corresponds to
people (e.g., patient, customers, tax payers, travelers), businesses, consumer products or
publications and citations. The two traditional applications domains that started to use
entity resolution a few decades ago are the health sector and census databases. More re-
cently, entity resolution has been used to match entities after two companies merge, to
detect national security threats, to build online digital libraries and for e-Commerce, to
find the records referring to the same product. The main challenge in entity resolution
is that there is no unique identifier and that records are not consistent across databases.
Consequently, researchers from database, data mining, and knowledge engineering commu-
nities proposed a number of methods to accurately match entities based on approximate
similarities of records. Most of the techniques work for a specific application or data type,
but there are a few concepts that hold across different research lines.
Records are composed of different fields such as name, address, and date of birth. Meth-
ods to match entities have usually three main steps: (1) pre-process data to put it in a
comparable format, (2) measure the similarity between records, (3) decide whether the
records match according to the previous computed similarity. Researchers have proposed
many methods for each of these steps, please refer to the book by Peter Christen [34] or
the many surveys in the area [20, 35, 44, 94, 191, 192] for more details. Metrics to measure
the similarity between records can be defined per record or per field. A typical per field
metric is the Jaro distance [36] to measure the similarity between names. A typical metric
to compare records is the number of common words between records. To decide whether
two records match or not, researchers proposed three classes of methods: supervised, unsu-
pervised, and rule-based (made by a field expert). Our strategy to match accounts across
social networks is similar: we pre-process the data, we compute account similarities per
field, and we use a supervised approach to identify whether two accounts match.
Unfortunately, the methods proposed in entity resolution are not directly applicable for
matching accounts across social networks for three main reasons. First, we have to deal with
very large datasets, for example Facebook has over 1 billion users, thus the data contains
one billion matching accounts and one quintillion non-matching accounts. Second, the
number of features we can use to match accounts is relatively small because there are not
many profile attributes available across multiple social networks. The most common profile
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attributes are: name, location, friends, and profile photo. Because of these reasons, the
accuracy of traditional matching methods is not high enough to provide reliable matching.
To overcome this problem, instead of using one classifier to detect matching and non-
matching accounts, we use two classifiers sequentially that achieve better accuracy. Finally,
given the social networks policies, there can only be one account per user per social network.
We can take advantage of this to increase the reliability of the matching. Chapter 4 details
our algorithm and strategies.
2.3.2 Anonymization and de-anonymization of user identities
One could view de-anonymizing user identities as matching accounts between unanonymized
and anonymized user accounts. In fact, our work is inspired by Sweeney’s [173] seminal
work on de-anonymization, which explored the uniqueness of attributes such as date of
birth, postal code, and gender to de-anonymize medical records of US citizens. Similarly,
we leverage public attributes for matching accounts. Nevertheless, we have to deal with a
noisier environment, where data is not always available or consistent and accounts can be
impersonated. We first review prior work that studied the anonymity of different demo-
graphics when sharing anonymized administrative datasets and then we discuss techniques
to de-anonymize social networks accounts through either the graph structure of the social
networks or other kinds of information present in users’ accounts.
A number of studies investigated the anonymity of different demographics in public data [58,
59]. Golle et al. [60] studied the anonymity of home and work locations of US citizens and
found that the median anonymity set, i.e., number of people with the same home and work
locations, at census block2 is one (i.e., can uniquely identify a person). This is exactly what
we want to leverage for matching accounts by exploiting the location metadata in users’
posts.
Backstrom et al. [12] were the first to propose methods to de-anonymize social networks.
They created sybil accounts that link to the identities that the attacker wants to identify.
Because it requires the creation of many sybil accounts this approach is not scalable.
Narayanan et al. [137] showed the feasibility of de-anonymizing the friendship graph of
a social network at large-scale using the friendship graph of another social network as
auxiliary information. They were able to match 30% of the accounts with a 12% error
rate. In a different scenario, Srivatsa et al. [167] explored how mobility traces can be
de-anonymized by matching their contact graph with the friendship graph of a social
network. While we use data about users’ friends to match individual user accounts, we
do not leverage the social network graph as a whole. The structure of the social network
graph is certainly a very powerful feature to match accounts. However, assuming that
we have access to the whole social graph is not practical if we want to build a real-time
and on-demand service that takes as input one account on a social network and searches
for the matching accounts on other social networks. Nevertheless, combined with other
features, these techniques might improve the matching accuracy. We leave this for future
works.
2A census block may correspond to a city block in urban areas, however in rural areas where there are
fewer roads, blocks may be limited by other features.
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Researchers have also exploited other features for de-anonymizaiton. Wondracek et al. [193]
identified users who visit a malicious web site by matching their browser history against
group memberships in Facebook. Language models have been used for data de-anonymization.
For example, Nanavati et al. [135] used language distribution at the n-gram level to de-
anonymize reviews in an anonymous review process. Two other recent studies showed that
text posted on blogs can be de-anonymized [136] and that online reviews could be matched
across different sites [128]. We use the language models as an additional feature to match
accounts.
2.4 Matching accounts across social networks
We now review the line of research more closely related to our work. Studies from different
research communities have tackled the problem of matching accounts across social networks
based on different features extracted from users’ accounts. Most of these studies, however,
were not evaluated at large scale on real social networks where the challenges reside. Con-
sequently, even if most prior studies achieved good matching performance when evaluated
at small scale, their methods will behave poorly when applied to today’s social networks
with millions to a billion of users. Moreover, no prior work analyzed the robustness of
their schemes to impersonation attacks. In this section we classify matching schemes by
the type of information they exploit.
2.4.1 Matching accounts using private user data
Balduzzi et al. [15] matched accounts on different social networks using the “Friend Finder”
mechanism that social networks provide for users to find their friends using their email
addresses. The study matched accounts with a list of 10 million e-mail addresses. As
e-mail addresses satisfy all the four ACID properties3 (Availability, Consistency, non-
Impersonability and Discriminability), this is a simple yet powerful technique for matching
accounts. In fact, this is what we use for obtaining our ground truth in Chapter 3. Many
sites, however, view Friend Finder as leaking users’ private data and have since limited the
number of queries a user can make. Therefore, we focus on matching accounts using only
public attributes.
2.4.2 Matching accounts using public user data
A number of previous studies have leveraged different profile features to match accounts
without a systematic understanding of their ACID properties. Consequently, some of
these studies use features with low availability and thus can only match a small fraction
of accounts across social networks. Even the studies that used features with good ACID
properties fail to achieve a reliable and scalable matching. In addition, most of the studies
use ground truth users that willingly publish links to their accounts on different social
networks. Our analysis in §4.1 reveals that such datasets have a higher attribute availability
3Remember that to guarantee a scalable and reliable matching an ideal features needs to satisfy all four
properties.
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and consistency, consequently the accuracy results of such schemes are overly optimistic.
We split these studies according to the type of attributes they use.
Leveraging user profile attributes
A number of schemes leverage user profile attributes [6, 122, 134, 140, 145, 147, 148, 154,
184, 195] similar to the attributes we use for matching. Irani et al. [77] showed that one
could potentially match accounts by searching for accounts where the screen names (the
user loggin) were simple variations of the users’s name. Perito et al. [148] showed that
accounts can be matched by exploiting the similarity between their screen names. Liu et
al. [118] used a very similar strategy to match users across different forums. Since the
same screen name can correspond to different users, both Liu et al. [118] and Perito et
al.’s [148] exploited the uniqueness of screen names to increase the accuracy of matching.
Zafarani et al. [197, 198] proposed more sophisticated methods to detect if two screen
names correspond to the same person by assuming that users follow the same practices
in choosing their screen names across social networks. This assumptions is not valid on
social networks, like Facebook and LinkedIn, that automatically generate screen names
from the real names of users. The work by Motoyama et al. [134] is the first that showed
the potential for matching accounts using profiles attributes (e.g., location, occupation,
university, gender) aiming to assist users to find their friends when they join a new social
network. The scheme considers attributes as bags of words and computes the similarity
between two accounts as the number of common words between profile attributes. The bag
of words technique is known to have a low recall because it cannot account for common
entities that have slightly different names. For example, it cannot detect that the Bay Area
and Berkeley are actually referring to the same area. Other studies [147, 154, 184] defined
more specialized text based metrics for measuring the similarity between different fields
and used classifiers to distinguish between matching and non-matching accounts. These
techniques [118,134,147,148,154,184,197,198] have only been evaluated using small-scale
datasets. We simulate these approaches in §4.2, and we see that they are prone to give
many false matches when used at scale.
A few recent studies performed account matching at scale [6, 122, 145]. These studies
pointed out that account matching at large scale yields a large number of false matches.
They do not, however, propose any mechanism to tackle the low reliability of their schemes.
In contrast, we conduct a systematic analysis of the causes of such false matches and our
scheme presented in Chapter 4 eliminates them.
Acquisti et al. studied the power of face recognition algorithms to match accounts in a
dating site to Facebook accounts [6]. Even though the study showed that face recogni-
tion algorithms can match 10% of the accounts, it also acknowledged that face detection
algorithms need to lower their false positives to be usable at large scale. Our matching
scheme uses photo similarity to detect if two photos are the same but it does not use face
recognition. Face recognition algorithms work very good when we have access to multiple
photos to train the classifiers, however, unfortunately, in many social networks we only
have access to one training instance, the profile photo. Adding face recognition could lead
to improvements in matching accuracy, however, the challenge is to build face recognition
algorithms that work well with only one training instance.
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Leveraging user friends
To give more relevant information when searching people on the web, You et al. [195]
proposed a scheme to link people’s names to their social identities. Their scheme discrimi-
nates between candidate social identities by matching the relational graph of co-occurrences
of names, extracted from EntityCube4, to the friends graph. Similar with our matching
scheme, they propose a notion of confidence in the match. The algorithm, however, only
works for people with notable web presence that have an entry in the relational graph thus
the scalability is limited. In contrast, our scheme in Chapter 4 finds matching accounts for
arbitrary users.
Labitzke et al. [110] showed that the overlap between friends can be used to match ac-
counts on social networks. Our results confirm that friendship overlap is an important
feature for detecting matching accounts and we use it to complement the other features
extracted from user accounts. Similar with efforts in de-anonymizing graphs, Korula and
Lattanzi mathematically formalize the problem of matching accounts across social net-
works and propose an algorithm that uses the friendship graph to match accounts [95].
As we discussed in §2.1.2, researchers have propose algorithms to jointly predict links and
infer attributes in social networks. Bartunov et al. [16] took this approach further and
proposed a joint link-attribute algorithm to match two social networks. The structure of
the networks can be used to infer missing attributes; while profile attributes can be used
to link matching nodes. The authors, however, only evaluated the algorithm on one-hop
neighbors. As we already discussed, the structure of the social graph is certainly a powerful
feature and, combined with other features, it might improve the overall matching accuracy.
Nevertheless, we leave this for future work.
Leveraging user activity traces
Other schemes use attributes extracted from user activities (i.e., the content users generate
instead of attributes of the profile) [76, 128]. These schemes reveal how even innocuous
activities of users can help identify a user across social networks. Mishari et al. [128] showed
that the authors of online reviews could be linked across different sites by exploiting the
writing style of the authors. Finally, Iofciu et al. [76] used tags to match accounts between
Delicious and Flickr. In Chapter 5, we also exploit information from user activities to
match accounts. We show that the locations from where users post and the time when
users post are much better at matching accounts than the writing style when considering
social networks where users do not post long sentences such as Twitter and Flickr.
To conclude, there are two main points to consider when building and evaluating a scalable
and reliable matching scheme. First, for a scheme to be scalable it has to disambiguate the
matching account out of a list of similar-looking accounts. Most of the current schemes
build (and evaluate) their classifiers using data that contains half matching accounts and
half non-matching accounts chosen at random. Non-matching accounts chosen at random
are likely very different, and thus very easy to identify as non-matching. Even if such
classifiers show good results their performance drops drastically, when they have to disam-
biguate between similar looking accounts (they will return a high number of false positives).
4http://entitycube.research.microsoft.com/
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In Chapter 4, we show that, to obtain an accurate classifier, one has to train the classifier
with pairs of non-matching accounts that are not easy to identify. Second, from a relia-
bility point of view, a scheme has to differentiate between cases where it is confident that
the most similar account is the matching account and cases where it is not confident. We
propose, in Chapter 4, a method to evaluate this confidence in the match.
2.5 Security threats in social networks
In this thesis we want to identify impersonation attacks in social networks. Since attack-
ers are actually creating fake accounts to impersonate people, we review in this section
the research done in detecting fake accounts online. We then focus on identity theft at-
tacks.
Today, most online services including social networking services, allow users to create
accounts for free or at very little cost. All these services are based on a weak notion of
identity where it is hard to map an identity to a real entity. In such a setup, it is a
challenge to distinguish trustworthy from untrustworthy users (e.g., spammers). This task
is especially hard because an attacker can exploit weak identities to create multiple fake
identities and manipulate the functioning of the system. For example, an attacker can
create multiple fake accounts to manipulate content ratings or to send spam. It is well
known that spam and service abuse is a standing problem [25]. Below we discuss three
broad existing approaches to detect fake identities.
Behavioral profiling
Is one of the most widely used approach today where given some ground-truth information
about known trusted and untrusted users, the service provider can build a behavioral profile
for each class of users. A behavioral profile for an account approximately characterizes the
activities of an account within that service and may also characterize the content generated
or consumed by the account. Activity within a service can include, for example, the act of
sending messages to other identities, viewing pages, or rating a particular piece of content.
Once we have constructed such a behavioral profile, we can use it to classify unknown
accounts as being either trusted or untrusted. The typical way to build behavioral profiles
of accounts is through machine learning approaches. While researchers have proposed
several techniques [17, 200], the industry has also adopted this strategy. Facebook has
built a tool called the Immune System [169] to identify attackers. All techniques used
so far to detect fake accounts rely solely on information available about a single user
identity. We will see in Chapter 6 that such techniques fail to detect the fake accounts
created by impersonators. A better approach to detect such accounts is to use features
that characterize pairs of accounts (the impersonating and the real account) rather than
features of that characterize only the fake account.
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Leveraging trust between identities
To assess trustworthiness of identities, one type of information typically available on social
networks is trust relationship between identities. This relationship can be explicitly defined
when two identities mutually trust each other and form a friendship relationship, or it could
be implicitly estimated based on the amount of interaction between two identities (e.g.,
identities that talk to each other frequently or tag each other in photos might trust each
other more). We can build a trust network between identities using this information,
where each edge in the network represents trust. Researchers have proposed a variety of
schemes such as SybilGuard [196] and SybilRank [25] that analyze such trust networks to
assess trustworthiness of identities and thus identify Sybil attackers [181,183,196]. The key
assumption here is that an attacker cannot establish an arbitrary number of trust edges
with honest or good users in the network. It should be noted that such a trust network is
entirely built based on information available within a single site. This assumption breaks
when we have to deal with impersonating accounts as for them it is much easier to link to
good users.
Crowdsourcing misbehavior detection
A third approach to identify suspicious identities is to crowdsource this task. Many social
networking services rely on end users to report suspicious profiles or actions taken by users
(e.g., message postings) to the service provider. End users make the judgement to report
suspicious actions or profiles solely based on information available to them within that
site. Furthermore, a recent study that examined crowdsourced misbehavior detection by
end users in a social network reported that such reports tend to be false alarms most of
the time [25].
Another variation of this approach is to crowdsource this task to experts who are familiar
with identifying suspicious profiles or actions. Social networking services typically have a
tiered approach where suspicious profiles reported by end users are further verified by a
group of experts before taking a decision to suspend the account or show Captchas to those
suspicious users [25]. In fact, researchers recently explored the possibility of using online
crowdsourcing services such as Amazon Mechanical Turk (AMT) to crowdsource the task
of detecting sybil identities in a social network [185]. In Chapter 6, we will see that AMT
workers have a very poor accuracy in detecting impersonating accounts because they are
extremely similar to real accounts.
Identity theft
Traditional methods to detect fake accounts fail to detect impersonators. Recently, re-
searchers have become interested in detecting identity theft attacks. Identity theft attacks
are also known as profile cloning or identity cloning. The attacker creates a fake account
that clones the information of a victim account. The attacker then uses the fake account to
send friend requests to the victim’s friends. The goal of such attack is to launch phishing
attacks or to harvest sensitive information about the victim. Bilge et al. [22] demonstrated
the feasibility of automated profile cloning attacks both inside the same social network
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and across different social networks. We consider identify theft attacks as a subclass of
impersonation attacks. By impersonation attacks, we mean all the attacks that create
fake accounts impersonateing another person, whatever the reason. The fake accounts can
be either used to acquire sensitive information about the victim, to spread wrong rumors
about a celebrity, or just to avoid fake account detection systems.
A few studies made some initial investigation about detecting profile cloning [84,93]. They
hinted at the fact that cloned profiles can be identified by searching for profiles with similar
attribute values. None of the prior works, however, has done a systematic study of how
to search for profiles with similar attributes and what is the accuracy of the approach for
detecting cloned profiles in real social networks. To protect against friend requests coming
from cloned profiles, He et al. [70] proposed three strategies: (1) use a challenge – upon
receiving a friend request, the users can chat to confirm their identities; (2) use a single
account such as OpenID to connect to multiple social networks; (3) verify the number of
mutual friends. The detection of impersonation attacks shares common techniques with
the detection of identity theft attacks. However, we do not stop at detecting a group of
similar looking accounts with a victim account, we propose an algorithm that detects with
high accuracy when two accounts correspond to the same person or not. Furthermore, our
proposed method can discriminate between pairs of accounts that are avatars (multiple
honest accounts maintained by the same person inside a social network) and pairs of
accounts where one account corresponds to an impersonator and one account corresponds
to an honest user.
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Chapter 3
Account Matching Framework
In this chapter, we set the general framework for matching accounts. We define the problem
of matching accounts across social networks (§3.1), and we then list the constraints imposed
by our scenario (§3.2). One important design consideration for our matching problem is
to build reliable and scalable matching schemes that perform well even when applied in
large-scale networks with hundreds of millions of users. For this we identify four crucial
properties – Availability, Consistency, non-Impersonability, Discriminability (ACID) –
that features need to satisfy to enable reliable and scalable account matching (§3.3). This
chapter also presents our ground truth data in §3.4 and our strategies to evaluate the
matching schemes in §3.5. Chapters 4 and 5 will go into the technical details of building
the matching schemes.
3.1 The matching problem: definition
Given an account in one large social network, a ∈ SN1, the account matching scheme
attempts to find its matching account in another large social network, aˆ ∈ SN2, if one
exists. We consider two accounts to be matching if they are managed by the same person,
i.e., user(a) = user(aˆ). We assume that there is at most one matching account to a user
in any given social network, an assumption that is rooted in the usage policies of many
social networks like Facebook [142].
To match accounts across social networks, we will to exploit all kinds of information users
publicly provide in their profiles such as their real names, screen names, location, profile
photos, friends as well as what they post. We call the information users provide about
themselves in their profiles (e.g., real names, screen names, location, profile photo, bio)
the public attributes and everything that is related with their activity on a social networks
(e.g., what they post, what they like) the user activity.
An alternative could be to match accounts based on private information in user profiles.
For example, an attacker could gain illegal access to users’ private information when users
inadvertently access a malicious site or application. Such approaches raise some serious
privacy and security concerns. However, gaining illegal access to users accounts requires
users to visit some malicious sites. These techniques are usually specific to a single social
network and cannot be reused on other social networks. As soon as the social network
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owners discover the security vulnerability that is exploited by the attacker they fix it.
Therefore, this thesis only considers public information. Public information is essential for
the purpose of the social network.
We tackle two specific variations of the problem:
- Is it possible to match accounts across different social networks only using the infor-
mation users provide in their public profiles such as their real name, screen name,
profile photo, friends and location?
−→ Chapter 4
- If we ignore all profile attributes, can we still match accounts by exploiting the user
activity (e.g. from where users post, at what time users post and what are the
specificities of their writing style)?
−→ Chapter 5
The matching scheme that exploits public attributes will be mainly able to match accounts
of users that maintain the same persona across different social networks and do not neces-
sarily want to hide. This matching scheme can be used in the future as a building block for
applications that exploit cross-site information. On the other hand, the matching scheme
that exploits the user activity can be used to target users that want to hide and maintain
different personas across social networks. For example, this matching scheme can be part
of a suite that helps users measure their online footprint to better understand their privacy
risks.
3.2 The matching problem: challenges
There are several challenges to match accounts in todays social networks that make the
problem both interesting and difficult:
1. Information users provide is noisy. First, users might not provide the same kind
of information on different social networks. For example one user might choose to
show his location on Facebook while he keeps his location private on Flickr. Second,
even if the users provide the same kind of information across different social networks,
they might not be consistent. For example, one user who moved, might update his
location only on Facebook while leaving his old location on Twitter.
2. At large scale, the chances that two users have similar profiles grows.
While in a small dataset there might be just one Jennifer Clark in San Francisco, if
we consider all the accounts in a social network, there might be tens or hundreds of
Jennifer Clarks.
3. Attackers create accounts attempting to impersonate other users. If a
matching scheme does not handle such cases, it risks matching the account of a real
person to the account of an impersonator.
4. Social networks have restricted APIs to access/query user accounts. If
we want to build a matching scheme that works in practice, we have to take these
restrictions into account.
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5. Data imbalance: There are many more possible non-matching accounts than match-
ing accounts. If not handled correctly, data imbalance creates problems for both
training and evaluating classifiers.
3.3 The matching problem: scalability and reliability
A matching scheme that aims to match accounts over large real-world social networks like
Facebook and Twitter must be reliable and scalable. By scalable, we refer to the challenge
of finding a single account (say on Facebook) that matches a given account (say on Twitter)
from potentially hundreds of millions of user accounts. By reliable, we refer to the challenge
of matching accounts with a very low error rate, i.e., very few false positives. It is crucial for
an account matching scheme to be reliable, as in most application scenarios (e.g., profiling
a prospective employee) incorrect matches could be worse than simply failure to match.
Thus, it is better for a matching scheme to return nothing rather then to return an account
when it is not highly confident that the account is a true match. The difficulty of achieving
highly reliable matching gets magnified with the scale (size) of the social network. In a
social network with hundreds of millions of accounts, there is a non-trivial chance that
there exist multiple accounts with very similar features leading to false matches.
3.3.1 The ACID test for scalable and reliable matching
Any scheme for matching accounts works by matching features of the accounts on different
sites. The reliability and scalability of the scheme depends crucially on the features selected
for matching the accounts. To achieve reliability and scalability for matching accounts, we
identified four key properties that an ideal feature should have:
• Availability: To scale account matching, the selected features should be available
for a large fraction of user accounts across the different sites. For example, if only
5% of users provided information about their ‘age’ across two sites, then ‘age’ has
limited utility in matching accounts.
• Consistency: It is crucial that the selected feature is consistent across different
matching accounts, i.e., that users provide the same feature values across the different
accounts they manage. If users provided different values for their “name” across the
different sites, then “name” would not be useful in matching accounts.
• non-Impersonability: If a feature can be easily impersonated, i.e., faked, then
attackers can compromise the reliability of the matching by creating fake accounts
that appear to be matching with the victim’s accounts on other sites. Some public
features like ‘name’ and ‘profile photo’ are easier to copy and impersonate than others
such as ‘friends’.
• Discriminability: A highly discriminating feature would have a unique and different
value for each account, while a less discriminating feature would have similar values
for many accounts. For example, ‘name’ is likely to be more discriminating than
‘location’ and ‘gender’. The more discriminating a feature, the lower the chances
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of a false match with other non-matching accounts and the higher the reliability of
matching.
To enable reliable correlation, the selected feature should be highly Available, Consistent,
non-Impersonable, and Discriminable (ACID). If a feature satisfies these four ACID prop-
erties, then matching accounts using the feature is trivial. Unfortunately, in practice, we
will see that no feature exhibits all four ACID properties. In Chapter 4, we will study
the ACID properties of attributes from public profiles and in Chapter 5 we will study the
ACID properties of user activity. Different account features satisfy the properties to dif-
ferent extents and the key challenge in reliable account matching schemes lies in designing
matching algorithms that can leverage multiple features with imperfect ACID properties
to achieve high reliability and scalability.
3.4 Ground truth data
Our analysis requires ground truth data of matching accounts, i.e., accounts belonging to
the same user, across different popular social networks. To evaluate our techniques in the
most challenging environments, we gather ground truth data on seven out of the most
popular and largest social networks today: Facebook, Twitter, Google+, LinkedIn, Flickr,
Yelp, and MySpace. Gathering ground truth data of matching accounts spanning multiple
social networks is difficult. Below we describe two methods that we used to obtain our
ground truth.
We first obtained ground truth data by exploiting “Friend Finder” mechanisms on many
social networks that allow a user to find her friends by their emails. We used a list of 10
million email addresses collected by colleagues for an earlier study analyzing spam email.1
To combat abuse, some social networks limit the number of queries one can make with
their “Friend Finder” mechanism and employ techniques to make an automated matching
of an email to an account ID impossible. Hence, we were only able to collect the email-
to-account ID matching for Twitter and Flickr. In addition, we obtained from colleagues
pairs of matching accounts among Twitter, Facebook, and LinkedIn, which they collected
for an earlier study using the same technique before the restrictions were introduced in the
query APIs [15].
Table 3.1 summarizes the number of matching accounts we obtained using the Friend
Finder mechanism (Dataset 1). Since spammers target the public at large, we believe
that this list of emails catches a representative set of users, but we are limited to only
five social networks. Therefore we complement Dataset 1 with a second, orthogonal set
that contains more social networks. We exploit the fact that Google+ allows users to
explicitly list accounts they have on other social networks on their Google+ profile pages.
We randomly crawled about 3 million Google+ accounts and arrived at the ground truth
set summarized in column Dataset 2 of Table 3.1, which reports the number of matching
accounts for different combinations of social networks.2 Google+ users, who voluntarily
reveal their accounts on other sites, might not represent users in general but we can use
1The local IRB approved the collection.
2Google+ proves easy to crawl as it provides an initial starting point in the form of a comprehensive
directory of all accounts, and does not block crawlers.
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Table 3.1: Number of ground truth matching accounts obtained with Friend Finder
(Dataset 1) and Google+ (Dataset 2) for different combinations of social networks.
Dataset 1 Dataset 2
Twitter - Facebook 4,182 76,332
LinkedIn - Facebook 2,561 20,145
Twitter - Flickr 18,953 35,208
LinkedIn - Twitter 2,515 20,439
Twitter - Yelp 1,889 5,130
Flickr - Yelp 1,119 2,899
LinkedIn - Flickr - 8,503
Twitter - Google+ - 205,709
Twitter - Myspace - 9,015
Facebook - Google+ - 164,333
Facebook - Myspace - 9,610
LinkedIn - Google+ - 32,827
LinkedIn - Myspace - 2,283
Myspace - Google+ - 36,440
Yelp - Google+ - 5,620
Twitter - Facebook - Google+ - 76,332
Twitter - Facebook - Myspace - 4,207
Twitter - Google+ - Myspace - 9,015
Facebook - Google+ - Myspace - 9,610
Twitter - Flickr - Yelp 559 2,753
these users to extend our study to other social networks and to a larger dataset. Note
that most of previous works used this kind of users as ground truth. In the rest of the
manuscript, by default, we show the values for accounts in Dataset 1 because they are
more representative. Generally, the matching accuracy for users in Dataset 2 is higher
than users in Dataset 1. We will pinpoint throughout the manuscript some of the most
interesting differences.
3.5 Evaluation method
In this section we present the evaluation methodology that we will use in Chapter 4 and
Chapter 5. We evaluate our matching schemes from three complementary perspectives.
First, we evaluate the accuracy over a small dataset. This evaluation method was used by
most of previous studies. However, we believe that the evaluation over a small dataset is a
misleading indicator of the accuracy over entire social networks. Thus, we also evaluate the
matching schemes at scale over entire social networks. Finally, we evaluate the matching
schemes against human workers.
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3.5.1 Evaluation metrics
We say that a matching scheme outputs a true match when it correctly identifies the match-
ing account and the scheme outputs a false match otherwise. To measure the accuracy
of a scheme we use two pairs of metrics: true and false positive rates, and precision and
recall. The recall and the true positive rate represent the proportion of true matches, i.e.,
the proportion of matching accounts detected by the scheme out of all the tested matching
accounts. The false positive rate is the proportion of non-matching accounts the scheme
mistakenly identifies as matching accounts out of all the non-matching accounts tested.
The precision is the number of true matches divided by the sum of true and false matches
the scheme returns. An accurate matching scheme has a high true positive rate and a low
false positive rate, or else, a high recall and precision. Even if the two pairs of metrics are
similar, when dealing with unbalanced datasets (i.e., the number of non-matching accounts
is much higher than the number of matching accounts), the precision/recall is a much bet-
ter indicator of the accuracy of a matching scheme than the true/false positive rate as
we will see later. We present both pairs of metrics to allow comparison with previous
work.
3.5.2 Evaluation over a small dataset
The evaluations over a small dataset has been the typical evaluation method for most
of the previous works that attempted to match accounts across social networks [118, 134,
147, 148, 154, 184, 197, 198]. Here we sample data to simulate this approach. We select n
random accounts on SN1 fromDataset 1 for which we know the corresponding n accounts
on SN2. We evaluate the accuracy of the matching scheme to identify the n pairs with
matching accounts out of the n2 possible combinations of pairs.
3.5.3 Evaluation at scale
The evaluation of matching schemes at scale requires access to all the accounts in a social
network, i.e., hundreds of millions of accounts, on large social networks like Facebook,
Twitter, or Google+. Obtaining such large datasets is very difficult. Instead, we resort
to an optimization where, for a given account in SN1, we preselect a candidate set of
accounts that are most similar to the given account on SN2 and evaluate the efficacy of
our schemes over the candidate set. Our assumption is that, if a matching scheme is able
to disambiguate the matching account out of a small set of very similar accounts, it will
most likely be able to disambiguate the matching account out of a larger set of less similar
accounts. Evaluating matching schemes over the candidate set rather than the set of all
accounts leads to an under-estimation of both the true positive rate (when the matching
account is missed from the candidate set) and the false positive rate (when one or more
non-matching accounts that are similar to the given account are missed). Our insight
is that such a candidate set of accounts can be generated by leveraging the search APIs
provided by social networks like Facebook.
We build next two separate datasets for the evaluation of matching schemes using user pro-
files (Chapter 4) and for the evaluation of matching schemes using user activities (Chap-
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ter 5).
Large scale dataset for matching schemes based on user profiles: We evaluate
the accuracy of matching schemes to find the corresponding Facebook account for a given
Twitter account. The matching method as well as the evaluation are not specific to these
social networks.
To build a test dataset to evaluate the scheme at large scale we generate, for each Twitter
account, a, the candidate set of the most similar Facebook accounts, C(a). A perfect
candidate set would include the Facebook matching account as well as all the Facebook
accounts that are similar with the target Twitter account, a. The Facebook search API
allows to search for people by name, however it is not possible to search by other attributes.3
Given that 84% of Twitter-Facebook matching accounts have consistent real names and
40% consistent screen names we can build a comprehensive candidate set by exploiting
the Facebook search API to find Facebook accounts with the same or similar real name or
screen name as the Twitter account. The Facebook search API mostly returns accounts
with the same name and only very few accounts with similar names. To get more accounts
with similar names, we apply a number of heuristics to the real name and the screen name
so that we can find accounts with simple variations of the name (for example, if the real
name is Franklin Delano Roosevelt, we will search for Franklin Delano, Delano Roosevelt,
and Franklin Roosevelt; if there is only one name as FranklinRoosevelt, we will try to split
it). Finally, we test whether there is a Facebook account with the exact same screen name
as the Twitter account. When the real name of the Twitter account is a single word, we
also check whether it is a screen name in Facebook.
We build Facebook candidate sets C(a) for 1,000 Twitter accounts from Dataset 1 (the
same we choose for the small dataset). The averages size of accounts in C(a) is 320. The
Facebook matching account is included in the candidate set for 70% Twitter accounts.4
This percentage is lower than the percentage of Facebook-Twitter matching accounts with
consistent real names, 84%, because Facebook mostly returns accounts with the same
name rather than similar names. This limitation is out of our control and has the following
implications on our system design and evaluation method: 1) if we build a real-time service
that finds the Facebook matching account for a given Twitter account, 70% will be an
upper bound on the percentage of accounts we can match regardless of the accuracy of the
matching scheme; 2) the true positive rate we estimate when matching at scale in the rest
of the paper is underestimated by a percentage up to 30%.
Large scale dataset for matching schemes based on user activities: For our
case study, we evaluate matching schemes to match Flickr or Yelp accounts to Twitter
accounts.
As for the previous dataset, we have to generate, for each account a ∈ SN1, a candidate set
of the most similar accounts in SN2, C(a). However, the dataset used to evaluate matching
scheme at scale using user profiles is not good for evaluating matching schemes based on
3Facebook actually allows to search for people in a particular location but the number of results returned
is limited to a few hundreds.
4This percentage is 82% for accounts in Dataset 2.
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user activities for two reasons. First, it mainly contains users that have consistent real
names across social networks, while we focus here on matching the accounts of users that
do not have consistent names. Second, since we use features extracted from user activities
such as the location and time of users’ posts and the users’ writing style, the dataset
previously generated will not contain the accounts in SN2 that are the most similar with
the target account a. The key to generate comprehensive candidate sets is to select the
accounts in SN2 based on the features considered for the matching. For example, if we
aim to match accounts by exploiting the location from of posts, we can assume that users
who post regularly within a certain region will most likely live there, and thus their posts
on other sites will originate from there as well. For each account a in SN1 we can build
the candidate set of accounts C(a) in SN2 by extracting all users of SN2 who have posted
from that region where a lives.
To build the dataset for evaluating the matching schemes at large scale to match Flickr to
Twitter accounts, we could, for each Flickr account, determine the dominant region (the
region where a user posts the most) and then collect all the Twitter accounts that have at
least one post in this region. Such approach requires us to collect separate sets C(a) for
each a, which will likely lead to gathering users from all around the world. Since there is
no Twitter API call that gives the list of users who posted in a certain region (as there is
a call to get all the users with a given name, which we used for the previous large scale
dataset) we resort to an optimization. We limit our evaluation to match users living in five
urban areas in the US (San Francisco, San Diego, New York, Chicago, and Los Angeles),
which allows us to use a single set Carea for all the ground truth accounts in each of these
areas. We define the subset of ground truth users, GTarea ⊂ Dataset 1, as those who
have more posts inside the respective area than outside it. Table 3.2 shows the number of
matching ground truth accounts in Dataset 1 in the five areas previously mentioned. We
filtered out all accounts that have no posts or no locations attached (considering addresses
for Yelp, and geotags otherwise).
For the evaluation, we focus on matching Flickr or Yelp accounts to their corresponding
Twitter accounts. We obtain the candidate sets Carea by crawling Twitter for users from
each of the five areas. We use the Streaming API5 to collect in real-time all the tweets
tagged with a location in one of the five areas between August and November of 2012.
We then extract all users that have at least one tweet in this collection. For the San
Francisco area, the Twitter matching account is included in the candidate set CSF for
75% of the Flickr accounts in GTSF (a set of users taken from the San Francisco for one
year achieves 95% coverage). This shows that our method to gather a comprehensive list
of accounts that are similar with a given target account based on location works well and
has a comparable coverage with what we previously had when using real names. Table 3.3
presents the number of users we collected for each area.
We evaluate the accuracy of the matching scheme to detect the Twitter matching account
aˆ of a given Yelp or Flickr account, a in GTarea, out of the candidate set, Carea. We
focus on matching Yelp and Flickr to Twitter accounts, but the same methods can be
applied to other social networks. It is also possible to gather candidate sets in Flickr and
Yelp. The Flickr API allows to search all photos with geotags in a certain region (defined
5While the Streaming API generally returns only a sample of tweets, limiting a query to a region the
size of, e.g., the San Francisco area seems to indeed return the complete set.
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Table 3.2: Number of Yelp and Flickr users in Dataset 1 (for which we know their
matching Twitter account) with more posts inside a given area than outside it, for 5
selected areas.
Number of users in
SF SD NY C LA
Flickr - Twitter 474 152 427 236 284
Yelp - Twitter 160 45 106 50 117
Table 3.3: Number of users in the Carea for five selected areas. † Users with at least one
post inside a given area; users may belong to multiple areas.
Carea in
SF† SD† NY† C† LA†
Twitter 75,747 35,068 89,219 54,774 77,402
as a latitude/longitude bounding box), which makes the collection of the candidate set
straightforward. For Yelp, we can retrieve a list of all restaurants in each of the areas and
then extract users that reviewed one of them.
We build the candidate set based on the feature used for matching. In principe, then, to
match accounts based on timing, we can select C(a) as those accounts for which we find a
temporal overlap with posts from a ∈ SN1. Instead, however, we also limit the language
and timestamp analyses to the datasets gathered using location so that we can evaluate
the combination of multiple features on the same set of users.
3.5.4 Evaluation against human workers
The evaluation over a small dataset and at scale measure the accuracy of the matching
schemes against the ground truth, which is the standard way to evaluate such schemes.
However, we can obtain a more interesting and different perspective by evaluating their
accuracy against human workers. The practice of employing human workers to do simple
tasks such as detecting fake or spam accounts is becoming more and more popular and is
used by companies like Facebook and Twitter. Humans are particularly good at such tasks
and are often much better than machines [186]. We can consider human workers as a gold
standard for matching accounts because they are very good at identifying persons. Thus,
in this evaluation, we focus on understanding: (1) how well humans can detect matching
accounts; and (2) which are the cases where the matching scheme performs worst than
humans and where it performs better.
3.6 Summary
In this chapter, we setup the matching account framework: we defined the problem of
matching accounts, we described the challenges in matching accounts in todays’ social net-
works and we described our ground truth data and evaluation method. We proposed a set of
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four properties to evaluate the quality of features used for the matching in order to achieve
reliable and scalable matching schemes – Availability, Consistency, non-Impersonability
and Discriminability. We also proposed a novel evaluation method that allows to put in
perspective the accuracy of matching schemes by comparing results against humans as well
as comparing the results at small scale vs. large scale. Chapter 4 and Chapter 5 will use
this framework to build and evaluate matching schemes.
Chapter 4
Matching Accounts using Public
Profile Attributes
In this chapter we investigate ways to match accounts across social networks by exploiting
the information users provide in their public profiles. One important design consideration
for our matching problem is to build reliable and scalable matching schemes that perform
well even when applied in large-scale networks with hundreds of millions of users.
Given an account in one social network, say a, we leverage multiple public attributes of
the account (specifically, real name, screen name, location, profile photo, and friends) to
find its matching account in another social network. We first study the ACID properties of
these features (see §4.1). Our analysis reveals that they satisfy the ACID requirements to
different extents, but none of the features alone satisfies all requirements. We then inves-
tigate the challenges of leveraging multiple public attributes to build a reliable matching
scheme.
We present a scheme that matches accounts using a binary classifier, called the Linker,
trained to distinguish between matching accounts and random non-matching accounts
(§4.2). This training approach is similar to what prior work has done. Unfortunately, we
show that the Linker has limited scalability. We then propose a new matching scheme
(§4.3) that proceeds in three steps to work at scale. First, we filter the majority of accounts
that are clearly different from a. Second, we build a classifier, calledDisambiguator, that
is able to distinguish between matching accounts and other similar non-matching accounts.
The Disambiguator is solving a harder problem than the Linker, because it is trying to
distinguish among accounts that are highly similar. Third, based on the assumption that
there is only one matching account on the second social network, we process the results from
the Disambiguator to ensure that the matching scheme is reliable to impersonators and
to achieve a better precision. The key distinguishing features of this three-step matching
scheme are its reliability and scalability. This scheme can accurately estimate its confidence
in the match and abstains from producing an output when it is uncertain. Contrary to
the one-step matching scheme, the three-step matching scheme has good accuracy at scale
and is therefore usable in practice.
We evaluate the performance of the three-step matching scheme on two of the largest
real-world social networks: Twitter and Facebook. Our results show that the three-step
matching scheme can correctly detect 21% of matching accounts with a 98% precision (or
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alternatively, a 30% recall for a 92% precision). These numbers reflect the real fraction of
accounts we can match, at scale, without shortcuts and considering all the limitations im-
posed by the query interfaces of social networks. We further confirm the inherent difficulty
in reliably matching accounts by comparing the performance of our automated matching
scheme with that of human Amazon Mechanical Turk (AMT) workers. Under similar
conditions, AMT workers are able to match 25% of the accounts with a 98% precision.
Interestingly, when we evaluated the matching scheme over small subsets of Facebook ac-
counts containing a few thousands accounts as in previous work, it detects 83% with 89%
precision. Our analysis highlights the true costs of achieving high reliability in account
matching schemes at large-scale.
It is certainly possible to improve detection by using more account features (beyond the
public attributes we considered) and more sophisticated matching techniques (e.g., better
face matching techniques) in the account matching schemes. We consider, however, that
our main contributions consist in identifying the challenges in achieving a scalable and
reliable matching and proposing a set of fundamental design considerations to meet these
challenges.
4.1 ACID test of public attributes
In this section we analyze the extent to which public attributes satisfy the ACID test
requirements. We perform this analysis for six large scale social networks to understand
the potential of matching accounts across different sites.
4.1.1 Attribute availability
We begin by examining the availability of public attributes across the six social networks
in our ground truth. We focus on five attributes that are supported by all sites: screen
name (aka. username, nickname – name that appears in the URL of the profile), real
name, location, profile photo, and friends. The availability of these attributes depends on
whether users choose to provide information about them. In some sites, users can choose
to make some of these attributes private, which also affects their availability.
For all users in our ground truth datasets, we collected their publicly visible attributes
from their accounts on the six social networks. Table 4.1 shows the breakdown of attribute
availability per social network. We highlight three implications of attribute availability
results for matching accounts.
First, we find that some attributes like screen name and real name are considerably more
available than other attributes like location or friends. The more available attributes
are, the more useful they are in matching a larger number of accounts. However, the
availability of the less available attributes is not negligible – for example, location and
friends are available for more than 50% of accounts in Twitter and Facebook. In later
sections, we show how these partially available attributes can be used in conjunction with
highly available attributes to improve the accuracy of matching accounts.
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Table 4.1: Availability of attributes for a single social network and for pairs of social
networks for Dataset 1 and Dataset 2.
Legend: Tw = Twitter, Fb = Facebook, G+ = Google+, M = Myspace, Fl = Flickr,
Lnk = LinkedIn; X%/Y % = availability in the Dataset 2 availability in Dataset 1.
Whenever there is only one value it is for Dataset 2.
Real Name Profile Photo Location Friends
Twitter 100%/100% 96%/69% 80%/54% 91%/86%
Facebook 100%/100% 99%/98% - 58%/60%
Google+ 100% 80% 72% -
Myspace 20% 98% 26% -
Flickr 76%/30% 95%/29% 53%/11% 68%/40%
LinkedIn 100%/100% 54%/57% 98%/99% -
Fl - Tw 76%/31% 88%/24% 46%/8% 72%/35%
Fb - Lnk 100%/100% 53%/56% - -
Fb- Tw 100%/100% 94%/69% - 38%/48%
Lnk- Tw 100%/100% 52%/44% 84%/54% -
Fb - G+ 100% 91% - -
Fb - Fl 77% 88% - 20%
Fb - M 17% 89% - -
Tw - G+ 100% 90% 55% -
Tw - M 16% 85% 23% -
Lnk - Fl 79% 47% 56% -
Lnk - G+ 100% 52% 74% -
Lnk - M 16% 40% 37% -
Fl - G+ 76% 87% 39% -
Fl - M 12% 81% 21% -
G+ - M 20% 75% 22% -
Second, we find that the availability of the attributes varies considerably across the different
social networks. For example, users are more likely to provide their location information
on LinkedIn than they are on Facebook or Twitter. The differences in availability are
presumably due to the different ways in which users use these sites. For our purposes
here, it highlights the additional information one could learn about a user by matching
her accounts on different sites. Our observation also hints at the potential for iteratively
matching accounts across different sites, i.e., building a more complete profile of a user
by matching her accounts across some sites and useing the resulting profile with more
attributes to match her accounts on other sites.
Third, when we compare the availability using Dataset 1 and Dataset 2, we observe
that the availability of attributes for accounts in the Dataset 1 is much lower than the
availability for accounts in the Dataset 2. This has implications on the representativeness
of users in Dataset 2, and consequently the representativeness of the results in previous
works [122,136,145,148,198].
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4.1.2 Attribute consistency
We now study the extent to which users provide similar attribute values for their accounts
on different social networks. Some users deliberately provide different attribute values
either out of concerns for privacy or out of a desire to assume online personas different
from their oﬄine persona. It would be very hard to match the matching accounts of such
users by matching their attributes.
Amongst users who do not deliberately set different attribute values on different sites, many
users may not spend the effort needed to set their attributes to exactly the same values
across all sites. For example, a user might specify their work place as International Business
Machines on one site and International Business Machines Corporation on another site.
To profile for such scenarios where the attribute matching is not exact, we first propose
metrics for estimating similarity in attribute values for matching accounts and determine
thresholds for determining when two values are sufficiently similar.
Similarity metrics for attributes
We borrow a set of standard metrics from prior works in security, information retrieval,
and vision communities to compute similarity between values of the five public attributes
we study.
Name similarity: Previous work in the record linkage community showed that the Jaro
string distance is the most suitable metric to compare similarity between names both in
the oﬄine and online worlds [36,148]. So we use the Jaro distance to measure the similarity
between real names and screen names.
Photo similarity: Estimating photo similarity is tricky as the same profile photo can
come in different formats on multiple social networks. To measure the similarity of two
photos while accounting for image transformations, we use two matching techniques: (i)
perceptual hashing, a technique originally invented for identifying illegal copies of copy-
righted content that works by reducing the image to a transformation-resilient “finger-
print” containing its salient characteristics [3] and (ii) SIFT, a size invariant algorithm
that detects local features in an image and checks if two images are similar by counting
the number of local features that match between two images [120].
We use two different algorithms because the perceptual hashing technique does not cope
well with some images that are resized, while the SIFT algorithm does not cope well
with computer generated images. Thus, having two algorithms makes the detection more
robust.
Location similarity: For all accounts, we have the textual representations of the pro-
files’ location such as the name of a city. However, as social networks use different formats
for this information, we cannot just perform a textual comparison. Instead, we convert the
location to latitude/longitude coordinates by submitting them to the Bing API [1]. We
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then compute the similarity score between two locations as the actual geodesic distance
between the corresponding coordinates.
Friends similarity: The similarity score is the number of common friends between two
accounts. We consider that two accounts have a common friend if there is an account with
the same screen name or real name in both friend lists. A more complex but potentially
more accurate method would have been to apply our approach recursively by taking other
features beside screen name and real name into account. We will see later, however, that
given two small list of accounts on different social networks, real names and screen names
are already very good alone to identify matching accounts. Thus, we limit ourselves to the
simpler approach in this thesis.
Selecting thresholds for attribute consistency
Clearly the more similar two values of an attribute, the greater the chance that the values
are consistent, i.e., they refer to the same entity, be it a name or photo or location. Our
goal is to select thresholds for attribute similarity beyond which the chance of two values
being consistent is quite high (say larger than 90%).
To this end, we gathered ground truth data by asking humans (AMT users) to evaluate
whether pairs of attribute values are consistent or not. We randomly selected 100 pairs
each of matching and non-matching Twitter and Facebook accounts from Dataset 1 and
asked AMT users to compare their corresponding attribute values for consistency. We
followed the guidelines [9] to ensure good quality results from AMT workers. For each pair
of attribute values, workers had to choose between 3 answers: (i) Yes, they match; (ii)
No, they do not match; and (iii) Cannot say, the information is not available. For each
attribute value pair, we ask the opinion of three different AMT workers and consider that
the values are consistent if there is a majority agreement that these values match.
We leverage the AMT experiments to select the similarity thresholds to declare two values
as consistent. Specifically, we select similarity thresholds, such that more than 90% of the
consistent values, as identified by AMT workers, and less than 10% of the inconsistent
values have higher similarities. We only use thresholds to study the consistency and not
to match accounts. The matching algorithm uses the similarity scores between attributes
directly.
Attribute consistency in matching accounts
We now use the similarity metrics and thresholds defined in the previous section to evaluate
whether attribute values in matching accounts are consistent.
Table 4.2 shows how likely users are to provide consistent values for an attribute in a pair
of social networks. We highlight three implications of our consistency analysis for matching
accounts.
First, we find that large fraction of users provide similar real names across the different so-
cial networks. Put differently, most users are not attempting to maintain distinct personas
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Table 4.2: Consistency of attributes for pairs of social networks for Dataset 1; † consis-
tency extracted from Dataset 2.
Screen Name Real Name Location Profile Photo
Fb - Tw 40% 84% 22% 19%
Fb - Lnk 71% 97% 17% 23%
Tw - Fl 40% 84% 32% 22%
Tw - Lnk 36% 83% 28% 31%
Fb - Tw† 60% 88% 77% 26%
Fb - Lnk† 80% 98% 81% 23%
Tw - Fl† 56% 89% 71% 31%
Tw - Lnk† 57% 89% 70% 36%
Fb - Fl † 48% 94% 30% 20%
Fb - G+ † 59% 94% 65% 20%
Fb - M † 46% 77% 43% 13%
Tw - G † 50% 85% 62% 31%
Tw - Lnk † 57% 89% 29% 36%
Lnk - Fl † 48% 95% 33% 29%
Lnk - G † 65% 97% 67% 35%
Lnk - M † 54% 76% 56% 23%
Fl - G † 42% 94% 63% 31%
Fl - M † 43% 78% 49% 27%
G - M † 44% 70% 51% 20%
on different sites. This trend bodes well for our ability to match the different accounts of a
user. Note that even if real names have such high consistency, we will see that they cannot
be used alone to match accounts at scale because there can be multiple people sharing
the same name. We also computed the percentage of matching accounts in Twitter and
Facebook for which all public attributes in Table 4.2 are inconsistent. We find that there
are 7% of such users. These users are likely assuming different personas on different sites
and it is very hard, if not impossible, to match their accounts using only the public at-
tributes that we consider in this chapter. Thus, we can at most hope to correlate accounts
for 93% of users. This percentage represents an upper bound on the performance of public
attribute-based matching schemes.
Second, some attributes such as real name are considerably more consistent than others
such as location.
Third, the consistency differs between different social networks. Twitter and Facebook
have consistencies among the lowest.
4.1.3 Attribute discriminability
We now investigate the discriminability of attributes, by which we refer to the extent to
which different values of an attribute can be used to distinguish a single account from all
other accounts in a social networking site.





















































































































Figure 4.1: Discriminability of attributes: CDFs of similarity scores between Twitter and
Facebook matching accounts and non-matching accounts from Dataset 1.
We can evaluate the discriminability of an attribute by comparing the similarity in attribute
values between accounts that belong to different users with the similarity in attribute values
between accounts that belong to the same user.
We randomly sample 1,000 Twitter and Facebook matching accounts and 1,000 non-
matching accounts from Dataset 1 and we compute attribute similarity scores between
all the account pairs. Figure 4.1a shows the CDF of real name similarity scores for match-
ing and non-matching accounts between Twitter and Facebook. The X-axis represents
the similarity scores, where zero means no similarity and one means perfect similarity.
Figures 4.1b to 4.1f show the CDFs for other features. For location, zero means perfect
similarity because it corresponds to locations that have the same latitudes and longitudes.
For friends, zero similarity means no friends in common. Results for other pairs of social
networks are similar, and are therefore omitted.
For the real name and screen name we see a clear distinction between distributions of
matching and non-matching accounts. Non-matching accounts systematically have simi-
larities around 0.5 while matching accounts have similarities around 1. This suggests that
these features have a high discriminability, i.e., are efficient at separating matching and
non-matching accounts. Note that, even if the discriminability of real names is very high,
when considering entire social networks, there can be a non negligible number of users with
the same name. For photo, the two distributions are generally similar, with many scores
around 0.5 for Phash algorithm (this is a typical score returned by the perceptual hashing
method for unrelated photos). The photo does not have a very good overall discriminability
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because there are not many matching accounts that use the same profile photo. Location
and friends also have a good discriminability between matching and non-matching accounts
although it is lower than the discriminability of real names and screen names.
4.1.4 Attribute impersonability
There is an emerging trend of malicious attackers and spammers that create fake accounts
to impersonate honest users. Since one can use any values to fill the profile information
when creating an account on a social networks, it is very easy to impersonate users. At-
tributes such as real name, location, bio or profile photo are all very easy to impersonate.
Screen names are harder to impersonate because they are unique in a social network, so the
impersonator cannot have the same screen name with the honest user. Finally, friends are
the hardest attribute to impersonate, out of the ones we consider in this chapter, because
for an attacker it is very hard to establish links to good users [26].
4.2 One-step matching scheme
The ACID test, described in §4.1, helps us understand the quality, from a matching point
of view, of public attributes. None of the public attributes satisfy all the ACID properties,
however each property is satisfied by at least one attribute. In this section, we make a
first attempt to build a solution to our matching problem by combining all the attributes
together so that we can obtain a matching scheme that satisfies all the ACID properties.
The one-step matching scheme aims to simulate previous approaches to match accounts.
However, instead of just using previous algorithms, we opt to improve them and build the
best possible configuration for the one-step matching scheme.
4.2.1 Design of the scheme
Recall from §3.1 that our problem definition is: given a account in one large social network,
a ∈ SN1, find its matching account in another large social network, aˆ ∈ SN2, if it exists. We
can reduce this problem to an easier problem: given two accounts on two social networks,
a ∈ SN1 and b ∈ SN2, determine whether b is a’s matching account. We design the
Linker to solve this problem. Then, given an account a ∈ SN1, we can use the Linker
to check, for every pair of accounts (a, b) such that b ∈ SN2, whether b is a’s matching
account. We can then return any account b that the Linker declares as matching as the
result of our general account matching problem.
4.2.2 The Linker
We design the Linker as a binary classifier that determines whether two accounts on
different social networks, a ∈ SN1 and b ∈ SN2, belong to the same user or not.
Input: An account a ∈ SN1 and an account b ∈ SN2.
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Output: A binary answer whether b is a’s matching account, and the probability they
are matching accounts.
Objective: Correctly identify matching accounts without mistakenly identifying non-
matching accounts as matching accounts, i.e., maximize true positive rate while keeping
false positive rates very low.
Conception: We build a binary classifier that takes as input a feature vector f(a, b) that
captures the similarity between each attribute of a pair of accounts (a, b), where a ∈ SN1
and b ∈ SN2; and then outputs 1 if b is a’s matching account; and 0, otherwise. We
represent (a, b) with five features each corresponding to the similarity score between a and
b for each of the five account attributes: real name, screen name, location, photo, and
friends.
Realization: Dataset 1 contains ground truth on matching accounts, which we use
to train the binary classifier. We build a training set with 1,000 samples of Twitter and
Facebook matching accounts from Dataset 1 and with 1,000 samples of non-matching
accounts chosen at random from Dataset 1. The Twitter and Facebook accounts used
for training are different than the accounts used for evaluating the matching schemes (i.e,
accounts used for testing). We use 10-fold cross validation to train the classifiers.
Matching accounts across social networks is very challenging for standard classification
methods, because (as discussed in §4.1.2) user accounts may be incomplete (users may
choose to omit their location or photo). We must either work with classification tech-
niques that are robust to missing values or identify methods to impute the missing values.
We evaluate how well four classification techniques handle missing values: Naive Bayes,
Decision Trees, Logistic Regression, and SVM:
Naive Bayes decides if two accounts match based on the probability that each attribute’s
similarity score belongs to the matching class, assuming that the distribution of attribute
scores in each class is based on a kernel density estimation. The Naive Bayes classifier
has a natural way of handling missing values of a attribute: during training, attribute
instances with missing values will not be included in the attribute-value-class probability
computation. During testing, if a particular attribute vector has a missing attribute value,
then that attribute will be omitted from the prediction calculation.
Decision Trees decide if two accounts match by traversing a tree of questions until
they reach a leaf node; the leaf node then specifies the result. In our setting each node
represents a threshold for a given attribute; the classifier tests the input account against
that value and takes the appropriate branch. The most popular way to handle missing
attributes is at training time to only create branches on present values, and at testing to
take all the branches of the node representing the attribute whose value is missing and
then select the class with the highest frequency among the leafs. Decision Trees prove
useful for eliminating redundant attributes, and they allow to directly interpret results by
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Figure 4.2: Comparison of the performance of different classifiers (matching Flickr to
Twitter with combination of all attributes).
following the decision process. The drawback is that the decision boundaries are rough
because Decision Trees can only make horizontal and vertical splits.
Logistic Regression is a linear classifier that bases its decisions on a linear combination
of all the similarity scores of each attribute. Logistic Regression does not have a native way
of handling missing values, so they must be inputted. The most common way is to replace
missing values with the median, the mean of all existing attribute values or a values that
does not exists in the dataset (e.g., -1). We tested both methods and replacing with the
median value gives higher accuracy.
SVM is a large margin classifier that obtains the decision boundary with the largest
distance between matching and non-matching observations. Boundaries can either be linear
or not (kernel). Missing values are inputted in the same way as for Logistic Regression.
The imputation of missing values with -1 gives the best results.
Figure 4.2 presents ROC curves to compare the performance of different classifiers using the
Google+ dataset. The Naive Bayes and SVM classifiers (both linear and kernel) perform
the best, Logistic Regression is close to the first two while Decision Trees exhibit the lowest
performance for small false positive rates because of its rough decision boundaries to split
matches and non-matches. Since Naive Bayes takes much less time to compute than SVM
on our large data set, we use Naive Bayes for computing all results in this chapter.
SVM usually performs better than Naive Bayes in scenarios where all values are avail-
able, however its accuracy decreases due to missing values. Note that previous works
on matching social networks did not evaluate different classifiers with respect to missing
values.
Given a pair of accounts (a, b), our Naive Bayes classifier outputs the probability p that
b is a’s matching account. We select a cut-off threshold for p and the classifier returns 1
(i.e., matching accounts) if p is larger than the threshold; and 0 otherwise. The threshold’s
choice constitutes the standard tradeoff between true and false positive rates. We use 10-
fold cross validation on the training set to analyze the tradeoff. There is a clear distinction
between matching accounts and non-matching accounts: p is close to one for most matching
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accounts, whereas p is close to zero for the vast majority of non-matching accounts. If we
use a threshold of 0.94 for p and we consider all the pairs of accounts that have a probability
higher than 0.94 as being matching accounts and all the rest as non-matching accounts,
we detect 89% of the matching accounts with a false positive rate of 1%. We choose this
operational point because most of the previous works focused on false positive rates at this
scale.
4.2.3 Evaluation over a small dataset
To test the one-step matching scheme on the small dataset, we use the Linker to predict
whether each pair of Twitter-Facebook accounts match or not. As expected, the scheme
correctly identifies 89% of the matching accounts with 1% false positive rate. At a first
glance, these results are promising. However, at a closer look, these results translate into
a 89% recall for a 8% precision, i.e., only in 8% of the accounts output by the Linker
are actually matching accounts. This is due to the fact that the number of possible non-
matching accounts (∼ 1 million) is much larger than the number of matching accounts
1,000. Thus, even for a small dataset we have to choose a threshold for p that corresponds
to smaller false positive rates. For a threshold corresponding to a 10−3 false positive rate,
we get a 85% true positive rate and a 45% precision while for a 10−4 false positive rate, we
get a 83% true positive rate and a 89% precision. Thus, even for small datasets, to obtain
a reliable matching we need to focus on very small false positive rates.
Unfortunately, in large social networks like Facebook, Twitter, and Google+, where the
number of users is larger than 500 million, even a low false positive rate of 10−4 would still
lead to several hundreds false positives. Since accounts have a single matching account on
another site, distinguishing this single account from the haystack of hundreds of millions
of accounts poses a serious scalability challenge.
Due to the small size of the dataset, we cannot estimate true positive rates with false
positive rates lower than 10−4. To evaluate the scheme at scale, we use in next section the
method described in §3.5.3.
Takeaway: The one-step matching scheme can identify 83% of the matching accounts
with a 89% precision on a small-scale dataset.
4.2.4 Evaluation at scale
To evaluate the one-step matching scheme at scale, we use the Linker to determine the
corresponding Facebook account for a given Twitter account a. More precisely, we use
the Linker to determine whether every pair of accounts (a, b) where b ∈ C(a) match or
not where the candidate set C(a) is built as described in §3.5.3. We return all accounts
detected as matching as output. Ideally, the Linker should correctly identify the single
matching account and reject all the other accounts in the candidate set.
For the evaluation, we set a threshold probability for the Linker to declare an account as
matching at 0.99. For the small dataset of the previous section, this threshold corresponds
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Figure 4.3: CDF of the number of Facebook matching accounts identified by the Linker
for each Twitter account.
to a zero false-positive rate due to the small number of non-matching account. Here, it
will give a small number of false matches (see below).
True matches: Linker successfully identifies 66% of all matching Facebook accounts.
While this true positive rate is lower than the expected rate observed in §4.2, 83%, it is
due to our limitations in generating the candidate set. Recall that, the candidate sets we
generated contains the matching account only 70% of the time. With a more extensive
candidate set containing a larger fraction of matching accounts, the true positive rate would
likely improve.
False matches: Figure 4.3 shows the cumulative distribution of the number of Facebook
accounts in the candidate set that Linker identifies as matching to the Twitter accounts.
For more than 62% of Twitter accounts, Linker identifies 100 or more Facebook matching
accounts. Note that the number of matching accounts is likely to be higher with a more
extensive candidate set. Since there is only one matching account, our finding indicates that
more than 99 out of 100 accounts are false matches, i.e., the Linker has a ≈ 1% precision.
The high number of false matches highlights the reliability problem with applying Linker
to match accounts at scale.
The maximum precision the Linker can achieve, i.e., when we set the probability threshold
for detecting matches to 1 (the maximum possible), is 2.5% for a 50% recall. Note that,
while such precision is very low for a reliable matching scheme, we could potentially use
the Linker as a filtering step.
Takeaway: The maximum achievable precision of the Linker when evaluated at scale
is 2.5% for a 50% recall. Such precision is unsatisfying.
4.2.5 Evaluation against human workers
To investigate the detectability of matching account by humans we set up an Amazon
Mechanical Turk (AMT) experiment where we ask AMT workers if they think that a
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Table 4.3: Fraction of matching and non-matching accounts detected by AMT workers
out of the true matching and non-matching accounts; † X%(Y %) = fraction of accounts
detected with majority agreement (fraction of accounts with full agreement).
True True
matching non-matching
Detected matching 58% (45%)† 0%(0%)
Detected non-matching 15% (7%) 85% (67%)
No Consensus 27% 15%
Twitter and a Facebook account belong to the same individual or not. We randomly select
100 pairs of matching and non-matching Twitter and Facebook accounts from Dataset 1.
In each assignment, we give AMT workers a link to a Facebook and a link to a Twitter
account and we ask them to choose between three options: ‘the accounts belong to the same
individual’, ‘the accounts do not belong to the same individual’, and ‘cannot say’. For each
assignment we ask the opinion of three different AMT workers. We say that we have a full
agreement when all the AMT workers chose the same answer, a majority agreement when
at least two AMT workers chose the same answer, and no consensus when all workers chose
different answers or at least two AMT workers were unable to say if the accounts belong
to the same individual.
Table 4.3 shows the fractions of accounts matched by humans out of the tested match-
ing and non-matching accounts. The AMT workers were able to detect with a majority
agreement 58% of the matching accounts and 45% with full agreement. For 27% of the
matching accounts the AMT workers are not able to detect if they belong or not to the
same individual, and for 15% of the matching accounts AMT workers said that they belong
to different individuals. We manually investigated the latter cases and the accounts indeed
correspond to different identities of the same user (i.e, either the accounts correspond to
different personas, or one corresponds to a person and the other to an organization or
interest group). The AMT workers were also able to detect with a very high accuracy
the non-matching accounts: 85% are detected with a majority agreement; no accounts
are mistakenly identified as belonging to the same individual; and for 15% there was no
consensus. We can conclude that humans can achieve a 58% true positive rate for a 0%
false positive rate (100% precision). We will see later in the chapter, that in more com-
plex scenarios where AMT workers have to choose the matching account out of a list of
similar looking accounts, they sometimes choose the wrong account (i.e., they have a lower
precision).
Humans are not able to obtain a higher true positive rate not because they are doing a bad
job but because the matching accounts that are not detected do not have enough available
information to make the AMT workers confident that the accounts correspond to the same
person. To ensure the quality of their work, AMT workers where asked to describe in free
text the reasons they think the accounts correspond to the same person. They gave very
detailed descriptions showing they are doing a thorough job (you can find some examples
of their descriptions in Table 4.4).
The AMT workers’ detailed descriptions allowed us to identify a number of attributes AMT
workers found helpful for matching accounts. There are 6 main attributes AMT workers
48CHAPTER 4. MATCHING ACCOUNTS USING PUBLIC PROFILE ATTRIBUTES
Table 4.4: Examples of descriptions AMT workers gave about why they think two accounts
belong to the same individual or not.
Detected Matching (True Matching)
· same account picture
· It is a different picture, but he has the same look on his face, same glasses and same hairdo.
· He likes the cubs and is a pilot, picture on fb has him with a plane and hes from illinois
· Names are the same. Twitter references corkscrews as does the facebook account under
"groups". Locations are also the same.
· Both have the same name, they both have a baseball picture
· same tweet as post on Facebook.
· it is an unusual last name and for two people to have the same first name spelled in an
uncomventional way and the same last name would be a rare coniciennce to me
Detected Non-matching (True Matching)
· Not a match, one is for music channel, other is for person.
· different name location information pictures
· No because they look totally different and have different names.
Detected Non-matching (True Non-matching)
· Two different photos, names and sex.
· The Twitter account appears to be of a woman, The Facebook account, a man.
No Consensus (True Matching and Non-matching)
· Other than the name of the accounts there is not enough information on either account to
compare them
· twitter account has no tweets or pictures to help with identifcation
· Twitter account belong to american, facebook to hispanic in guatemala.
· Twitter account does not provide much information
used to identify matching accounts: if the names, screen names, locations, or account
photos are the same on the two accounts; if it appears to be the same person in the photos
and if any information in their bio matches. In some cases AMT workers went even further
and said that from analyzing the posts and photos they think that the two accounts show
the same interests or that they link to the same sites. Some of these attributes can be
verified automatically with a low effort, such as identifying if two accounts have the same
name, screen name, location or account photo. However, other are much harder to check
by machines. For example, it is very easy for humans to identify that the same person
appears in two photos whereas it is much more harder for a machine [6]. The average time
an AMT worker took to decide if two accounts correspond to the same person is 6 minutes
and 49 seconds.
Takeaway I: Human workers are able to detect 58% of the matching accounts without
mistakenly mis-detecting any non-matching account.
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Takeaway II: Not all the matching accounts in the ground truth dataset correspond to
the same person even if they are managed by the same person.
Takeaway III: These results suggest that a true positive rate of 58% is more indicative
of the expected fraction of accounts a matching scheme could detect instead of 100% of
the ground truth.
To get a better understanding of the accuracy of the Linker, we compare it with the
accuracy of human workers. We use the Linker to match the accounts used for the AMT
experiment to compare the Linker against AMT workers. The Linker is able to detect
89% of the matching accounts without any misclassification (§4.2.3) while AMT workers
are able to detect 58% of the matching accounts with majority agreement, suggesting that
the Linker is doing a better job than AMT workers.
Table 4.5 details the proportions of matching accounts that AMT workers and the Linker
detect or not: 55% of the matching accounts are detected by both; 34% of the accounts are
detected by the Linker but not by AMT workers. Most of the accounts AMT workers miss
and the Linker detects have no location information nor photos but they have very similar
real names or screen names. The Linker puts more weight on the similarity between real
names and screen names (and less on the other attributes) when it makes a decision, and
consequently it often decides that two accounts match only because they have similar real
names. AMT workers are more cautious when deciding if two accounts match and they
check for other attributes besides the real name or screen name to match. The Linker
gives such a high weight to the similarity between real names because the real name is the
most discriminative, available and consistent attribute and when looking at all accounts
in a social network this is the attribute that best distinguishes matching accounts.
Furthermore, 3% of the accounts are detected by AMT workers but not by the Linker.
AMT workers are able to identify these accounts because the same person appears in the
photos but the Linker misses them because it does not do face recognition. The 8% of
the accounts that are not detected by either AMT workers or the Linker are accounts
where the real name does not match and other attributes are not available. Note that
this fraction is consistent with the 7% fraction of accounts with inconsistent values for all
attributes we found in §4.1.2.
The Linker has such high true and false positive rates because it often decides that two
accounts match only because they have similar real names. AMT workers have a better
precision because they check for other attributes besides real names to declare that two
accounts belong to the same person.
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Takeaway IV: The Linker has a higher true positive rate than AMT workers because it
often decides that two accounts match only because they have similar real names whereas
AMT workers need other attributes beside real names to match. This comes at the cost,
however, of a large false positive rate.
Takeaway V: AMT workers are not able to detect a higher percentage of matching
account because, other than real names, the accounts have a low availability of attributes
and/or low consistency.
4.3 Three-step matching scheme
Our analysis in the previous section reveals reliability issues with the one-step matching
scheme when applied at scale. This section designs a three-step matching scheme to address
this issue. We combine three classifiers that together find matching accounts with very
high accuracy and abstains when its confidence in the output is low.
4.3.1 Design of the scheme
To design a scalable and reliable matching scheme, we leverage four observations: (1)
the Linker is not able to accurately detect matching accounts at scale, however it is
very good at weeding out non-matching accounts while retaining a small set of possible
matching accounts that contains with high probability the true matching account; (2) the
Linker often decides that two accounts match only because they have similar real names;
(3) however, humans need multiple attributes to match between accounts to be confident
that they correspond to the same person; and (4) an impersonator can copy most of the
public attributes of an account, and trick the matching scheme to output the impersonator
account instead of the matching account.
Figure 4.4: Three-step matching scheme.
The reason why the Linker cannot achieve a good precision at scale is because we have
to deal with very large datasets. For example Facebook has over 1 billion users, thus the
data contains one billion matching accounts and one quintillion non-matching accounts.
Moreover, the number of features we can use to distinguish the matching account out of
hundreds of millions of non-matching accounts is small. To overcome this problem, instead
of using one classifier to detect matching and non-matching accounts, we use two classifiers
in sequence that achieve a better accuracy.
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We propose a simple but efficient methodology based on three steps to build a scalable
and reliable matching scheme, as shown in Figure 4.4. The Filter takes as input a target
account a ∈ SN1 and all the accounts in SN2 and returns a small candidate set C(a) of
accounts in SN2 that are similar to a. TheDisambiguator takes the output of the Filter
and further disambiguates the matching account out of the candidate set. Furthermore,
we take advantage of the fact that there can only be one matching account on a second
social network to build the Guard. The Guard adds a second level of confidence. It
checks the account retuned by the Disambiguator and returns the account only if it is
confident that is indeed the true matching account and abstains otherwise. Part of the
Guard’s job is to detect impersonator attacks.
We present next in more details the three components of the matching scheme.
4.3.2 The Filter
The Filter weeds out obvious non-matching accounts and returns a small candidate set
of possible matching account.
Input: A target account a ∈ SN1 and all the accounts in SN2.
Output: A candidate set C(a) of accounts in SN2 similar with a.
Objective: Minimize the size of C(a) while keeping a high probability that the matching
account aˆ ∈ C(a).
Conception: Several techniques are possible to build the Filter:
Indexing: We can opportunistically use the Facebook search API to find accounts with
the same or similar names to the target account. Indexing techniques are often used for
such tasks [34]. These techniques are computationally light and scalable however they are
limited to using names to find similar accounts.
Supervised approach: Use the Linker to build the candidate set. The drawback of such
approach is that it needs to compute the similarity between the target account and all
the accounts on SN2, which is inefficient. However, this approach is able to use multiple
attributes to find similar accounts.
Unsupervised approach: We could map all the accounts in an unsupervised way so that
we can cluster similar accounts without the need of computing the similarities among
all the accounts. Such approach is not straightforward and we leave it as future work.
Furthermore, this approach is more suitable when we have access to the whole social
network data and has limited benefits if we have to use the Facebook API to gather
portions of data.
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Realization: We opt for a combination between the first and the second approach be-
cause this is what we can practically do. Since we do not have access to all the accounts
on Facebook we use the Facebook search API to generate a candidate set, CFb(a) (as
described in §4.2), and then we apply the Linker (with a threshold corresponding to 1%
false positive rate) on CFb(a) to weed out accounts that are not similar enough to build
C(a). Recall from §3.5 that for 70% of Twitter accounts aˆ /∈ CFb(a).
4.3.3 The Disambiguator
The goal of the Disambiguator is to find the matching account in the candidate set of
accounts returned by the Filter.
Input: A target account a ∈ SN1 and C(a).
Output: The account in C(a) most similar to a. We call this account the topmatch.
Objective: Maximize the probability aˆ is the most similar account in C(a) to a.
Conception: Similar to building the Linker, we train another probabilistic classifier to
determine whether an account in the candidate set is the matching account or not.
Realization: To build a training dataset, we take 1,000 Twitter accounts fromDataset 1
(different from the ones used for testing the matching schemes) and for each Twitter ac-
count, a, we generate the candidate set, CFb(a), using the Facebook search API, we then
filter CFb(a) using the Filter to obtain C(a). Since we know the Facebook matching
accounts for all the Twitter accounts we can train the classifier with matching accounts
(a, aˆ) where aˆ ∈ C(a) and non-matching accounts (a, b) where b ∈ C(a) and b 6= aˆ.
Similar to the Linker, given two accounts (a, b), the Disambiguator outputs the proba-
bility, p, that they are matching accounts. Note that the Disambiguator estimates would
be different from the Linker as the training sets and the discriminability of the public
attributes within the training sets are very different. For example, real name and screen
name attributes have high discriminating power in the training sets used for Linker (see
Figure 4.1a, 4.1b), while they have limited discriminating power in the training set here
(see Figure 4.5a, 4.5b and compare with Figure 4.1a, 4.1b). Contrary to the Linker the
Disambiguator gives high weights to the similarity between other attributes beside the
real names.
We could proceed by searching a threshold for p to detect matching accounts by investi-
gating the tradeoff between the true and false positive rates. Alternatively, to improve the
reliability of the Disambiguator, for each Twitter account a, we choose to return instead
only the Facebook account with the highest probability of being a matching account from
C(a). The intuition is that while some Facebook accounts might cross the probability
threshold, the Facebook matching account would match the Twitter account better than
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other accounts. This can increase the precision because it forces the Disambiguator to
only output one matching account. Secondly, even if the Facebook matching account does
not cross the probability threshold, it might still be the most similar account in C(a). This
can potentially increase the recall.
4.3.4 The Guard
The Guard ensures a reliable matching by distinguishing between the scenarios where the
Disambiguator outputs a true match versus a false match and abstain from producing
an output in the latter case. The Guard exploits the fact that there can only be one
matching account in a social network.
Input: The two most similar accounts in C(a), i.e. the accounts with the highest prob-
abilities to be matching accounts as computed by the Disambiguator.
Output: The matching account on SN2 or nothing.
Objective: Minimize the number of false matches while maximizing the number of true
matches returned by the matching scheme.
Conception: There are three scenarios where the Disambiguator might output a false
match:
1. If an attacker creates a cloned account on SN2 that is more similar than the true-
matching account. It might be possible to distinguish these cases as there will be
two accounts (the real and the impersonator) that both have high similarities with
the target Twitter account, and the difference between their similarity is small.
2. When the true matching account in Facebook does not exist in the candidate set,
forcing the non-matching account that is most similar to the given Twitter account
to be chosen as output. Intuitively, we might be able to distinguish this case, as
the attributes of the topmatch might be less similar to those of the given Twitter
account compared to the scenarios where the true matching account is provided as
output.
3. When the true matching account exists in the candidate set, but a falsely correlated
Facebook account is chosen as output because it is more similar to the given Twitter
account than the true matching account (due to the lack of attribute availability
and/or consistency). Intuitively, it might be possible to distinguish this case, as
there would be multiple Facebook accounts with relatively high similarities to the
given Twitter account.
To investigate evidence that supports these intuitions, we analyze cases when the top-
match is a true match and when it is a false match. We investigate a dataset containing
500 topmatch accounts that are true matches and 500 that are false matches. Figure 4.5
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Figure 4.5: CDF of similarity scores for each attribute, when topmatch is the matching
account and when it is not.
confirms our intuition, it presents the cumulative distributions of attribute similarity scores
between the given Twitter account and the topmatch. We show two distributions per
plot, one when the topmatch is the matching account and another it is not. Matching
account are in general more similar to the Twitter account across the different attributes
than non-matching account. Thus, we can leverage the differences to distinguish the cases
when the topmatch is a true match vs. a false match.
Figure 4.6a shows the cumulative distributions of Disambiguator probabilities for top-
match to be a matching account. We plot two separate distributions, one when the
topmatch is the matching account and another when it is not. The graphs show that
Disambiguator matching probabilities are higher when the topmatch is the matching
account than when it is not. For example, the median probability of a matching account
is 1, whereas this value is 0.78 for non-matching account.
Figure 4.6b shows the cumulative distributions of the difference in Disambiguator’s
probabilities between the topmatch and the second most similar account. When the
topmatch is the matching account, the median difference to the second most similar
account is 12 times more than when the topmatch is not the matching account.
Realization: Based on these observations we can build a binary classifier, that takes as
input the Disambiguator estimates of the probabilities that the top two accounts are
matching accounts and determines whether the topmatch is a true matching account.
The Disambiguator assumes that all the accounts in C(a) are independent. The Guard
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Figure 4.6: CDFs when the topmatch is the matching account and when it is not.
takes into account that the accounts are actually dependent on a and exploits the structure
in C(a).
For training the classifier, we again select 1,000 Twitter accounts from Dataset 1 (that are
not used for testing the matching schemes or for training the Filter andDisambiguator)
and we apply, as described, the Filter and Disambiguator to find the topmatch. We
train the classifier with the probabilities of being matching accounts of the two most similar
accounts in C(a) when topmatch is the matching account and when it is not. TheGuard
is able to detect 42% of the cases when the topmatch is the matching account while it
only misclassifies 1% of the cases when the topmatch is non-matching account. It can
also operate at a 60% true positive rate for a 5% false positive rate.
4.3.5 Evaluation at scale
We investigate the accuracy of the three-step matching scheme at each step.
Filter (precision = 1%, recall = 69%) Similar with the evaluation of the
Linker at scale in §4.2 the Filter is able to attain a recall of 69% for a precision of
1%.
Disambiguator (precision = 50%, recall = 50%) We sort the Facebook
accounts in C(a) according to p. We define the rank as the position of the matching
account in the sorted list of candidate accounts. The best case is when the matching
account has a rank of one. Figure 4.7 shows the CDF of the rank of the matching account.
The X-axis is in log scale to focus on small ranks. When the matching account is not in
C(a) we put the rank to be 10,000.
The Disambiguator yields the Facebook matching account for 50% of the Twitter ac-
counts. For the remaining Twitter accounts, the topmatch is not the matching account.
While 50% might sound low, note that for 30% of the Twitter accounts, the candidate set
does not contain the matching account and thus, it cannot yield a true match. Excluding
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Figure 4.7: CDF of the rank of the matching account for matching Twitter to Facebook
accounts using the Filter and the Disambiguator.
such cases, the percentage of Twitter accounts for which Disambiguator yields a true
match is as high as 75%. While the recall of the Disambiguator might be acceptable at
50% (or higher), the precision of the Disambiguator is still too low at 50%. Any reliable
matching scheme would require the precision to be substantially higher a challenge that it
will be solved by the Guard.
If instead of selecting the topmatch, we used a threshold on the probability p that a is
the matching account, as we did for the Linker, the Filter and the Disambiguator
would achieve a 30% recall for a 23% precision. The precision is better than the Linker
but it is still unsatisfactory. Perhaps the most important asset of the Disambiguator,
however, is in increasing the gap between the true and false matches to make the Guard
more accurate. Indeed, the Disambiguator separates very well the matching account
(giving a high probability) from other accounts in C(a) (giving a low probability). On the
contrary, the Linker gives very close probabilities to be matching to all accounts in the
candidate set (i.e., all accounts with similar real names).
Guard (precision = 98%, recall = 21%) The Disambiguator returns the
same number of true and false matches (on average 50% of the topmatch accounts are
true matches and 50% are not). When we test the Guard we obtain a 21% recall for a
98% precision or a 30% recall for a 92% precision.
Thus, the three-step matching scheme can match 21% of the Twitter accounts to their
corresponding Facebook accounts with a very high precision. Whenever theGuard returns
an account 98% of times it will be the true match and only 2% of times will be a false
match. Although 21% true positive rate may seem low, the next section shows that it is
almost as good as what humans can do.
Takeaway: The three-step matching scheme can match 21% of Twitter accounts to their
corresponding Facebook accounts with 98% precision, or match 30% of Twitter accounts
with a 92% precision. To increase the precision the scheme has to trade off recall.
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4.3.6 Evaluation against human workers
We compare the performance of the three-step matching scheme with that of humans in an
AMT experiment. We randomly select 200 Twitter accounts from Dataset 1 (that are not
used for training the matching scheme). In each assignment, we give AMT workers a link
to a Twitter account as well as links to the 10 most similar Facebook accounts (we shuﬄe
their position) and we ask AMT workers to choose the matching account. We also allowed
AMT workers to say that they are unable to identify the matching account. For each
assignment we ask the opinion of three different AMT workers. We design two versions
of the experiment: in the first if the matching account is not in CFb(a) (the candidate
set returned by the Facebook search API), the matching account will not be in the list of
10 Facebook accounts; and a second version, where whenever the matching account is not
in CFb(a) we replace one of the 10 Facebook accounts with the matching account. The
first version of the experiment gives AMT workers similar conditions with the matching
scheme while the second version gives them perfect conditions, i.e., there is no limitation
introduced by the Facebook search API.
In the first version of the experiment, AMT workers are able to match 25% of the Twitter
accounts to their Facebook matching accounts with full agreement and 40% with majority
agreement; 2% of Twitter accounts are matched to the wrong Facebook accounts with full
agreement, and 4% with majority agreement. This means AMT workers achieve a 25%
recall for a 98% precision, which is only slightly better than three-step scheme, or a 40%
recall for a 96% precision. Thus, under similar conditions, the accuracy of AMT workers is
not much higher than the three-step matching scheme. Under perfect conditions (second
version), AMT workers can correctly match 27% of Twitter accounts with full agreement
and 58% with majority agreement.
To understand the limitations of the three-step matching scheme we compare the accounts
AMT workers detect vs. the accounts the matching scheme detects. About half of the
matching accounts detected by AMT workers with full agreement and 40% with majority
agreement, the matching scheme also detects. To understand why the matching scheme
does not detect the rest, we manually checked the descriptions AMT workers gave in the
assignments. About 58% of the missed accounts AMT workers detect are because they
have the same person in the photos, 15% have some matching bio information and the rest
have some sort of content, interests that match. These results hint at ways we can improve
the matching.
The matching scheme is able to detect 5% of matching accounts that AMT workers do
not detect. These accounts have friends in common which AMT workers do not check.
These results suggest that if we combine AMT workers with the matching scheme we can
potentially attain a 30% recall (25%+5%) for a 98% precision or 45% recall (40%+5%) for
a 96% precision.
Takeaway: Under similar conditions, the AMT workers do not detect much more ac-
counts than the three-step matching scheme, AMT workers can achieve a 25% recall for a
98% precision.
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4.4 Testing the reliability of the three-step matching scheme
To ensure that the three-step matching scheme is indeed reliable, we test how well it
performs when there is no matching account on the second social network, and when there
is an impersonator.
4.4.1 Reliability in the absence of a matching account
In practice, a Twitter user may not have a Facebook account. Ideally the matching scheme
should return no account in this case. To test the reliability of the matching scheme in this
scenario we take the dataset used for the evaluation at scale and for all Twitter users we
remove the Facebook matching account from the candidate set. The matching scheme only
returns a false matching account for 1% of the Twitter accounts. We manually investigate
the 1% cases when the matching scheme returns an account. Half of these cases correspond
to a false match; the other half, however, correspond to accounts of the same person. These
accounts correspond to either impersonators or people that maintain duplicate accounts
on Facebook. Thus, the matching scheme is reliable when there is no matching account on
the second social network.
4.4.2 Reliability to impersonation
We now study the vulnerability of the matching scheme to impersonation attacks. We
distinguish two different scenarios when impersonation attacks occur: (1) when a user
does not have a matching account on the second social network and (2) when a user has a
matching account on the second social network.
In the case where there is no matching account on the second social network the matching
scheme is vulnerable to impersonation attacks. The matching scheme is based only on
public attributes. So an attacker can easily gather the attributes of the public account of
the victim in one social network and create a cloned account on the second social network.
If the impersonator creates an account that has the same real name, similar screen name
and has the same account photo or location, she would be able to fool the matching scheme
into marking the impersonated account as the matching account.
In the case where the user has an account on the second social network, the task of imper-
sonation becomes much harder. Recall from §4.3 that Guard is designed to be resilient
to impersonation attacks. If the attacker creates a cloned account on the second social
network then there will be two accounts (the real and the impersonated one) that have
high similarities and there is a good chance that the difference between their high similarity
scores will be small. In this case, the Guard will not return a matching account, avoiding
a false match. The only scenario when the attacker can trick the matching scheme is when
the matching account does not have a good similarity with the target account.
In fact, we can use the robustness of the matching scheme to impersonation to study
if spammers and malicious attackers are impersonating accounts today. To search for
impersonators, we check Twitter accounts in Dataset 1 that have two Facebook accounts
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with probabilities to be matching (as returned by the Disambiguator) higher than 0.95
that are rejected by the Guard. The intuition is that one of the accounts might be an
impersonator. We collected 16 such accounts. For each of the 16 Twitter accounts, we
take the account which is not the matching account and we ask AMT workers whether
the Twitter and this Facebook account belong to the same person. If someone is trying to
impersonate, then the AMT workers should think the accounts belong to the same person.
AMT workers said that four accounts out of 16 belong to the same person. This shows
that the design of the matching scheme makes it resilient to impersonation attacks in cases
where the victim has created an account on both sites and that it can be used as a tool to
find impersonators. We will explain this property in Chapter 6.
Takeaway: The three-step matching scheme is reliable both when there is an imperson-
ator on the second social networks and when there is no matching account.
4.5 Matching in the wild
We implement a prototype of the three-step matching scheme to match Twitter to Facebook
accounts on demand. We deployed the prototype at: http://matchingaccounts.app-ns.
mpi-sws.org/. We evaluate the matching scheme on a set of active Twitter accounts. We
do not know whether these accounts have a corresponding Facebook account or, when they
do, which one is the corresponding Facebook account. Our goal is to evaluate for which
fraction of these Twitter accounts can we identify a matching account.
We collect a set of Twitter users by tapping the Twitter streaming API form March to
June 2013. We extract all the users that tweeted something during this period. From this
set of users we randomly sample 100 popular users (i.e., with more than 1,000 followers),
100 medium popular users (i.e, with between 100 and 1000 followers) and 100 unpopular
users (i.e, with less than 100 followers).
We measure the fraction of Twitter accounts for which the matching scheme returns an
account. The matching scheme returns an account for 16% of the unpopular, 17% of
the medium popular, and 7% of popular Twitter accounts. These fractions are lower than
what we found when matching Twitter and Facebook accounts in Dataset 1 because they
include cases when users do not have a matching account. For popular users the fraction
is even lower. This result is likely due to fact that popular Twitter accounts are either
celebrities or organizations such as newspapers that have Facebook pages, not accounts.
This will be taken into account in future improvements of the online service.
Takeaway: We provide an online service that can match a significant portion of Twitter
accounts to their corresponding Facebook accounts in the wild and on demand.
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4.6 Summary
We conducted a systematic and detailed investigation of how to reliably match user ac-
counts across large-scale, real-world online social networking sites like Twitter and Face-
book. Our analysis yielded a number of key insights which we summarize below.
We analyzed the ACID properties of public attributes of profiles such as name, location,
and photos. We found that they satisfy these properties to different extents, though none
satisfies all properties. Nevertheless, a large majority of users provide consistent values for
public attributes across the different social networking sites we study, which enables cross-
site account matching using only public attributes. Only 7% of users maintain different
personas on different sites. Finally, the profile attributes for the users in Dataset 2 (a
biased set of users who willingly link their accounts) are more available and consistent
than for the users in Dataset 1 (a more representative set of users). As the availability
and consistency of features directly impacts the accuracy of the matching schemes, this
has implications on the representativeness of results showed by previous works (most of
the previous works evaluated their schemes over datasets similar to Dataset 2).
Humans are good at recognizing persons, so we decided to set up an Amazon Mechanical
Turk experiment to see what fraction of accounts can be detected by humans as belonging
to the same user out of a list of accounts we know, a priori, match. Surprisingly, the
results show that humans can only detect 58% of a random sample of Twitter and Facebook
accounts that belong to the same users. This result has two sides. It demonstrates that it is
indeed possible to match a large fraction of accounts across social networks only using the
public information present in user profiles, but it also demonstrates that there is another
important fraction of accounts that even humans cannot match. Consequently, this shows
that is unrealistic to expect that a matching scheme will be able to detect 100% of a
random sample of matching accounts.
It is easy to achieve high recall (83%) with high precision (89%) when attempting to
match accounts between datasets containing only a few thousand accounts. Nevertheless,
maintaining a high recall without compromising precision is a challenge at the scale of
today’s popular social networks, which contain hundreds of millions of users. The three-
step scheme is able to match 21% of accounts between Twitter and Facebook with 98%
precision. Although we cannot claim that 21% is a high recall, humans, under similar
conditions, can only detect 25% of matching accounts. Note that Twitter and Facebook
have the lowest attribute availability and consistency, thus the accuracy of matching other
social networks should be higher than what we obtain for Twitter and Facebook. Most
of the accounts that we cannot match are of users who barely use Twitter, so one can
argue that it is not as interesting to match these accounts. We achieve this performance
thanks to a combination of three learning algorithms with separate training, which better
leverage the power of the different attributes. We believe that this approach can lead to
improvements in other applications using learning. Furthermore, the three-way matching
scheme is robust when a user does not have an account on a second social network as
well as to impersonation attacks. Finally, we can match a significant portion of Twitter
accounts to their corresponding Facebook accounts in the wild and on demand.
Overall, our findings reflect the potential as well as the limits of reliably matching accounts
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at scale. We implemented a prototype of the three-step matching scheme to match Twitter
to Facebook accounts on demand. We deployed the prototype at http://matchingaccounts.app-
ns.mpi-sws.org/. The online service can be used by privacy conscious users to check how
well one can detect their accounts in different social networks.
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Chapter 5
Matching Accounts using Public
Innocuous Information
In this chapter we study how potential attackers can identify accounts on different social
networks that all belong to the same user (even when profile attributes do not match) by
exploiting only innocuous activity that inherently comes with posted content. This study
has significant privacy implication as it presents a novel class of attacks that exploit users’
tendency to assume that, if they maintain different personas with different names, the
accounts cannot be matched together.
In contrast to the previous chapter, we focus on exploiting implicit features derived from
a user’s activity, rather than leveraging information explicitly provided—and hence more
easily controlled—such as name or profile photo. Specifically, we explore matching accounts
based on where, when and what a user is posting. As it turns out, combining these three
types of features provides attackers with a powerful tool to match accounts.
Our focus in this chapter is on demonstrating the feasibility of matching accounts based
on innocuous data rather than the scalability and reliability of the matching scheme. We
devise a possible set of attack heuristics, yet we emphasize that our choices are far from
exhaustive. We also emphasize that, contrary to the previous chapter, it is unrealistic to
expect such attacks to work reliably in a fully automated fashion. Given the large number
of accounts online, even small false positive rates would quickly render any fully automated
approach infeasible. In that setting, identifying a small candidate set of accounts on other
networks is sufficient to allow for manually sifting through for the correct match.
We account users with three implicit features of their activity: the geo-location attached
to a user’s posts; the timestamps of a user’s posts; and the user’s writing style modeled
with a probabilistic approach. We first evaluate the potential of each of these three fea-
tures individually to match user accounts across social networks (in §5.2, §5.3, and §5.4,
respectively). Then, we evaluate the improvements in accuracy that result from combining
all three features (§5.5). Our results show that, when available, location and timing are
powerful for matching accounts across social networks while a user’s language model is not
as effective. We find that the combination can identify almost as many matching accounts
between Flickr and Twitter as when we exploit screen names (a much more obvious feature
to key on). Moreover, the three features together can identify 37% more matching accounts
between Yelp and Twitter than screen names.
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Our work demonstrates a novel class of attacks by showing that innocuous features of a
user’s posts can help match accounts across social networks. Indeed, it remains the very
fact that users want to post content that makes them vulnerable.
In this chapter we analyze matching attacks with data collected from three social networks:
Flickr, Twitter, and Yelp. We choose these social networks because of their popularity and
because they represent different types of social networks: photo sharing, micro-blogging,
and service reviewing. We note that many Flickr, Twitter, and Yelp users may not neces-
sarily consider account matching across these networks as a compromise of their privacy
(in fact, 40% of the Flickr users in our dataset have an identical screen name on Twitter).
We use them to demonstrate a technique that would also apply to users with different
screen names as well as to more sensitive sites, for which the users may care if they were
aware of the threat (e.g., dating or medical sites).
5.1 Features of innocuous activity
Our overall goal is to understand how user activity on one social network can implicitly
reveal their identity on other social network. To this end, we have to extract features that
we derive from user activity to build activity profiles. We choose three types of features for
building activity fingerprints that are present on many social networks: location, timing,
and language characteristics.
Location Many social networks provide location information directly in the form of geo-
tags attached to user content, potentially with high accuracy if generated by GPS-enabled
devices like mobile phones. However, even without geotags, one can often derive locations
implicitly from posted content (e.g., when users review a place on Yelp, that gives us an
address). Furthermore, a number of online services map images and textual descriptions
to locations or geographic regions (e.g., by identifying landmarks) [2,5,33,39,91]. For our
study, we use the location fingerprint of a user, i.e., the list of all locations associated
with her posts on a specific social network. The intuition behind that choice is that the
combination of locations a user posts from may sufficiently fingerprint an individual across
social networks.
Timing Many mobile services and applications such as Gowalla, Foursquare, and Instagram
allow users to automatically send content to multiple social networks simultaneously. The
resulting posts then have almost identical timestamps, which we can exploit to match the
corresponding accounts.
Language The natural language community has demonstrated that users tend to have
characteristic writing styles that identify them with high confidence [135]. While these
methods typically work best with longer texts, such as blog posts or articles, it is unknown
how they perform for short texts such as tweets and how they can contribute to matching
attacks.
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5.2 Location fingerprint
In this section, our goal is to understand the degree to which locations attached to user
content are sufficiently unique to identify an individual. The availability of location data
differs between social networks. On Twitter, 5% of users have at least one post with
geotags, on Flick, 4% of users have at least one photo that has geotags, while on Yelp,
all the users have posts with location metadata. Our focus here is not necessarily on
the scalability of the matching scheme but rather on showing that is possible to match
accounts using only the location information that comes with their posts even if there are
not many users that have such location data. The location metadata is one of the hardest
features to impersonate as the attacker must travel and upload content from the same
places from where the victim uploads. Measuring the consistency and discriminability of
location involves two parts, which we discuss in turn: (i) representing a user’s location in
the form of a fingerprint suitable for comparison; and (ii) defining a similarity measure
between two such accounts. For evaluation, we focus on matching accounts from the Yelp
and Flickr GTarea sets to the Twitter Carea sets. Based on the results, we also investigate
what properties enable matching users successfully by their location fingerprints.
5.2.1 Building the fingerprint
To motivate the use of locations, we start by examining the degree to which location fin-
gerprints represented as zip code sets uniquely identify a user. Out of all Twitter accounts
from the combined sets Carea from all the five areas, 91% exhibit unique zip code com-
binations (i.e., no other user posts from the same set of zip codes). Of the remaining 9%,
almost all post from only a very small number of zip codes: 74% only post from one, 21%
from two, 5% from more than two, and 5 accounts post from more than ten locations.
Manually inspecting the latter, we find that three of them appear to belong to a single
person maintaining separate personas on Twitter—which, incidentally, means we have just
matched related accounts by their location information. For Flickr, 96% have unique zip
code sets; out of the remaining 4%, 97% post from only one zip code and 3% from two.
For Yelp, 77% have unique zip code sets; out of the 23% non-unique ones, 89% post from
one zip code, 8% from two, and 3% from more than two zip codes. These results encourage
us to use locations to fingerprint users.
We define a user’s location fingerprint as a histogram that records how often we observe
each location in her posts. The histogram’s bins represent “location units”, such as zip
code, city, coordinates of a longitude/latitude cluster or region1. To eliminate the bias of
users posting more often on one social network than another, we normalize each histogram
by the total number of location units in the histogram such that they represent probability
distributions.
As location units, we test three different types of choices:
1We also experimented with other fingerprint representations, such as a binary vector just indicating
whether a location is present and non-histogram approaches such as matching directly on geo-coordinates,
but the histogram approach provided the best results.
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Grids: We map each latitude/longitude geo-coordinate to the cell within a spatial grid
that has its center closest to the coordinate. Considering cell sizes ranging from 1x1 km2
to 12x12 km2, 10x10 km2 proves most effective in our experiments.
Administrative regions: We map each latitude/longitude geo-coordinate to an address
using the Bing Maps API [1]. Trying alternative address granularities (streets, zip codes,
cities, counties, states), we find zip codes yield the best results.
One problem with representing location fingerprints as normalized histograms of zip codes
is that all zip codes contribute the same to the similarity between two accounts. That
however is undesirable as some zip codes are much more popular than the others (especially
on Yelp, where people go out). Profiles containing those zip codes are therefore likely to
have a high similarity even if they do not correspond to matching accounts. To adjust
for that effect, we borrow the term frequency - inverse document frequency (TF-IDF) [86]
weighting scheme from the information retrieval field to weight zip codes proportionally to
their popularity. We apply TF-IDF as follows: for each zip code in an account’s location
fingerprint, TF represents the frequency of the zip code in the location fingerprint, and
IDF represents the number of times the zip code appears in other location fingerprints in
Carea. Then the weight of the zip code is TF/log(IDF ). With TF-IDF, zip codes that are
less common across all accounts but more representative of specific location fingerprints
have higher weights.
Clusters: We use a clustering approach as a more dynamic scheme to group geo-coordinates
into regions. Using the k-means algorithm with an Euclidean distance, we group lat-
itude/longitude geo-coordinates from all users in each Carea into corresponding longi-
tude/latitude clusters. A small cluster represents a popular small area (e.g., blocks of
downtown San Francisco), while larger clusters represent bigger, less populous regions
(e.g., a park or forest). Our experiments show that using 10,000 total clusters per area
produces the best results. We then associate each geo-coordinate with its N closest clus-
ters. We assign weights to each of the N clusters based on a Gaussian distribution, with
mean equal to the location, and variance set to 400 (the optimal value according to our
experiments). In this approach, the cluster with the centroid closest to the location is
assigned the largest weight of 1. The remaining clusters are assigned decreasing weights
equal to values along the tail of the Gaussian distribution, according to the distances of
their centroids to the geo-coordinate. Using N > 1 is better because associating more clus-
ters to each location represents a ‘soft’ assignment. This soft assignment is advantageous
in cases where locations of a user’s posts in one social network is close to, but not exactly
the same as, the locations of the same user on a different site. In our experiments N=20
produces the best results. We obtain the final cluster-based location fingerprint histogram
for an account by first adding the weights of all clusters associated with all locations of
the account, and then normalizing the weight of each location by this total sum of the
weights.
Figures 5.1a and 5.1b compare the accuracy of using histograms at grid level, zip code level,
zip code level weighted with TF-IDF, and cluster level at their best configurations. We
use the Cosine distance to measure the similarity between histograms (in the next section,




















Zip Code − TFIDF
Cluster
Grid




















Zip Code − TFIDF
Cluster
Grid
(b) Yelp to Twitter
Figure 5.1: ROC curves for different location representations for matching Flickr and Yelp
users (GTSF ) to Twitter users (CSF ).
we explore alternative choices). Figure 5.1a shows the ROC curve for matching Flickr
to Twitter for users in San Francisco (the conclusions were similar for other cities), and
Figure 5.1b for Yelp to Twitter. We obtain each ROC curve by varying the similarity score
threshold from highest to lowest similarity score values, and computing the true positive
rate (TPR) and false positive rate (FPR) when only considering as a match accounts with
similarity score above the threshold. These plots take into account all pairs s(ai, bj), where
ai ∈ GTSF and bj ∈ CSF . The best case would be a vertical line at 0% FPR followed by a
horizontal line at 100% TPR; a random classifier would be a diagonal line from 0% TPR
and FPR, to 100% TPR and FPR. Note that the plots are in log scale to focus on low false
positive rates.
Grids have the lowest TPR in both cases. For a FPR of 1%, grids never achieve TPR higher
than 20%. Users from densely populated areas have a greater chance of being confused
with one another, when using grids, because the places from where they post tend to be
closer to each other, which makes users post from different grids less often. In addition, in
less populated areas (e.g national parks), grids split places that should be considered the
same in different locations, which makes matching accounts that post from different grids
in the same place look less similar.
Zip codes achieve higher TPR than grids, in particular when combined with TF-IDF,
because zip codes take into account population density. Clusters achieve the highest TPR
for all values of FPR. Their accuracy is significantly better for small FPR, which is the
operational point we are interested in. For example, when the FPR is 1%, the TPR for
identifying Flickr users in Twitter is 60%. Clusters have higher accuracy because they
capture population densities. Furthermore, the soft cluster assignment finds similarities in
cases when a user posts from two close by zip codes in her Flickr and her Twitter account.
We analyze all ground truth users for which the location fingerprint of their account in
Flickr and Twitter had no zip code in common (i.e., they had similarity score equal to zero
when using zip codes). Half of these users were indeed posting from neighboring zip codes,
and hence had higher similarity scores when using clusters.
While the above considers the complete data sets, we also examine building location finger-
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prints individually per time interval: one month, one year, two years, three years, and all
available data. Our results show that by aggregating at smaller time intervals, we end up
removing too many data points from the accounts, making them less precise. While doing
so helps to better identify a few prolific users, it impacts most users negatively.
The clusters made of complete datasets of posts achieve higher TPR than grids and zip
codes, in particular for low FPR, thus we use them for the rest of this chapter.
5.2.2 Similarity metrics
So far we have used the Cosine distance to compare histogram-based location fingerprints.
Another possibility is to train a classifier and obtain a data-driven function to perform
this match; however, the feature space for the classifier is too large and sparse, as we have
more than 300,000 features (i.e., clusters). Furthermore it has been shown that if you train
a neural network to match two discrete probability distributions using the squared error
criterion, it learns to approximate the cosine distance [149]. We now proceed and examine
other distance functions to compare the histograms. The statistics literature offers a variety
of metrics for measuring similarity between two probability density functions P and Q [28].
We test a series of candidates, including Cosine and Jaccard from the Inner Product family;
Euclidean and Manhattan from the Minkowski family; Hellinger from the Squared-chord
family and Kullback-Leibler (KL) divergence from the Shannon Entropy family. We skip
the details here for brevity but our analysis finds that except for the Euclidean distance
others show comparable accuracy (which agrees with the previous mentioned result [149]).
The Euclidean distance yields a much lower accuracy because it is sensitive to the absolute
difference between two bins, in particular if it is large. In contrast, similarity metrics such
as Cosine are sensitive to bins with non-zero values in both accounts, which better suit the
matching of location fingerprints. Since the Cosine, Jaccard, and Hellinger distances have
similar TPR in our experiments, we use Cosine for the remainder of our discussion.
5.2.3 Evaluation at scale
In this chapter, we evaluate the matching scheme only on the large-scale dataset described
in §3.5. An evaluation over a small scale dataset does not make sense as most people will
likely be from different parts of the world, hence matching accounts will be very easy to
detect. Furthermore, the evaluation against human workers does not make sense because
we are using features that are not visible to them. Given the large number of users that post
in a particular region, even a small false positive rate could render an attack infeasible by
returning a large number of false matched accounts. Hence, we typically tune the threshold
so that it reports false positive rates of 1%. Furthermore, we do not have high expectations
as in the previous chapter to fully automate the matching scheme; instead, we allow the
matching scheme to return a small set of accounts that an attacker can check manually
instead of only returning one account.
The previous sections show that representing the location of posts with clusters and iden-
tifying similar location fingerprints with the Cosine distance achieve the best tradeoff be-
tween TPR and FPR for identifying matching accounts in Flickr-Twitter and Yelp-Twitter.
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Figure 5.2: ROC curves for different urban areas for matching Flickr and Yelp users to
Twitter users using clusters.
In this section, we discuss the overall accuracy of using location to identify matching ac-
counts across social networks.
Figure 5.2a presents the accuracy of matching Flickr to Twitter accounts for each of the
five regions we study, whereas Figure 5.2b presents the same results for Yelp to Twitter
(the San Francisco results are the same as the Cluster curves in Figures 5.1a and 5.1b).
For San Francisco, at 1% FPR, we have 60% TPR to match Flickr and Twitter accounts
and 42% TPR for Yelp to Twitter. As a toy example, consider how these numbers apply
to a small company of 10 employees, where all of them have Flickr accounts. Assume an
attacker aiming to find their respective accounts on Twitter starting from a pre-filtered list
of 100 candidate accounts. Among the total of 1,000 (Flickr, Twitter) account pairs, 10
are true matches and 990 are not. With 60% TPR and 1% FPR, our location-based attack
will return a set of about 16 (Flickr, Twitter) account pairs that are possible match: 6 true
matches (60% of the 10 users) and 10 false matches (1% of the 990 pairs). An attacker
will need to sift through these 16 account pairs manually to identify the 6 true matches.
Consider now the scenario used in our experiments, where an attacker wishes to identify
the Twitter account of one given Flickr user in the San Francisco area using only location
information. In this scenario, she has 60% chance of finding the Twitter account associated
with the Flickr account by manually investigating the 750 most similar Twitter accounts,
instead of searching all of the 75,474 San Francisco Twitter accounts. The precision for
such operational point in less than 0.1%. This is acceptable here, however, because our
focus is to see if we can return a small list of accounts that can be manually checked rather
than returning only one account.
Figures 5.2a and 5.2b show that, although the shape of the ROC curves are similar across
areas, the accuracy of the attack based on location is even higher for other areas than San
Francisco. Our analysis of matching accounts in each area shows that most differences come
from the fact that some areas such as San Francisco and New York have more users whose
posts in Flickr or Yelp have no location in common with posts in Twitter. This observation
is especially true when matching accounts from Yelp to Twitter. In San Francisco and New
York, many people work and live away from the neighborhoods in the city center, where
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people often go out. If a given user mainly tweets during her daily activities and not when
she is out in restaurants, the location of her tweets will have little overlap with the places
of restaurants she reviews on Yelp.
The comparison of Figures 5.2a and 5.2b shows that the accuracy of matching accounts
from Flickr to Twitter is higher than from Yelp to Twitter. This difference comes, most
likely, from the nature of these social networks. Users of Flickr and Twitter have more
unique location fingerprints, because they can post or take a picture from anywhere,
whereas Yelp reviews come from a large, but fixed set of locations (which correspond
to the address of the reviewed restaurants). Indeed, §5.2.1 showed that only 77% of Yelp
profiles are unique as opposed to 96% unique accounts for Flickr. Moreover, Flickr users
tend to post from more locations. Finally, Flickr posts have more common locations with
the corresponding Twitter account than Yelp posts do.
5.2.4 Implications
We now study the implications of these results for users. In particular, we investigate which
properties of a user’s location fingerprints can help prevent the attacker from successfully
matching her accounts. Although the location fingerprint is a powerful feature for matching
account of a single user across social networks, the results in Figures 5.2a and 5.2b show
that we cannot identify all of our ground truth users with low FPR.
We define a new metric to split users in three groups according to the difficulty for an
attacker to identify the correct account from the set of candidate accounts. Our metric
determines the number of accounts in Carea with similarity scores higher than or equal to
s(a, aˆ) (the similarity score of the true matching pair), which we term a user’s rank for a
given attack:
rank(a, aˆ) := #{bi ∈ Carea : s(a, bi) ≥ s(a, aˆ)}.
Having rank(a, aˆ) = 1 means taht the matching is perfect and the attacker will pick the
right account directly. Since a perfect matching is hard to obtain, we typically check if
rank(a, aˆ) ≤ m, i.e., the correct user is amongst the top m most similar accounts. For
small m, an attacker can inspect that set manually.
We define as vulnerable the set of users with rank smaller 750 (this is equivalent of 1% FPR
for users in San Francisco); medium vulnerable users with rank between 750 and 7,500; and
protected as users with rank higher than 7,500. We check how many locations users in each
of these groups post from, and how the number of common locations between the location
fingerprints of the two matching accounts affects the rank. To investigate this we use all
true account matches from Flickr to Twitter and Yelp to Twitter in the San Francisco
area.
We find that protected users generally post from fewer locations, only 36% of protected
users post from more than five locations, whereas 70% of vulnerable users post from more
than five locations. Moreover, 95% of protected users have no common locations between
the location fingerprints of their accounts across social networks; whereas all vulnerable
and all medium vulnerable users have at least one location in common. These results
suggest that one approach to protect against this attack is to minimize the number of
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common locations across social networks. In fact, there is an 80% probability of the
matching Twitter account to have a rank lower than 750 given a Flickr account when the
two accounts have posts in three common locations (this probability is 69% to have rank
lower than 375 and 47% lower than 50). If the user in the two accounts posted from more
than six locations in common, then these probabilities increase to 85%, 76%, and 58%
respectively.
Thus, the number of common locations across social networks is the most important prop-
erty that makes users vulnerable to the account matching and even posting from a few
common locations can already be enough to identify a small set of candidate matching
accounts.
5.3 Timing fingerprint
Many third-party applications, in particular on mobile devices, allow users to automatically
send updates to different social networks simultaneously. For example, when Instagram
uploads to Flickr, it can automatically tweet a pointer to the photo. We exploit this
behavior to match accounts based on the timestamps of such automated posts.
In any social networks the posts have upload dates attached to them, thus the availability
of timing data is 100% for any social networks. However, the granularity of the upload
date might not be sufficient in some cases. The timing data is very hard to impersonate as
the attacker has to post at the same time as the user. In this section, we focus on Flickr
and Twitter datasets because Yelp only gives the date, and not the exact time of each post.
Generally, we aim to find accounts where one or more timestamps of Flickr photos match
the timestamps of tweets. However, even for simultaneous posts, timestamps may differ
slightly due to processing delays and desynchronized clocks. Hence, we consider a small
time window around each timestamp to declare that the timestamp of the photo and that
of the tweet match. The question is what an appropriate window size is. If the window
is too small, we might miss true post matches, whereas a larger window may report many
false matches.
To answer that question, we investigate the timestamp differences we see in our ground
truth set, considering all the GT Twitter - Flickr pairs. For each account pair (a, b),
a ∈ Twitter, b ∈ Flickr, where user(a) = user(b), if the list of timestamps of posts in a
is tstmps(a) = {t1, t2, t3} and in b is tstmps(b) = {T1, T2, T3} and t1 < t2 < T1 < t3 <
T2 < T3, then we define the set of timestamp differences as the set of differences between
timestamps of two consecutive posts on different social networks td(a, b) = {T1 − t2, t3 −
T1, T2 − t3}. This set contains all the timestamp differences between posts on the two
social networks potentially corresponding to the same content (e.g., a photo on Flickr and
its link on Twitter). Note that in this example, if T2 represents a Flickr image post, and t3
the automated Tweet for the image post, then T2 − t3 represents the delay resulting from
desynchronized clocks between Flickr and Twitter.
We investigate what is an appropriate threshold for this delay between posts across social
networks so that we detect automated posts with low false positives. We manually investi-
gate the content of posts with timestamp differences smaller than 30 s, as we consider 30 s
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a safe upper bound for the maximum delay between automated posts. We can differentiate
automated posts from the others as they have similar texts, and the metadata attached
to tweets contains the name of the application that generated it. We find that most posts
with timestamp differences larger than 5 s are not automated. We thus investigate TPR
of applying thresholds ranging between 1 s to 5 s to match accounts.
We define the timestamp similarity score s(a, b) between accounts a and b as the number
of timestamp differences in td(a, b) that are lower than a given delay threshold. We ex-
perimented with normalizing this value by the size of td(a, b), but it did not improve the
matching quality. We set FPR to 1% and measure TPR for thresholds ranging from 1 s
(which includes all timestamp differences between 0 s and 1 s) to 5 s for accounts in Flickr
GTSF to accounts in Twitter CSF . The 1 s threshold has the highest TPR (13%) while
5 s has the lowest TPR (12%). Hence, we use a 1 s threshold to match accounts based on
timing.
The reason why the TPR is never higher than 13% is because only few users in our datasets
use automated posts. When users do use automated posts, however, we often find a perfect
match because timestamp is highly discriminable and consistent. In our dataset, all the
users with more than four timestamp matches have a rank of one. This means that even
if users only use automated posting for a brief period or just to test them, an attacker
can match their accounts with a very high precision. As applications such as Instagram
and Foursquare become more popular, we expect the timing information to allow matching
even more pairs of accounts.
5.4 Language fingerprint
The final type of feature we consider for matching accounts is textual data. Textual data
is always available when users are active in a social network, but there are users that never
posted anything. On Twitter, 57% of users have at least one post, on Flickr, only 35%
of users posted at least one photo, and on Yelp 52% of users posted at least one review.
Textual data is also hard to impersonate as the attacker has to invest a significant amount
of time to be able to adopt the writing style of the victim.
This approach builds on existing work that demonstrate that free-form text can exhibit
characteristics sufficiently unique to identify an author [90]. To explore this potential, we
examine matching Yelp reviews and Flickr photo descriptions with Twitter posts. We do
not explore exact text matches because these are usually automated, and we capture these
cases with timing matching.
For each Yelp account we consider the joint set of all the reviews; for each Flickr account
we consider all the descriptions, tags and titles attached to a photo; and for each Twitter
account we consider all the tweets with the exception of re-tweets and tweets that share
links (as the text represents the title of the article in the link and not something that the
user wrote). In the GTSF and CSF datasets, we find an average of 546 distinct words per
Twitter account, 730 per Yelp account, and 516 per Flickr account. Note that these words
may contain punctuation, and are case-sensitive. If we remove punctuation and disregard
case, we have 394 distinct words per Twitter account, 218 per Yelp account and 480 per
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Flickr account.
There are tens of millions of distinct words found in the posts of the three social network
accounts, and many do not appear across all three accounts (only 200,000 of the roughly
40 million case-sensitive words in Twitter, along with punctuation, appear in Yelp and
Flickr). Hence, it is important to first apply a pre-filter to reduce the number of words for
several reasons: (i) to reduce the total number of words to a computationally-manageable
size, (ii) to remove words that do not appear across multiple accounts, which would not
significantly affect user account matching, but could de-emphasize the words that do sig-
nificantly affect the matching, (iii) to remove common words (i.e. “and", “the") that may
not be user-discriminative, and (iv) to account for case-sensitivity and punctuation. We
recognize, however, that certain users may prefer certain combinations of case and punc-
tuation in their writing style, potentially making case and punctuation user-discriminative
features. After removing words that do not appear in both Yelp and Twitter, or Flickr
and Twitter, we conduct two investigations based on the aforementioned points. First, we
investigate the effects of punctuation and case-sensitivity of words. Second, we investigate
the effect of removing the most frequent words between Yelp and Twitter, and Flickr and
Twitter. The pre-filtering approach of removing punctuation and case-sensitivity, along
with the top 1,000 most frequent words, gives the optimal results.
We build probabilistic language models for each Twitter user by constructing histograms
of word unigrams, and normalizing them by the total word count per user such that each
histogram represents a unigram probability distribution. We choose word unigrams as
the unit for our models because our experiments show no further improvements when
broadening to higher n-grams (i.e., multi-words). The reason why higher n-grams and
other stylometry methods are less effective is because (i) the pre-filtering already removes
what often links words together, and (ii) tweets consist mostly of keywords with fewer
stylistic expressions. To measure the similarity between the Yelp and Twitter or Flickr
and Twitter accounts, we accumulate the probabilities of each word in the Yelp or Flickr
text from the language model of the Twitter account. This approach is a general version
of the approach implemented by Stolcke [170].
In general, the language-based results are significantly worse compared to the location-
based results, and achieve only a 6% TPR at 1% FPR for matching Yelp to Twitter
accounts, and 10% for matching Flickr to Twitter accounts. The small TPR from Yelp to
Twitter likely comes from the fact that the same user may adopt drastically different kinds
of textual structure when writing Yelp reviews (typically complete paragraphs using words
mostly found in the English lexicon) versus when tweeting (typically short sentences with
fewer standard words). Correlating accounts from Flickr to Twitter is better than from
Yelp to Twitter possibly because the short description of the photos may be more similar
in style and topic to tweets than reviews.
5.5 Combining features
The previous sections discuss matching accounts across social networks with one individual
feature at a time (location, timing, or language). We now use all three features simulta-
neously. The premise here is that combining the individual metrics should (i) achieve
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stronger matching by leveraging their respective strengths, while (ii) making it harder for
users to defend against such attacks. We then compare the results obtained by combining
the three features with existing attacks that exploit screen names to match accounts.
5.5.1 Method
To assess the performance of combining multiple features to identify accounts that belong
to one user across social networks, we use a binary logistic regression classifier [180]. For
a pair of accounts in different social networks, the classifier takes as input the similarity
scores of each feature (using the best settings for each feature as discussed in §5.2, §5.3, and
§5.4) and predicts whether the pair of accounts is a match (i.e., belong to the same user)
or not, as well as the probability of a match. We build classifiers for different combinations
of features. For matching Yelp to Twitter, we build three classifiers using location and
language (one classifier using location alone, another using language alone, and a third
combing these two features). For Flickr to Twitter, we build six classifiers with different
combinations of location, language, and timing.
We build our training and test sets from a dataset with all pairs of accounts in GTarea
and Carea. As a result, we obtain an imbalanced training and test sets with fewer cases of
account pairs that are true matches (only |GTarea|) and significantly more account pairs
that are not matches (|S˜Narea|×|GTarea|−|GTarea|). This imbalance is representative of
real-world datasets (where we expect the number of true matches to be orders of magnitude
smaller than the total possible account pairs between two social networks). To account for
the data imbalance and to correctly train the classifier we set the cost of mis-classifying
the matching accounts inversely proportion to the proportion of matching accounts in
the training dataset. We then evaluate the accuracy of each classifier using 10-fold cross
validation.
5.5.2 Evaluation at scale
We compare the accuracy of classifiers using different combinations of features. We only
present results for users in the San Francisco area, but the conclusions are similar for other
areas. Table 5.1 presents the classification accuracy of each classifier for matching accounts
from Flickr to Twitter and from Yelp to Twitter. This table also includes results for screen
names for discussion in §5.5.3. The table presents the average TPR corresponding to
1% FPR across the ten runs of cross validation as well as the 95% confidence interval
computed with vertical averaging [153].
TPR for classifiers based on individual features–location, timing, and language–are prac-
tically the same as the results in §5.2, §5.3, and §5.4, respectively. The small differences
come from the fact that here we present results from the 10-fold cross validation, whereas
earlier sections simply computed TPR for the entire dataset. The comparison between Loc
and (Loc, Lang) when matching Flickr and Yelp with Twitter shows that language doesn’t
improve TPR when combined with location (in fact, it seems to reduce TPR slightly when
matching Yelp to Twitter accounts). Hence, at low FPR, language doesn’t help to identify
more matching accounts than the ones location already identifies. We note that when we
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Table 5.1: Comparison of the TPR for different classifiers at 1% FPR for matching Flickr




Timing (T) 13±3% -
Language (Lang) 10±3% 6±3%
Location (Loc) 60±6% 44±6%
Screen name (S) 77±3% 7±4%
Loc, Lang 60±6% 42±6%
Loc, T 70±3% -
Loc, Lang, T 63±5% -
Loc, S 86±2% 44±6%
Loc, Lang, S 86±2% 44±7%
Loc, T, Lang, S 88±2% -
consider a higher than 10% FPR, adding language to location can increase the TPR by
10% for Flickr to Twitter matching. Timing, however, is more powerful than language.
When we combine timing with location TPR improves by 7% over location alone. This
increase shows that, when present, timing can very precisely identify true matches which
helps improve the TPR especially for low FPR. The combination of location, language,
and timing increases the TPR over the entire range of FPR. Timing improves TPR when
FPR is low, whereas language helps when FPR is high. At 1% FPR, the highest TPR we
achieve for matching Flickr accounts to Twitter is 70% when we combine location and tim-
ing. The highest TPR for matching Yelp accounts to Twitter is 44% when using location
alone. With the best combination, for the Flickr to Twitter matchings, 17% of the ground
truth users can be identified in the top 10, 27% in the top 50 and 33% in the top 100,
while for the Yelp to Twitter matchings, 1% can be identified in the top 10, 4% in the top
50 and 7% in the top 100.
5.5.3 Comparison with screen name matching
This section compares the accuracy of our classifiers, which only use features extracted
from innocuous user activities, with the state-of-the-art technique to match accounts across
social networks: matching based on the screen name. We compute the similarity between
two screen names using the Jaro distance [36], which is the state-of-the-art distance in
record linkage to measure the similarity between two names. Perito et. al [148] showed
that the Jaro distance performs well to match screen names across different social networks
as well.
Table 5.1 also shows the average TPR at 1% FPR for matching accounts from Flickr to
Twitter and from Yelp to Twitter based on screen names. We first note that screen names
alone achieve 77% TPR for matching accounts from Flickr to Twitter. When matching Yelp
accounts to Twitter, however, screen names only reach 6% TPR, which is lower than any
of the other features we consider. Screen names achieve high accuracy to match accounts
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in Flickr to Twitter, because many users use the same or similar screen names on these two
social networks. On the contrary, Yelp users often select as screen names just their first
name and the initial of their last name or some alias, reflecting their desire to maintain
their reviews pseudo-anonymous.
When we compare matching based on screen names with the combination of location,
timing, and language for matching Flickr to Twitter accounts we observe that the TPR of
screen names is higher than that of the combination of the three other features together.
If we combine screen names with the other three features, we obtain even better results
(TPR increases to 88%). Screen name is clearly a powerful feature to match Flickr and
Twitter accounts today, as we showed in Chapter 4. We should not forget, however, that it
is easy for users who want to hide to obfuscate their identity by simply selecting different
screen names. So, the accuracy of screen names to match accounts across social networks
can decrease drastically as soon as users realize that correlating information across social
networks represents a real threat to their privacy.
We further check whether we can match, by exploiting the user activity, users that maintain
different personas on Flickr and Twitter that we cannot match only using screen names.
Our results show that we can match, by exploiting user activities, almost 50% of the users
that cannot be matched using only screen names.
Given that users in Yelp select screen names that do not reveal their identity, when match-
ing Yelp to Twitter accounts, location alone achieves a much higher TPR than screen
names (44% vs. 7% TPR for 1% FPR). Screen name does not even help increase TPR
when combined with location (see Table 5.1). In fact, out of all detected matches between
Yelp and Twitter 78% are only identified by location. Our approach of using features
based on innocuous user activity should always work better than screen names for social
networks like Yelp, where users do not use their true identity.
5.6 Discussion
Our results in Sections 5.5.2 and 5.5.3 demonstrate the power of our matching scheme,
which provides a high match quality even when tuned for the low false positive rates that
such needle-in-a-haystack challenges require. We now discuss our results further in terms
of realistic attack models, availability of the features we exploit, and potential defenses
users may take.
Attack model Given our matching accuracy we see two attack models as particularly
relevant. First, our matching scheme allows an attacker to find further accounts that belong
to a specific target individual by quickly winnowing down from a large initial starting set
to a much smaller number of candidate accounts suitable for manual inspection. While she
may still need to invest non-trivial effort into the final verification step, the automatic pre-
screening nevertheless enables an attack that would not be feasible at all otherwise.
Second, it is possible to attack a group of people rather than a specific individual. An exam-
ple here is finding employees of a large company that might be vulnerable to bribery (maybe
because of gambling habit that indicates money problems) or extortion (maybe because
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of a medical condition, or an affair). In such a model, the attacker would start with the
set of company employees, e.g., on LinkedIn; match them with other social networks, and
potentially further public records, to collect more personal information; and eventually
match all that to relevant target sites such medical forums, addiction advise networks, or
dating sites.
Feature availability Most social networks provide the features our attacks exploit. For
example, Facebook posts carry timestamp information, and Facebook check-ins come with
location information. Likewise, both Google+ posts and Youtube videos make the upload
time available, and either can include location in its metadata. However, even if an attacker
does not have direct access to some of the features on a particular network, often she
might still infer it from the posted content itself. For example, with LinkedIn we could
get a suitable location fingerprint from the places somebody has previously worked. More
interestingly, the multimedia community is developing a range of approaches to accurately
determine location information from content, such a photos, videos, and meta-tags [2,
5, 33, 39, 53, 91]. Currently, only 1% of all the tweets have geotags and only 5% of the
active Twitter users have at least one post geotagged. Since our results show that we only
need coarse-grain location information to match users’ accounts, we believe that these
techniques can be reliably used in our attack to infer the location of posts when geotags
are not available.
One can also collect the necessary features outside of social networks. A particular privacy
threat concerns mobile applications with access to a user’s current location. If that infor-
mation is provided back to the application developers (as is typical, for instance, for map
and search services), they can identify users by associating corresponding location finger-
prints with social identities. As we have seen, even coarse locations, like zip codes, convey
sufficient information, and hence simple privacy-conscious schemes, such as blurring the
resolution, will not protect from such attacks.
While we discuss just three specific features for account matching, there are others that an
attacker can exploit in a similar way. In particular, content may indirectly reveal further
personal information that can help guide the matching process, such as “Happy Birthday”
greetings from friends that reveal a person’s birthday, even if she does note make the
date itself publicly available. Another possibility concerns matching based on interests as
inferred from the context and the content one “likes”.
Defenses As we indicated earlier, it remains hard to defend against de-anonymization
attacks that exploit information so intrinsically, and ubiquitously, linked with content.
However, there are some countermeasures that can make such attacks less likely to succeed,
in particular, from the perspective of an individual who is part of a larger group of potential
victims2.
As a possible defense against our timing matching, applications could slightly delay au-
tomated posts, introducing random jitter that makes it harder to find suitable thresholds
separating them from manually issued content. Our analysis suggest that a variation in-
terval in the order of 10 s of seconds would prove more than sufficient. We suggest two
2“I don’t need to outrun the bear; I just need to outrun you.”
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strategies to avoid becoming vulnerable to location matching. As the more obvious one,
it clearly helps not to post to separate social networks from the same location because
that’s what the attack keys on (remember from §5.2.4 that 95% of protected users do not
have any common location between their accounts). A more interesting, and less drastic,
countermeasure exploits the fact that one can correct past mistakes (i.e., already sharing
many locations between accounts) by adding further unrelated locations to the mix. Doing
so effectively blurs the link to other networks by adding noise. For example, for a vulner-
able user (with a rank less than 750, see §5.2.4), that has 5 common locations between his
accounts, to become medium vulnerable or protected he needs to add respectively around
two or seven unrelated locations on one social network.
Finally, we note that defending against account matching generally gets more difficult as
the attacker combines further features, hence making the analysis more robust against
inconsystencies in any individual feature. There is a fundamental tradeoff here in that any
useful information that a user publishes will potentially increase the chance of a successful
matching attack.
5.7 Summary
This chapter presents a powerful set of techniques for matching user accounts across social
networks, based on otherwise innocuous information like location and timing patterns. Our
approaches work independent of standard privacy measures, such as disabling tracking
cookies or using anonymizing proxies. For our study, we collected data from the three
social networks Twitter, Flickr and Yelp, including extensive ground truth of 13,629 users
with accounts on both Twitter and Flickr and 1,889 users with accounts on both Twitter
and Yelp. Our results go beyond prior work by not relying on more obvious, user-chosen
information (e.g., screen names [148]) and by evaluating the power of the matching in real-
world scenarios. We show for example that, using the location information, we can match
60% of Flickr accounts with their corresponding Twitter accounts, while only introducing
a small percentage of falsely matching accounts. Moreover, our results show that we
only need coarse-grained location information to match a relevant number of accounts.
Combining all features together gives comparable results with matching on screen names
for Flickr to Twitter matching, and can identify 37% more matching accounts for Yelp to
Twitter matching.
In the process of matching accounts based on locations, we propose a way to aggre-
gate/represent the location profile of an individual such that it is specific enough to make
him unique and general enough to approximate areas of interests rather then meaningless
locations.
The privacy implications of our results are two-fold. First, we point out that it is the
aggregate set of a user’s complete online footprint that needs protection, not just content
on individual social networks. Second, we find that it is hard to defend against such attacks
as the information that enables them often comes intrinsically with the very activity one
wants to publish.
While our work examines a specific set of websites and matching techniques as case studies,
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it demonstrates the broader potential, and risk, of cross-site matching. Our approaches re-
main conceptually simple yet we expect that, soon, more sophisticated variants will emerge
for exploiting the increasing volume of innocuous user information that websites now of-
fer via convenient APIs. In particular, we anticipate that automated content analysis
technology—such as face recognizers and natural language processing—will enable match-
ings more powerful than what we demonstrate here. As such, we see our contribution less
in the specific performance numbers that our experiments yield—which will always vary
between users, features, and social networks—but primarily in pointing out that identify-
ing users by their posting activity indeed poses a real threat. From a research perspective,
we encourage our community to devise novel privacy protections that take such threats
into account and, where hard to prevent, at least support users in understanding their
vulnerability.




In this chapter we use the tools developed in the previous chapters to study imperson-
ation attacks in social networks. We first propose a technique to detect impersonating
accounts and then we characterize impersonating accounts on Twitter. Our technique to
detect impersonating accounts works in two steps. We first identify all the accounts in a
social network that portray the same person; by building a rule-based matching scheme
that exploits findings from previous chapters and emulates human judgement in deciding
whether two accounts portray the same person. We then build a classifier that takes pairs
of accounts portraying the same person and outputs whether one account is impersonating
the other or both accounts are real (i.e., managed by the same person).
Traditional methods to detect fake accounts perform poorly for detecting impersonating
accounts. Many techniques detect fake accounts relying on ground truth from humans to
build classifiers that do the detection automatically [185]. We show that AMT workers
are easily tricked into thinking the impersonating accounts are real. Thus, if the ground
truth is flawed, the classifiers will do a poor job at detecting impersonating accounts.
Furthermore, traditional methods to detect fake accounts exploit features that characterize
single accounts. We show that, to detect impersonating accounts, we have to build methods
that exploit features of pairs of accounts instead of single accounts.
Our analysis of 5,693 impersonating accounts on Twitter shows that the attackers target not
only celebrities, but also ordinary Twitter users. Furthermore, attackers create accounts
that impersonate users mostly to evade the Twitter fake account detection systems rather
than to build social engineering attacks. Even if the victim is not harmed directly, she can
still suffer indirectly because the attacker alters her online image. For example, we found in
our datasets a technology company that was impersonated and the impersonating account
retweeted celebrities and posted tweets such ‘I think I was a stripper in a past life’. This
is clearly not the image the company wants to promote. Our findings reveal a new type of
impersonation attacks that can impact negatively the online image of any user.
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6.1 A framework to detect impersonating accounts
In this section we set the general framework for detecting impersonating accounts. We
first define the problem and we give the intuition behind our approach, we then describe
the features and the dataset we use.
6.1.1 Problem definition and approach
Given a person p, we want to find the accounts that impersonate p in the set of accounts
in a social network SN . Impersonating accounts are the accounts that pretend to be p but
that are not managed and do not have the legal authorization to act on behalf of p. We
denote an impersonating account as aˆ = impersonator(p). Some users maintain multiple
accounts in a social network – one account can be professional and the other personal –
thus there might be multiple real/legal accounts that portray p. We refer to these accounts
as the avatars of p. We denote an avatar account as a¯ = avatar(p).
We approach the problem of detecting impersonating accounts by splitting it in two distinct
parts:
1. Detect all the accounts that portray the same person p inside a social network, CI(p).
2. Split CI(p) in avatar and impersonating accounts. CI(p) can contain multiple avatar
and multiple impersonating accounts which makes the problem more challenging.
For the first step, we leverage the techniques that we developed for matching the accounts
of the same person across social networks, while for the second step we take a supervised
approach to distinguish between impersonating and avatar accounts.
6.1.2 Dataset
We base our analysis on Twitter. Some social networks such as Facebook and LinkedIn
clearly stipulate in their Terms of Use that users should only have one account in a social
network, while other social networks such as Twitter allow users to have multiple accounts.
We chose to detect impersonating accounts on Twitter because it is more challenging since
there can be more than one real account that portray a person. The techniques we develop
apply also to other social networks such as Facebook and LinkedIn.
Our impersonator detection technique requires a dataset of accounts that can potentially
portray the same person in a social network. To generate the dataset, we first choose a
set of accounts in Twitter, S, and then, for each account a ∈ S, we collect a candidate
set of accounts C(a) that can potentially represent the same person portrayed by a and
can potentially be impersonating accounts. To generate C(a) we use the Twitter API to
collect all the accounts that have the same or similar names as a.
Since the number of impersonating accounts on Twitter should be small compared with
the number of good accounts, we generate the initial list of Twitter accounts, S, in an
opportunistic way. Starting with a seed impersonating account, we do a breath first search
crawl on the followers of the seed account. Our intuition is that we might find other
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impersonating accounts in the close network of an impersonating account. The seed account
was an impersonator of Nick Feamster which we incidentally stumbled upon. We collected
100,000 accounts with the breath first search crawl on the followers of the seed account,
which we call Initial Accounts. To cover a larger part of the social graph the breath
first search crawler does not crawl users with more than 10,000 followers.
For each account a in Initial Accounts, we gather a set of 40 accounts, C(a), with
similar names with a, using the Twitter API. We call the resulting 4 million pairs of
accounts (a, b) where b ∈ C(a) and a ∈ Initial Accounts the Initial Pairs. Table 6.1
summarizes the datasets we use for this section. We will explain later the rest of datasets
in the table.









For each account, we use the Twitter API to collect profile information, the timeline, the
list of followers and friends, as well as the list of tweets the user added to this favorites1
and the Twitter users he mentions2 in his tweets.
6.1.3 Features
To distinguish between impersonating accounts and avatar accounts we use gather features
that characterize a single account and features that characterize pairs of accounts.
Features to characterize an account: We gather two categories of features to char-
acterize an account: features that describe the activity of a user and features that describe
the popularity of a user.
From the profile information of accounts we extract the following features that describe
the activity of a user: creation date of the account, timestamp of the first tweet, timestamp
of the last tweet, number of followers, number of friends, number of tweets, number of
retweets, and number of tweets favorited. Users can mention other users in their tweets
or bios using conventions such as @oanagoga. We define the number of mentions as the
number of unique users mentioned by an account. We consider these features because
they are markers of ‘good’ behavior and spikes in any of the features could rise suspicion
(e.g., having more retweets than normal users could indicate that an account is selling
retweets).
1On Twitter users can either re-tweet or favorite a tweet they like.
2On Twitter users can mention other users through convention such as @oanagoga.
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The more influential a user is, the more likely it is that he is a real and not an impersonating
account. Twitter allows users to create lists to split followers in different categories. For
example, users can create a list for news tweets where they can put @nytimes and @cnn.
The number of lists where the user appears counts the number of times a given users appears
in the lists of other users. The klout score [92] is a wide used score that measures the social
influence of an account. The klout score has values between 1 and 100, 100 meaning that
the account is very influential and 1 that the accounts is not influential.
Features to characterize pairs of accounts To characterize pairs of accounts, we use
three types of features: features that measure the similarity between two accounts, features
that characterize the interactions between two accounts, and features that characterize the
time overlap between two accounts.
To measure the similarity between names, screen names, locations, profile photos, friends,
and followers, we use the metrics from §4.1.2. To measure the bio similarity we simply
count the number of common words between the bios of the two accounts. This is a common
technique in entity matching to measure the similarity between records and has good results
in practice [34]. We leave more sophisticated techniques based on the popularity of words
as future work. To achieve better accuracy, we pre-process the bios and remove the stop
words, i.e., the most frequently used words such as the, is, at, and which. We obtained a
list of stop words in 19 languages from Ranks NL project.3
Besides the similarity between profile attributes we also measure the similarity between
the interests of two accounts. We use the algorithm proposed by Parantapa et al. [21] to
infer the interests of a user, by exploiting who the user follows. The algorithm returns a list
of interests that characterizes an account. Some interests are more common than others.
To give more weight to the least common interests we borrow the term frequency - inverse
document frequency (TF-IDF) [86] weighting scheme from the information retrieval field
to weight interests proportionally to their popularity. We apply TF-IDF as follows: for
each interest in an account’s interests lists, TF represents the frequency of the interest
in the interests lists, and IDF represents the number of times the interest appears in
other interests lists of accounts in Initial Accounts. Then the weight of the interest is
TF/log(IDF ). We finally use the cosine distance to measure the similarity between the
two weighted lists of interests.
We add a number of features that represent the interactions between the two accounts
portraying the same person, (a, b). The intuition behind these features is that avatars
managed by the same person will likely interact, while impersonators will never interact
with their victims as they do not want to be discovered and reported. Users can mention
other users through conventions such as @oanagoga. For example a user might have in
his bio the following text: "Hello, this is my personal profile. For professional content
please go to @oanagoga_lip6". To catch such behavior, we define a mention match when
a mentions b or b mentions a in his tweets or bio. Similarly, we define a retweets match
when a retweets a tweet of b or vice versa, a friends match when a is friend with b and a
followers match when a follows b or vice versa.
3http://www.ranks.nl/stopwords/
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We also add features related to the time overlap between two accounts: time difference
between the creation dates, time difference between the last tweets, time difference between
the first tweets and whether one account stopped being active after the creation of the sec-
ond account, we denote this feature as outdated account. We finally consider the difference
between the klout scores of the two accounts, the klout score difference. A small klout
score difference could be indicative of avatars of the same person while a large klout score
difference could be indicative that one account is impersonating the other.
6.2 Detection of accounts that portray the same person
In this section we discuss matching schemes to detect accounts that portray the same
person inside a social network. We start by describing the problems with directly applying
the three-step matching scheme from Chapter 4 to our current scenario. We then propose
a better suited matching scheme and we evaluate it using human workers.
To detect the accounts that portray the same person, we exploit the following public
attributes of accounts: real name, screen name, profile photo, bio, and location. We do
not use other features such as the number of common friends or location and language
fingerprints because we want to detect all the accounts that portray the same person and
not all the accounts managed by the same person. Consequently, we need attributes that
capture the appearance of an account and not the behavior of a user.
6.2.1 Naive approach
We first investigate whether we can use the three-step matching scheme proposed in Chap-
ter 4 to detect all the accounts that portray the same person in a social network. The
three-step matching scheme achieves a high precision to output a matching account be-
cause it assumes there is only one matching account in a social network (recall that, the
Guard abstains instead of returning a matching account whenever it stumbles on cases
where there are multiple possible matching accounts but there is no single account that
stands out). This assumption, however, does not hold in our scenario as we focus on
detecting cases where there are multiple accounts that portray the same person inside a
social network. The first two steps of the matching scheme, the Filter and the Disam-
biguator, however, do not make this assumption. Thus, we could potentially remove the
Guard and only use the first two steps of the matching scheme to identify all accounts
portraying a user. This approach, however, is sub-optimal because we tuned the parame-
ters (e.g., the weights given to each attribute and the thresholds for the probability of two
accounts to match) of the Filter and Disambiguator to detect the matching account
of a user across different social networks.
6.2.2 Single-site matching scheme
Since we do not have ground truth of accounts that portray the same person inside Twit-
ter, we cannot take a supervised approach to build the matching scheme. We can build,
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however, a new matching scheme based on the findings of Chapter 4. More precisely, we
exploit the following two observations:
• When we asked AMT workers why they think two accounts correspond to the same
person they usually said that their names are similar and some other piece of infor-
mation is similar such as their photo, their location or their bio, see §4.2.5.
• We know the similarity thresholds after which humans consider two values of an
attribute to be consistent, see §4.1.2 (we obtained these thresholds from an AMT
experiment that we did to measure how consistent users are in providing the same
value for an attribute across social networks). The thresholds are chosen such as
90% of the attributes identified as consistent by humans have a similarity above the
threshold and less than 10% of attributes identified as not being consistent have a
similarity lower than the threshold.
We combine these two observations to build two new rule-based matching scheme that
emulates human judgment. In entity recognition, it is a well known and widely used
technique, to define rule-based matching schemes built by domain experts [34].
Loose bounds matching scheme: A pair of accounts is in the loose bounds whenever
the real names or screen names are consistent (the similarity of names is higher than the
consistency threshold identified by humans) and some other feature such as the locations,
bios, or profile photos are also consistent:
(sname > thrname | sscreen−name > thrscreen−name) &
(slocation > thrlocation | sbio > thrbio | sphoto > thrphoto) (6.1)
Our intuition is that all the accounts that portray the same person should fall in the loose
bounds, i.e., it is very unlikely that two accounts that portray the same person do not
have any consistent attribute. This is especially true for an impersonator whose goal is to
be as similar as possible to the victim account. Thus, while it is likely that this matching
scheme catches all the accounts that portray the same person, i.e., it has a very high true
positive rate, it also likely catches accounts that do not portray the same person, i.e. it
has high false positive rate. For example, there can be people that have the same name
and live in the same city.
Tight bounds matching scheme: A pair of accounts is in the tight bounds whenever
the names or screen names are consistent and the bios, or profile photos are also consistent
(we leave out the location for this bounds).
(sname > thrname | sscreen−name > thrscreen−name) &
(sbio > thrbio | sphoto > thrphoto) (6.2)
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The tight bounds is more restrictive than the loose bounds matching scheme and likely
misses some accounts that portray the same person, i.e., it has a lower true positive rate.
However, our intuition is that all the accounts that fall in the tight bounds portray the
same person and there are no accounts that portray different persons that fall in the tight
bounds, i.e., it has a low false positive rate. Put differently, having a consistent name
and bio or a consistent name and profile photo is so unique that there cannot be another
different person that has the same values.
We evaluate the loose bounds and the tight bounds matching scheme on all the pairs of
accounts in Initial Pairs. For all the accounts a in Initial Accounts, we compute
the similarity between real names, screen names, profile photos, bios, and locations for all
pairs of accounts (a, b) where b ∈ C(a). We then test how many pairs of accounts (a, b) fall
in the loose and in the tight bounds. Out of the 4 million possible pairs of accounts, there
are 27,582 pairs that fall in the loose bounds and 7,967 pairs that fall in the tight bounds.
We denote the pairs of accounts that fall in the tight bounds the Same Person Pairs.
There are accounts a for which there are multiple pairs of account (a, b) where b ∈ C(a)
that fall in the loose or tight bounds. There are 13,007 accounts in Initial Accounts
that have at least one pair in the loose bounds and 5,897 accounts that have at least one
pair in the tight bounds. We evaluate the accuracy of the matching schemes next.
6.2.3 Evaluation using AMT workers
We want to evaluate how many pairs of accounts from the loose and tight bounds matching
schemes actually portray the same person. Since we do not have ground truth, we setup
an AMT experiment to estimate the true positive rate and the false positive rate of the
matching schemes. We assume the true positive rate of the loose bounds matching scheme
is close to 100% and we only measure the precision. We do not to evaluate the true
positive rate of the loose bounds matching scheme because it needs a very expensive AMT
experiment.
In Chapter 4, we saw that humans are good at identifying whenever two accounts portray
the same person. We randomly select 220 pairs of accounts from the loose bounds out
of which 62 fall in the tight bounds. In each assignment, we give AMT workers two
links corresponding to the two Twitter accounts and we ask them to choose between three
options: ‘the accounts belong to the same person’, ‘the accounts do not belong to the same
person’, or ‘cannot say’. For each assignment we ask the opinion of three different AMT
workers. We say that we have a full agreement when all the AMT workers chose the same
answer, amajority agreement when at least two AMT workers chose the same answer.
Table 6.2: Number of accounts detected by AMT workers as portraying the same person
in the tight bounds and in the loose bounds.
Total Detected as same person
Loose bounds 220 94
Tight bounds 62 61
Table 6.2 shows the number of pairs of accounts AMT workers identified as belonging to
the same person with majority agreement. The results show that 43% of the accounts that
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fall in the loose bounds belong to the same person, while 98% of accounts that fall in the
tight bounds belong to the same person. This validates our intuition that all the accounts
that fall in the tight bounds portray the same person. Furthermore, 65% of accounts that
belong to the same person fall in the tight bounds.
Consequently, the tight bounds matching scheme has a 65% true positive rate (assuming
the loose bounds matching scheme has a 100% true positive rate) for a 2% false positive
rate. The true positive rate could be slightly overestimated as there might be accounts
that portray the same person but do not fall in the loose bounds. Although we cannot
estimate how many accounts fall in this category, our intuition is that there should not be
many. We picked the similarity threshold for consistent values of an attribute such that
90% of the values identified by AMT workers as consistent to fall above the threshold.
Thus, there can be 10% of consistent values we miss. Thus, in the worst possible case we
miss 20% of accounts that portray the same person with the loose bounds. For the rest of
the chapter we use the tight bounds matching scheme to identify accounts that portray the
same person. We discuss next how we can identify impersonators in the list of accounts
returned by the tight bounds matching scheme.
6.3 Detection of impersonating accounts
In this section, we show methods to detect impersonating accounts out of the accounts that
portray the same person. If the social network restricts the number of accounts that each
person can have to one, then the problem of detecting the impersonating accounts out of
a list of accounts that portray the same person is easier. We can, for example, detect the
impersonating account as the one who was created more recently or the account that has
the lowest social influence (i.e., klout score). In some social networks, however, there can
be multiple accounts that are avatars of the same person, hence the impersonation account
detection is more challenging. We approach the problem in a supervised way and we study
two classification techniques to detect impersonation accounts, one based on features of
accounts alone and one based on features of pairs of accounts.
6.3.1 Ground truth
Obtaining ground truth data about impersonators is a challenging problem. Since we are
the first to do an impersonator study, there is no dataset with ground truth about imper-
sonating accounts. We managed, however, to gather a satisfying set of ground truth from
two sources: twitter suspended accounts and accounts that interact with each other.
Accounts suspended by Twitter: Three months after we first crawled the 7,967 pairs
of accounts in the tight bounds (the Same Person Pairs) we re-crawled them and 64%
of the pairs had at least one account suspended. Hence, the suspended accounts were likely
impersonating accounts. We denote the accounts suspended by Twitter the Imperson-
ation Accounts and the corresponding accounts that are not suspended the Avatar
Accounts. We use these datasets as ground truth for detecting impersonators. We also
denote the pairs of accounts with one account suspended and one not the Mixed Pairs
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and the accounts with both accounts suspended the Impersonation Pairs. Table 6.1
shows the number of pairs in each category.
We suspect that Twitter suspends these accounts because they are involved in illegal ac-
tivities such as fake followers or fake retweets rather than being detected as impersonating
accounts. Currently, there is no framework to automatically detect impersonating ac-
counts and the only solution is for the victims to manually report the accounts who are
impersonating them [75]. We validate this assumption in §6.5.
Accounts that interact: We previously discussed that is very likely that if two ac-
counts interact/mention each other they are avatars managed by the same person and not
impersonating accounts. We found 1,332 pairs of accounts in the tight bounds that either
have a mention match, retweets match, friends match or followers match. We denote the
pairs that mention each other the Avatar Pairs. To validate that these accounts are
actually representing avatars of the same user and not impersonators we randomly picked
100 pairs of accounts and we manually investigated them 4. In only three pairs out of 100
there was an impersonating account. These pairs corresponded to cases where one user
complained that there is someone else impersonating him. Since the majority of pairs do
not contain impersonating accounts we consider them as ground truth for pairs of avatar
accounts.
Our ground truth has limitations: the accounts suspended by Twitter might miss certain
types of impersonating accounts (that do not engage in fake retweets or fake followers
scams) and our ground truth for accounts that interact might also miss some types of
avatars that do not mention each other. An alternative way to get ground truth is to
ask AMT workers whether they think two accounts are avatars of the same person or
one account is impersonating another. We will see, however, in §6.4 that AMT workers
are not reliable enough to be used as ground truth. We leave as future work to study
how we can combine different ways to gather ground truth to obtain more representative
datasets. We envisage in the future to try to directly ask Twitter users whether an account
is impersonating them or if it is an avatar. Our current ground truth, however, is still
useful to detect and characterize impersonators.
6.3.2 Methods to detect impersonating accounts
We approach the problem of detecting impersonating accounts in two ways. We first present
a traditional approach that builds a classifier based on features of single accounts. We then
present a new approach that builds a classifier based on features of pairs of accounts instead
of accounts alone.
Account-based approach: The traditional approach to detect fake accounts in a social
network is to analyze the features of a single account with the help of human workers or
matching learning algorithms and decide whether the account is real or fake. The drawback
4We are trained at identifying impersonating accounts after long hours looking at the data.
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of such approach is that it can potentially miss impersonating accounts because they look
real when looking at them in isolation.
Impersonation Accounts and Avatar Accounts contain ground truth of imperson-
ating and avatar accounts. We build a binary classifiers, which we call Accounts Classi-
fier, that distinguishes between impersonating and avatar accounts. We select 1,000 ran-
dom accounts from Impersonation Accounts and 1,000 random accounts from Avatar
Accounts to build the training set. We use a Naive Bayes classifier and we train it with
all the features characterizing an account that we presented in §6.1.3. We use 10-fold cross
validation to train and evaluate the classifier.
To evaluate the classifier, we focus on small false positive rates as it is important when
detecting impersonators not to label an avatar account as an impersonating account. The
Accounts Classifier only achieves a 6% true positive rate for a 1% false positive rate
for detecting impersonating accounts and a 93% true positive rate for a 1% false posi-
tive rate for detecting avatar accounts. Thus, the account-based approach is not able to
accurately identify impersonating accounts. The feature that are the most indicative of
an impersonating account is a recent account creation date and the feature that is most
indicative of an avatar is a high klout score.
Pair-based approach: A more suited approach to detect impersonating accounts is
to analyze pairs of accounts instead of analyzing single accounts in isolation. Given
two accounts a and b that portray the same person there are multiple possibilities: (1)
both accounts are avatars, (avatar(p), avatar(p)); (2) both accounts are impersonators,
(impersonator(p), impersonator(p)) – attackers might create multiple accounts using the
same victim account information; and (3) one account is an avatar and one account is an im-
personator, (avatar(p), impersonator(p)). The pair-based approach first detects whether
a pair of accounts corresponds to one of the three categories by analyzing features that char-
acterize pairs of accounts. Whenever we have a pair of accounts (avatar(p), impersonator(p)),
we can further check the creation date and the klout score of the accounts to detect which
account is the impersonator and which account is the avatar. The avatar account usually
has a klout score higher than the impersonating account and the creation date of the im-
personating account is after the creation date of the real account. In the Mixed Pairs
dataset, all but one suspended account have the creation date after the creation date of the
unsuspeded accounts. The only unsuspended account that has the creation date after the
suspended account corresponds to a case where a spammer created multiple fake accounts
that have the same name, profile photo and bio.
Mixed Pairs and Avatar Pairs contain ground truth on pairs of accounts that are
avatars and pairs of accounts that contain an impersonating account. We use these datasets
to train a binary classifier to distinguish between (avatar(p), avatar(p)) pairs of accounts
and (avatar(p), impersonator(p)) pairs of accounts. We call this classifier the Pairs Clas-
sifier. We build a training set with 1,000 random samples of (avatar(p), avatar(p)) pairs
and 1,000 random samples of (avatar(p), impersonator(p)) pairs. We use all the features
that characterize pairs of accounts described in §6.1.3 besides mention, retweets, friends,
and followers match because we already used these features to build the ground truth. We
use 10-fold cross validation to train and evaluate a Naive Bayes classifier.
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The Pairs Classifier achieves a 75% true positive rate for a 1% false positive rate
to identify (avatar(p), impersonator(p)) pairs of accounts and a 85% true positive rate
for a 1% false positive rate to identify (avatar(p), avatar(p)) pairs of accounts. Thus, the
accuracy of the pair-based approach is much higher than the accuracy of the account-based
approach.
The features that are the most indicative of pairs of accounts (avatar(p), avatar(p)) are the
similarity between the accounts’ interest and the number of common friends and followers.
The most indicative features of pairs of accounts (avatar(p), impersonator(p)) are the
similarities between profile attributes, i.e. the more two accounts look alike the more likely
is that one is impersonating the other. Also the time difference between the creation date of
the two accounts is a powerful indicator that one account is impersonating the other.
6.3.3 Evaluation over unlabeled pairs of accounts
We test the Pairs Classifier over 1,578 pairs of accounts in the Same Person Pairs
that are not in the Mixed Pairs, Avatar Pairs or Impersonation Pairs dataset.
Pairs Classifier identifies 1,131 pairs of accounts (avatar(p), avatar(p)) and 356 pairs
of accounts (avatar(p), impersonator(p)). Thus, the Pairs Classifier can be used to
detect more avatars and impersonating accounts with a high accuracy.
6.4 Detecting impersonating accounts using humans
To understand how well humans detect impersonating and avatar accounts, we setup two
AMT experiments. More specifically, we want to evaluate the true positive rate and the
false positive rate of humans to detect impersonating and avatar accounts. In all the
experiments we ask the opinion of three AMT workers and we report the results for majority
agreement. We detail next the experiments we did and the results.
Single account: To evaluate the true positive rate and false positive rate of humans we
select 50 impersonating accounts and 50 avatar accounts from Same Person Pairs which
we manually validate. In each assignment, we give AMT workers a link to a Twitter account
and we ask them to choose between three options: ‘the account is real’, ‘the account is fake’
and ‘cannot say’. Table 6.3 shows the results. AMT workers correctly detected only 9 out
of 50 impersonating accounts, however they detected 48 out of 50 avatar accounts. Thus,
in this scenario, AMT workers have only a 18% true positive rate for a 82% false positive
rate to detect impersonation accounts and a 96% true positive rate for a 4% false positive
rate to detect avatar accounts.
Pairs of accounts: Hoping to achieve a better accuracy, instead of showing AMT work-
ers one account, we show them two accounts that portray the same person: either the
impersonating and the corresponding avatar account, or two avatar accounts. We picked
the same 50 impersonating accounts (and their corresponding avatars) and the same 50
avatar accounts (and their corresponding other avatars) as in the previous experiment. In
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Table 6.3: Number of impersonating and avatar accounts detected by AMT workers, based
on single account features, out of the true impersonating and avatar accounts.
True True
impersonating avatar
Detected impersonating 9 2
Detected avatar 41 48
Table 6.4: Number of (avatar(p), avatar(p)) and (avatar(p), impers(p)) pairs of
accounts detected by AMT workers out of the true (avatar(p), avatar(p)) and
(avatar(p), impers(p)) pairs of accounts.
True True
(avatar(p), impers(p)) (avatar(p), avatar(p))
Detected (avatar(p), impers(p)) 18 34
Detected (avatar(p), avatar(p)) 32 16
each assignment, we give AMT workers two links corresponding to the two Twitter accounts
and we ask them to choose between four options: ‘both accounts are real’, ‘both accounts
are fake’, ’one account is impersonating the other account’, and ’cannot say’.
Table 6.4 shows the results. AMT workers are able to correctly detect more imperson-
ating accounts (18 out of 50 pairs of accounts), but, they correctly detected less avatar
accounts (34 out of 50 pairs of accounts). Thus, in this scenario, AMT workers have a
36% true positive rate for a 68% false positive rate to detect (avatar(p), impersonator(p))
pairs of accounts and a 68% true positive rate for a 32% false positive rate to detect
(avatar(p), avatar(p)) pairs of accounts. This result shows that humans are generally bad
at identifying impersonators, in particular compared to an automated classification Pairs
Classifier.
6.5 Characterization of impersonation attacks
In this section we want to understand who are the victims of impersonation attacks, what
is the goal of impersonators and what is the behavior of impersonating accounts. We use
the Impersonation Accounts and the Avatar Accounts datasets to analyze these
questions. Figure 6.1 shows the CDFs of different properties of impersonating and victim
accounts.
Characterization of victims: Figure 6.1a shows the CDF of the number of followers
of victim accounts. The median number of followers is only 73. Since celebrities usually
have from many thousands to millions of followers, this shows that attackers do not only
target famous people but also ordinary users. Figure 6.1c shows the CDF of the number
of tweets per victim account. The median number of tweets is 181. This shows that
the victims are fairly active Twitter users. Furthermore, Figure 6.1h shows that 75% of
victim accounts posted at lest one tweet in 2013. Figures 6.1j and 6.1i show the CDF of
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Figure 6.1: CDFs of different properties of impersonating and victim accounts.
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Figure 6.2: CDFs of the similarity between different profile attributes between imperson-
ating and victim accounts.
the number of lists where a victim account appears and the klout score. 40% of victim
accounts appear in at least one list and 30% of users have klout scores higher than 25
(e.g. Dina Papagiannaki – https://twitter.com/dpapagia – has a klout score of 26 and Jon
Crowcroft – http://twitter.com/tforcworc – has a klout score of 45). This shows that a
significant fraction of victim accounts correspond to influential users. Consequently, the
victim accounts are users that are active on Twitter, that are not necessarily celebrities,
and some of them are quite influential on Twitter.
Characterization of impersonators: Figure 6.1d and Figure 6.1e show the CDFs of
the number of retweets and the number of tweets favorited by impersonation accounts.
This are the only two properties for which the impersonating accounts have higher counts
than the victim accounts. Our intuition was that attackers create these accounts to sell
fake retweets and fake favorites. Indeed, we checked who the impersonators are retweeting
or favoring and we found that most of the impersonating accounts retweet tweets from a
specific set of accounts. Consequently, we believe that most of the impersonating accounts
we detected are used for retweet fraud and they do not actually try to directly harm the
victims. The median number of followers, friends and tweets of impersonating accounts
are 11, 104, and 28 respectively. Such low numbers do not denote suspicious activity.
We believe that impersonators aim to keep their account properties in normal ranges so
that they are not detected by fake account detection systems. The median number of
impersonating accounts per victim accounts is one, but for 10% of the accounts, there are
more than one impersonating accounts.
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Figure 6.1f shows that impersonation attacks are a recent threat, as all the impersonating
accounts are created starting 2013. Since these accounts operate under the radar, Twit-
ter took in average 287 days to suspend these accounts. This means that victims were
impersonated, and their online image was potentially harmed, for several months.
Figures 6.2a to 6.2e show the CDFs of similarity scores between different features between
impersonating and victim accounts. These plots show how much information impersonators
copy from victim accounts. The consistency threshold is the threshold identified by AMT
workers after which they consider two values of an attribute to be consistent. If the
similarity between two attributes cannot be computed because of missing values, we put a
-1. These plots show a number of interesting things. First, most impersonators copy most
of the profile attributes of their victims. Second, the location is not as consistent as the
other attributes, there are more than 40% of accounts that do not have the same location
as their victim accounts. This means that attackers either alter sometime the profile
attributes copied from their victims, or do not update the impersonating profile.
6.6 Summary
We conducted the first study to detect and characterize impersonating accounts in current
social networks. We showed that we can detect impersonating accounts in social networks
by firstly identifying accounts that portray the same person inside the social network and
then using a classifier to detect which are the impersonating accounts in the returned
list.
We proposed a rule-based matching scheme that emulates human judgement to detect
accounts that portray the same person inside a social network. The scheme infers that
two accounts portray the same person whenever two accounts have consistent names and
consistent bios or photos. The matching scheme is an easy and intuitive way to detect
accounts that portray the same person and achieves a 65% recall for a 98% precision.
We proposed a new way of detecting fake accounts in a social network. Contrarily to
previous work, our technique exploits features of pairs of accounts instead of features of
single accounts. We showed that this technique is better suited to detect impersonating
accounts. In fact, our AMT experiments showed that our technique is better than humans
at detecting impersonating accounts. Studies of impersonators should avoid relying on
humans as ground truth.
Our analysis of impersonating and victim accounts on Twitter revealed that attackers
target a wide range of users and anyone that has a Twitter account can be victim of such
attacks. We also discovered a new type of impersonation attacks where attackers create
impersonating accounts to look real and to evade fake account detection schemes rather
than to engage in social engineering attacks.
Our findings reveal a new type of privacy threat against the online image of users. Many
surveys [38,48] suggest that U.S. firms started to do background checks for job applicants
that involve mining data from their online profiles. The most concerning fact is that
attackers impersonate a wide range of users and use the accounts to promote different types
of products and post random tweets. This can potentially have a tremendous negative
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impact on the online image of users especially when someone searches for information
about them and stumbles across the impersonating account. As we saw humans can be
very easily tricked into thinking an impersonating account is a real account, thus we call
for applications that can assist users when searching for people online to help them decide
whether the account is an impersonator or an avatar.
Chapter 7
Conclusions and Perspectives
The proliferation of social data is providing many opportunities for developing exciting
new applications. At the same time, however, it is also raising many new questions about
the privacy and security of people online. An important premise of many new services
and research is that it is possible to match the different accounts of a user. The main
contribution of my thesis is the development and analysis of scalable and reliable matching
schemes to match the accounts that correspond to the same individual in todays’ social
networks. Matching accounts across social networks allows applications to work on more
complete user profiles. It also rises, however, more serious privacy concerns, in particular
when we can match the accounts of users that deliberately change the information in
their profiles to maintain separate personas. Finally, matching accounts within a site is a
powerful tool to detect impersonators.
7.1 Summary of contributions
The thesis makes the following contributions:
Representative ground truth of matching accounts across social networks: We
gathered ground truth data of matching accounts by exploiting the Friend Finder mecha-
nism in social networks with a list of 10 million random email addresses. With this method,
we can find all the accounts on different social networks that were created using a specific
email address. This dataset better represents users in general than the ground truth used
by most previous work that captured matching accounts of people that willingly provide
links to their accounts in different social networks.
Characterization of user behavior across social networks: We show what kind of
information users provide in different social networks and how consistent they are between
different social networks. We found that only 7% of Twitter users have no attribute in
common (not even names) with their Facebook account. The rest of the users have at least
consistent names. We also show that the consistency and availably of attributes across
accounts is higher for users who willingly provide links to their accounts in different social
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networks that for random users. This result implies that this kind of ground truth will
have higher matching rate than on random users.
Framework to evaluate the quality of features used for matching accounts:
We proposed a set of four properties: Availability, Consistency, non-Impersonability and
Discriminability (ACID) to evaluate the quality of different features to match accounts.
We believe that these properties are necessary and sufficient for an ideal feature to have in
order to guarantee a scalable and reliable matching. None of the attributes extracted from
users profiles, however, have all four properties. Thus, we proposed ways to combine them
in order to build a scalable and reliable matching scheme. Besides being useful in deciding
whether a new feature has the potential to improve matching accuracy, these properties
should be useful to anonymize datasets collected from social networks and measure the
potential risks of de-anonymization.
Evaluation of the performance of human workers to match accounts: We eval-
uated the performance of human workers to match accounts using Amazon Mechanical
Turk (AMT) experiments. In an experiment where we showed AMT workers two pairs
of accounts and asked them whether they correspond to the same person or not, humans
were able to correctly detect 60% of the matching accounts with no false matches. For
the remaining 40% of accounts, AMT workers said that they cannot decide due to lack
of information. This study showed that: (1) humans do a good job at identifying when
two accounts correspond to the same person and when they do not; (2) humans need more
attributes than just names matching in order to be confident that two accounts correspond
to the same person.
A multifaceted approach to evaluate matching schemes: We proposed to evaluate
matching schemes in three scenarios: on a small dataset, on a large-scale dataset and
against human workers. Our evaluation shows that a matching scheme with a high accuracy
on a small dataset may have low accuracy on a large-scale dataset. Furthermore, a more
realistic target for matching schemes based on the public profiles of users is to achieve the
accuracy of humans rather than detect 100% of matching accounts.
A scalable and reliable matching scheme based on public attributes: We devel-
oped a scheme in three steps that exploits public attributes provided by users to achieve
a reliable matching even when applied on large social networks. Our problem has some
unique constraints that prevent us from using general matching schemes developed for
entity matching. First, we have to deal with very large datasets. For example, Facebook
has over 1 billion users, hence the data contains one billion matching accounts and one
quintillion non-matching accounts. Second, the number of features we can use to match
accounts is relatively small because there are not many profile attributes available across
multiple social networks. The most common profile attributes are names, location, friends,
and profile photos. The small number of available attributes hampers the accuracy of
traditional matching methods so that the matching is no longer reliable. To overcome this
problem, instead of using one classifier to detect matching and non-matching accounts, we
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use two classifiers sequentially that achieve better accuracy. Furthermore, we take advan-
tage of the fact that there can only be one matching account on a second social network to
increase the reliability of the matching. At the end, we are able to achieve a 21% recall for
a 98% precision which is close to what humans can achieve, 25% recall for a 98% precision.
Our scheme is robust to impersonators.
An online service to match accounts: We developed an online service that takes as
input an account in Twitter and searches in real-time the matching account on Facebook.
The service can be found at http://matchingaccounts.app-ns.mpi-sws.org/. Besides pro-
viding a potentially useful tool to the public, this service allowed us to test our matching
schemes in the wild and to identify the challenges faced when using the matching schemes
in the real world.
Amatching scheme using only innocuous information about user activities: We
showed that by only exploiting the location, timing and writing style of user’s posts we can
match his accounts across social networks. This result has important privacy implications
as users tend to think that, if they maintain different pseudonyms on different social
networks, their accounts are not linkable. We show, however, that we can leverage the user
activity to match accounts. We show for example that, using the location information,
we can match 60% of Flickr accounts with their corresponding Twitter accounts, while
only introducing a small percentage of falsely matching accounts. Moreover, our results
show that we only need coarse-grained location information to match a relevant number
of accounts. Combining all features together gives comparable results with matching on
screen names for Flickr to Twitter matching, and can identify 37% more matching accounts
for Yelp to Twitter matching.
A method to detect impersonators inside a social network: We developed a
method to detect impersonators in two steps. Our method, first, exploits the same sim-
ilarity metrics used for matching accounts across social networks to detect accounts that
portray to the same person inside a social network. We then use a classifier built on fea-
tures that characterize pairs of accounts to detect whether a pair of accounts corresponds
to different avatars of the same person or one account is impersonating the other. Tradi-
tional methods to detect fake accounts perform poorly for detecting impersonators. Our
study shows that detecting impersonators requires to build methods that exploit features
that characterize pairs of accounts rather than features that characterize single accounts
as done so far.
Demonstrate that humans are not very good at detecting impersonators: Many
social networks use humans to check if an account corresponds to a real person. Our exper-
iments on AMT show that humans are not very good at detecting impersonators. Humans
can achieve a 18% true positive rate for a 82% false positive rate to detect impersonating
accounts and a 96% true positive rate for a 4% false positive rate to detect avatar accounts.
Hence, their accuracy is not good enough to be used as ground truth.
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A characterization study of impersonators: We performed the first characterization
of impersonators on Twitter. Our analysis of 5,693 impersonating accounts shows that not
only celebrities are victims of such attacks but anyone with a Twitter account. We also
show the main purpose of these impersonating accounts is to avoid traditional fake account
detection schemes rather than launch social engineering attacks on their victims.
Together, these contributions advance the state of the art in measuring and protecting the
online footprint of users. We hope that our work will lead to better tools to manage and
control the online image of individuals as we discuss next.
7.2 Future work
Our ideas for future work are both on improving the accuracy of matching schemes and
on potential applications. We also have some more long term research agendas regarding
the privacy of users online.
7.2.1 Improving matching schemes
Mobile phones are able to connect to a wide variety of sensors that can log almost all user
activities. Applications on mobile phones use these sensors to provide different monitoring
services: we have applications to monitor sleep, heart rate or the number of steps we do
each day. Most of these applications offer the possibility to share these logs on Facebook
or other social networks. Sensors are still in their early days and we can only expect that
more and more sensors will surround us. With the proliferation of all these sensors, mobile
applications and social networks integration, it is becoming easier and easier to share any
aspect of a user’s life at a very fine grain and provide high quality context data to every
post. There is already a lot of data about users online and we can only expect this data
to become even more precise and complete in the future. Thus, it is important to keep
developing better matching schemes.
Improve the account matching using the graph structure of the social network:
In this thesis, we only exploited the friends of a user to match their accounts without ex-
ploiting the full graph structure of the social network. There are many studies that propose
techniques to de-anonymize graphs. The main idea of such approaches is to start with a
few nodes (seeds) for which we know the corresponding accounts on the two graphs, and
then propagate the matching by measuring the similarity between the two graphs. We plan
to combine such approaches with the method we currently have to match accounts.
Study the uniqueness of named friendship relations: In this thesis we used the
friends of a user as a feature to match accounts. We feel however, that we did not explore
fully this features. We want to investigate what is the uniqueness of friendship links: i.e.
if a user, user1, has the name name1 and one of his friends, user2, has the name name2,
we want to check if there exist other users, user3 and user4 with the same name1 and
name2 that are friends inside the same social network. If a friendship relation is unique,
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whenever we see two people that are friends with name1 and name2, we will know for
sure that they correspond to user1 and user2. If true, this would be a powerful and easy
method to match accounts across social networks.
Measure the spread of single sign-on services: Besides improving our matching
schemes, we can also study the implicit matching of accounts provided by single sign-on
services. We want to measure what percentage of users connect with their social networks
accounts on third-party sites. We would like to understand who are these users, to which
types of sites they are connecting and how often they share the activities they do on third-
party sites on social networks. By measuring the integration between social networks and
third-party sites we will be able to understand how much information on social networks
is generated with the help of third-party sites and what third-party sites learn about their
users from social networks. Furthermore, a better understanding of implicit matching can
potentially lead to applications that build on top of it. In the next section we will give an
example of such application.
7.2.2 Applications of matching
The amount of data generated by users that is publicly available has kindled a lot of
fundamental research on online communities such as user influence estimation [188], user
expertise estimation [117, 162], community structure and link analysis [139] and opinion
mining [144]. Most prior research, however, has focused on single social networks and did
not analyze social networks in aggregate. Knowing the matching accounts of users would
allow to compare and combine findings across social networks and have a better global view.
Finally, it also opens new research directions like understanding the migration patters of
users between sites [108] or detect impersonators.
Following are a few particular research studies that we would to pursue:
Sybil detection using cross-site information: A lot of recent research has focused on
the problem of verifying user identities (i.e., assessing the trustworthiness of user accounts)
in social networks like Twitter, Facebook, LinkedIn, or Google+. Existing proposals to
detect fake / untrustworthy identities rely on analyzing information about the identities
(e.g., their characteristics or activities) that is available within a single site or domain.
We want to investigate the feasibility of leveraging information about identities that is
aggregated across multiple social networking sites to reason about their trustworthiness.
The key insight is that, while honest (especially popular) users naturally maintain their
presence on multiple sites, attackers might be discouraged by the additional effort and
costs to do the same.
Combine multiple sources of information to infer the expertise of users and
transfer expertise from one social network to another: Researchers showed it is
possible to infer the expertise of users on social networks [117,162]. For example, Sharma
et al. [162] showed that we can easily infer the expertise of users on Twitter by exploiting
Twitter lists (thematic lists where users can group the people who they are following).
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Finding experts on Twitter leads to easy ways to find people to follow and find relevant
information regarding a subject. While Twitter and other social networks have metadata
that helps the organization and inference of such information, blogs, on the other hand,
have no such infrastructure. We want to provide better tools for finding relevant content
on blogs by matching blogs to their corresponding accounts on Twitter. This approach
will permit to structure the unstructured world of blogs using the structured world of
Twitter. Furthermore, we can use the content on both sites to further refine the expertise
of users.
Understand what makes a person popular across different social networks:
People are often interested in strategies to make their accounts more popular on differ-
ent social networks. Knowing that we can match accounts across social networks, we want
to investigate a number of questions: do the same strategies have the same impact on
different social networks? does the popularity on one social network influence the popu-
larity on another social network? is the audience the same on different social networks?
Answering these questions will lead to a better understanding of what makes an account
popular and what are the best strategies to adopt by companies and people who want to
increase their popularity.
Understand how information spreads from one social network to another: We
would like to understand whether information spreads from one social network to another
and, if so, how. We would like to investigate whether there exist relying nodes that always
transfer the information or whether there are only random users that transfer random
pieces of information. If there are indeed relying nodes, this information could be valuable
for advertisers and marketers.
Recommenders with heterogeneous information: So far, recommender system have
focused on recommending content inside a system using the information gathered inside the
particular system. Knowing the users accounts on different social networks will allow us to
see if it is possible to use the data learned in one site to recommend things in another site.
For example, we would like to check the information learned about users on Quora can help
do better recommendations on LinkedIn. Or, the profile learned about a user on Twitter
can help make better recommendations on a shopping site. This study can be useful, for
example, to better estimate the value of personal data, to bootstrap recommender systems
or to better understand users and how their preferences relate on different subjects.
Investigate whether single sign-on services help reduce spam: Even if this study
does not build directly on our matching scheme, it is based on the implicit matching of
accounts provided by single sign-on services. Detecting spam is a continuous fight. Big
social networks such as LinkedIn, Facebook or Twitter use sophisticated techniques to
detect spam and have entire teams that work full time on this [169]. Smaller sites or social
networks, however, do not have access to the same resources. We want to investigate
whether third-parity sites that allow users to connect with their Facebook or Twitter
accounts have less spam. Our intuition is that, first, it is harder to create a fake account on
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Facebook or Twitter because of their fake account detection system, and second, Facebook
and Twitter might be quicker at detecting accounts that post spam and suspending them.
We plan to do a measurement study on Quora. This study has several implications, if
it is indeed true that connecting with a Facebook or Twitter account reduces spam on
third-party sites, than Facebook or Twitter could sell this as a service. At the same time
third-party sites will have even better incentive to integrate with Facebook or Twitter.
Furthermore, this can be the initial step towards proposing collaborative schemes to detect
spam where both Facebook or Twitter and third-party sites participate with information
about the trustworthiness of accounts.
7.2.3 Protecting user privacy
The privacy of users online will remain an important topic. Although we do not have short
term research agendas, we are maturing at two ideas regarding online privacy.
Technical and legal solutions for protecting and controlling the digital footprint
of individuals: Given the current data enthusiasm where everybody is logging every-
thing we are at a point where we leave digital traces everywhere we go with or without
our knowledge and will. Ideal solutions for protecting the privacy of individuals should
protect their whole digital footprint both online and oﬄine. The online digital footprint
contains anything that is publicly visible on the Internet about a given person, while the
oﬄine digital footprint includes all the logs that are collected but not shared online. These
logs can range from medical records to bank statements and tracking cookies. The prob-
lem of protecting users’ privacy is complex and legal approaches should be combined with
technical approaches to obtain optimal solutions. For example, one combined approach
could consist of: (1) laws requiring companies to share with the user any kind of data they
collect about them; (2) technical solutions to store and collect such data, visualize it, and
have algorithms to show what else can be inferred.
Privacy specific to every person: The notion of privacy is different from person to
person and it is hard to build tools or laws that satisfy everyone’s perspective. For example,
teenagers mostly do not want their parents to see their posts. For young adults, privacy
could mean that a future employer cannot see the photos of their undergrad parties. For
other adults privacy might mean that an organization they want to be part of will not
deny their membership because of their political convictions. Therefore, we need research
in sociology to better understand privacy.
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Résumé en français
Aujourd’hui, plus de 2,4 milliards d’utilisateurs ont accès à l’Internet
et une grande partie d’entre eux ont un compte actif sur un réseau so-
cial. Il y a plus de 1,2 milliards utilisateurs actifs sur Facebook seul
(728 millions de ces utilisateurs se connecte quotidiennement), 540 mil-
lions sur Google+, 259 millions sur LinkedIn, et 232 millions sur Twit-
ter [171]. En 2009, une étude d’Anderson Analytics [178] a montré
que 91% des utilisateurs de Twitter et 82% des utilisateurs de LinkedIn
ont également un compte Facebook. Nous nous attendons à ce que ce
chevauchement soit encore plus élevé en 2014. Les utilisateurs parta-
gent toutes sortes d’informations sur les réseaux sociaux à un rythme
effarant. Par exemple les utilisateurs de Facebook partagent 4,75 mil-
liards de pièces de contenu quotidiennement. Toutes les 60 secondes, les
utilisateurs postent 510 commentaires, 293 000 mises à jour de statuts,
et 136 000 téléchargements de photos sur Facebook [141]. Les utilisa-
teurs se livrent souvent à des activités différentes et révèlent des infor-
mations sur différents aspects de leur vie sur différents réseaux sociaux.
Sur Facebook, les utilisateurs communiquent avec leurs familles et leurs
amis et partagent certains aspects de leur vie personnelle. Sur LinkedIn,
les utilisateurs donnent des détails sur leur évolution professionnelle et
à leurs aspirations. Sur Twitter, les utilisateurs ont tendance à poster
des choses qui les passionnent.
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Il y a un intérêt croissant dans l’identification des multiples comptes
qui correspondent à un seul individu. Premièrement, les organisations
sont intéressées par la corrélation des activités d’un utilisateur pour re-
grouper toutes les informations sur plusieurs réseaux sociaux et élaborer
un profil plus complet d’un utilisateur individuel que le profil fourni par
un seul réseau social. Deuxièmement, les réseaux sociaux s’intéressent
à la découverte de tous les comptes correspondant à un seul individu
au sein d’un seul réseau social. Les utilisateurs sont censés ouvrir un
seul compte dans un réseau social (comme stipulé dans les conditions de
service), cependant certains utilisateurs créent plusieurs comptes. En
outre, les utilisateurs malveillants usurpent souvent l’identité des util-
isateurs honnêtes. Dans les deux cas, nous avons besoin de techniques
permettant de trouver les comptes d’un seul individu.
Nous voyons déjà des modèles légitimes d’entreprises basés sur ces tech-
niques de corrélation. De nombreuses compagnies émergentes essayent
d’analyser automatiquement les profils d’utilisateurs sur différents réseaux
sociaux pour aider les recruteurs dans leurs décisions [166]. Des portails
de vente combinent les informations téléphoniques avec les informations
sur différents réseaux sociaux pour présenter un profil plus complet d’un
client aux représentants des ventes. Cela permet d’aider les appelants
des hotlines plus efficacement [159].
Finalement, certaines sociétés comme PeekYou [146] et Spokeo [4] pro-
posent des "moteurs de recherche de personnes" : a partir d’informations
de base telles que noms d’utilisateur ou noms et prénoms réels, ces ser-
vices retournent les profils d’utilisateur collectées dans différents réseaux
sociaux.
La corrélation des comptes d’utilisateurs sur différents réseaux sociaux
a aussi des applications pour des nombreux problèmes de recherche. Il
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y a beaucoup de recherche fondamentale sur les communautés sociales
telles que l’estimation d’influence d’utilisateurs [188], l’estimation de
l’expertise d’utilisateurs [117], la structure des communautés en ligne [139]
et l’analyse d’opinion [144]. A ce jour, les chercheurs ont analysé cette
problématique dans un seul réseau social et ils n’ont jamais analysé
les problèmes à travers plusieurs réseaux sociaux. Par exemple, les
chercheurs ont étudié le comportement des utilisateurs sur Facebook
ou LinkedIn séparément [10, 18, 182]. Ceci donne uniquement une vue
partielle d’un utilisateur. Les interactions dans Facebook peuvent prob-
ablement seulement caractériser les interactions avec des amis, et les
interactions de LinkedIn peuvent probablement seulement caractériser
les interactions avec les collègues de travail. Connaître la correspondance
des comptes sur plusieurs réseaux sociaux fournit l’occasion de construire
un meilleur portrait d’un utilisateur. Avoir une meilleure compréhension
d’un utilisateur peut ensuite mener à de meilleurs services personnalisés
ou une meilleure estimation d’expertise d’utilisateurs. Un bloc de con-
struction important pour toute recherche à travers différents réseaux
sociaux est d’avoir des techniques fiables pour corréler les comptes sur
les réseaux sociaux.
Alors que la création de tels profils complets des utilisateurs a de nom-
breuses applications dans l’industrie et la recherche, elle apporte aussi
des légitimes et sérieuses préoccupations sur la protection de la vie privée
des utilisateurs en ligne. Sur chaque site, un utilisateur peut juger appro-
prié ce qu’il poste sur son compte Facebook, Twitter, ou LinkedIn ; mais
il peut révéler beaucoup plus que ce dont il ne se rend compte lorsqu’on
les examine de façon agrégée. Par exemple, une attaque d’ingénierie so-
ciale pourrait d’abord identifier les employés d’une organisation victime
sur LinkedIn, puis examiner leurs comptes Facebook pour trouver des
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antécédents personnels a exploiter et regarder leurs tweets pour com-
prendre leurs modes de déplacement.
Dans cette thèse, nous développons des méthodes pour identifier les
comptes sur différents réseaux sociaux d’un utilisateur donné. Nous
avons d’abord étudié comment nous pouvons exploiter le profils public
(p. ex., les nom d’utilisateurs, les endroits où ils vivent, la bio et photo de
profil) que les utilisateurs maintiennent dans différents réseaux sociaux
pour corréler à leurs comptes. Nous avons identifié quatre propriétés
importantes – la disponibilité, la cohérence, la non-impersonabilité et
discriminabilité (ACID) – pour évaluer la qualité des différents attributs
de profil pour corréler les comptes. Exploiter les profils a un bon po-
tentiel pour corréler les comptes, car un grand nombre d’utilisateurs
ont les mêmes noms et d’autres informations personnelles sur différents
réseaux sociaux. Pourtant, il demeure difficile d’atteindre une préci-
sion utile en pratique en raison de l’ampleur réelle des réseaux sociaux.
Afin de démontrer que cette corrélation des comptes est faisable sur des
vrais réseaux sociaux et les erreurs sont suffisamment fiables pour qu’elle
soit utilisée dans la pratique, nous avons mis l’accent sur la conception
des méthodes qui permettent d’atteindre un faible taux d’erreur même
lorsqu’elles sont appliquées à des réseaux à grande échelle avec des cen-
taines de millions d’utilisateurs. Puis, nous montrons que nous pouvons
encore corréler les comptes sur des différents réseaux sociaux même si
nous exploitons seulement ce que les utilisateurs postent, c’est-à-dire
leur activité sur un réseaux social. Ceci démontre que, même si les util-
isateurs sont conscients et cherchent à maintenir des profils différents
sur différents réseaux sociaux, nous pouvons encore potentiellement cor-
réler à leurs comptes. Enfin, nous montrons que, par l’identification
des comptes qui correspondent à la même personne au sein d’un réseau
7.2. FUTURE WORK 109
social, nous pouvons détecter les usurpateurs d’identités.
Données personnelles partagées dans les réseaux sociaux
Une grande partie des données partagées par les utilisateurs est public
parce que le but d’avoir un profil dans de nombreux réseaux sociaux est
de rendre un individu plus visible. Le but d’un profil LinkedIn est d’avoir
une meilleure visibilité pour les recruteurs potentiels, alors que le but
d’un profil Twitter est d’atteindre une large audience pour promouvoir
des idées et des intérêts. Plus simplement, la raison pour rendre le
contenu public est soit d’atteindre soit d’être atteint plus facilement
par d’autres utilisateurs. De ce fait, cependant, n’importe qui peut
facilement accéder à ce contenu et l’analyser de façons qui sont hors du
contrôle de l’utilisateur qui l’a généré.
En général, nous pouvons trouver trois types d’informations sur les util-
isateurs d’un réseau social. Nous avons d’abord le profil utilisateur qui
est l’information quel les utilisateurs fournissent au sujet d’eux-mêmes.
Les informations de profil peuvent inclure des attributs comme le nom
de l’utilisateur, la ville où il vit actuellement, où il est allé à l’école,
son employeur actuel, le jour de son anniversaire, ou la photo du pro-
fil. En plus du profil utilisateur nous avons également des informations
sur les activités de l’utilisateur dans le réseau social, comme ce que
l’utilisateur poste ou quels livres, films, ou équipes sportives il aime.
Les posts des utilisateurs viennent souvent avec des métadonnées. Par
exemple, dans Facebook et Twitter, les posts peuvent être marqués avec
l’exacte position d’où le message a été envoyé. Sur Yelp, les utilisateurs
notes les restaurants, de sorte que nous disposons d’informations sur
l’emplacement et le type de restaurant. D’autres types de métadonnées
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incluent les hashtags, la langue du poste ou quelle application a été util-
isée pour poster le post. Enfin, nous disposons d’informations sur le
graphe social : les amis des utilisateurs.
Tous les réseaux sociaux permettent aux utilisateurs de marquer des élé-
ments de leur profiles comme contenu privé. Même avec les paramètres
les plus restrictifs, cependant, il y a toujours des éléments d’information
qui doivent être rendus publiques. La quantité minimale d’informations
qui reste toujours public dans tout réseau social est le nom réel, le nom
d’écran, et la photo du profil d’un utilisateur.
Techniques actuelles pour corréler les comptes d’utilisateurs
Aujourd’hui, un certain nombre d’organisations regroupent déjà des in-
formations d’un utilisateur unique sur plusieurs sites. Il existe quatre
approches actuelles pour corréler des comptes: (i) des sites qui permet-
tent aux utilisateurs de montrer explicitement les liens vers leurs profils
sur différents réseaux sociaux; (ii) les sites qui prennent en charge les
services single sign-on qui corrèle implicitement les comptes; (iii) les mo-
teurs de recherche qui utilisent des algorithmes qui exploitent les noms
d’utilisateur; et (iv) les algorithmes proposés par les chercheurs qui ex-
ploitent différentes sortes de données dans les profils des utilisateurs.
Nous discutons maintenant ces approches de manière plus détaillée.
Des réseaux sociaux comme Google+ permettent aux utilisateurs de
lister leurs comptes sur d’autres réseaux sociaux. Les gens, les marques,
et les compagnies qui veulent avoir une forte présence sur le web se voient
souvent conseillées de maintenir des comptes actifs sur différents réseaux
sociaux et de poster des liens d’un compte à un autre. Avoir plusieurs
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comptes reliés ensemble accroît leur visibilité et peut aussi accroître leur
position dans Google search [161]. Outre Google+, il y a aussi des sites
dédiés tels que itsmyurls.com, environ.me, et hi.im qui permettent
aux utilisateurs de créer une page où ils publient des liens vers tous
leurs comptes. Ces sites permettent aux utilisateurs de mieux gérer leur
empreinte en ligne. Outre certains utilisateurs qui veulent maintenir une
forte présence sur le web, il n’y a pas beaucoup d’autres utilisateurs qui
utilisent ces services pour lister leurs comptes.
Single sign-on est un type d’authentification de l’utilisateur qui permet
à un utilisateur de saisir un nom et un mot de passe pour se connecter
à plusieurs sites ou applications. OpenID [155] était la technique tradi-
tionnelle sur le web. Cependant, cette technique ne réussit pas à obtenir
une grande adoption des sites et utilisateurs, principalement à cause du
manque de mesures incitatives [172]. Au cours des dernières années,
Facebook, Google+, Twitter, LinkedIn ont commencé à autoriser les
utilisateurs à se connecter à d’autres sites avec leurs comptes de réseaux
sociaux. Cela fait partie d’un effort visant à autoriser des sites et des
applications tierces à s’intégrer aux réseaux sociaux. Nous pouvons voir
l’intégration entre Facebook, Google+, Twitter et LinkedIn avec des sites
tiers comme une corrélation implicite des comptes entre les deux sites.
L’intégration de Facebook est déjà très populaire, plus de 24,3% du top
10 000 des sites web ont une certaine forme d’intégration [150]. Cette
solution a reçu une plus grande adoption parce que l’intégration est béné-
fique pour les propriétaires des sites et des réseaux sociaux. Lorsque les
utilisateurs se connectent avec leur compte Facebook sur un site tiers,
Facebook partage certaines informations sur l’utilisateur telles que leur
âge, ville actuelle ou ce qu’il aime. Dans le même temps, Facebook en
tire des avantages : cela rend très facile pour les utilisateurs de partager
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sur Facebook toute activité qu’ils font n’importe où sur Internet. Par
conséquent, quelques-uns des principaux réseaux sociaux pourrait de-
venir à la fois les agrégateurs et les répartiteurs d’une grandes parties
des données générées par les utilisateurs en ligne. Toutefois, il n’y a pas
une corrélation implicite entre les différents réseaux sociaux.
Les moteurs actuels de recherche tels que peekyou.com, spokeo.com,
wink.com, pipl.com, et zabasearch.com agrègent d’informations glob-
ales sur les utilisateurs sans leur consentement explicite ou connaissance.
La plupart des moteurs de recherche utilisent des données agrégées des
registres publics, des enquêtes et des réseaux sociaux. Généralement,
lorsqu’ils sont interrogés, ils ont simplement à retourner tous les comptes
de personnes partageant le même nom. Étant donné que, dans la plu-
part des cas, les noms des personnes ne sont pas uniques, les résultats
peuvent conduire à de nombreuses fausses corrélations. Spokeo stip-
ule explicitement dans leurs conditions d’utilisation qu’ils ne garantis-
sent pas l’exactitude de leurs données. Certains moteurs de recherche
utilisent plusieurs algorithmes sophistiqués. PeekYou a déposé une de-
mande de brevet [74] pour corréler les noms de personnes à leurs comptes
dans les blogs, les réseaux sociaux et des forums. L’algorithme con-
siste principalement, à l’aide des informations recueillies sur des sites
différents, à attribuer empiriquement différents poids aux différents élé-
ments d’information sur l’identités. Ces heuristiques ne sont pas fiables,
comme signalé par Perito et al. [148]. Pour construire des services, il
est crucial de comprendre les limites et les capacités de ces techniques
d’appariement.
Enfin, il y a de nombreux efforts récents de recherche dirigés vers la
corrélation des comptes à travers différents réseaux sociaux [6, 16, 76,
122,128,134,137,145,148,195]. Ces efforts mobilisent un variété de don-
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nées de comptes allant d’attributs public de profil utilisateur au contenu
généré par l’utilisateur et aux données privées de comptes. Ce travail
fait allusion au potentiel de corrélation à grande échelle des comptes ;
toutefois, la plupart de ces études n’ont pas évalué leurs méthodes à
l’échelle [76, 128, 134, 148, 195] et le peu qui l’ont fait ont constaté que
leurs méthodes ont tendance à être très peu fiable [6, 122, 145], c’est-
à-dire qu’ils ont un grand nombre de fausses corrélations. Ainsi, le
problème des corrélations fiables reste un défi ouvert.
Les menaces à la vie privée et à la sécurité dans les réseaux
sociaux
Les gens sont de plus en plus intéressés par la confidentialité en ligne
avec la médiatisation des risques possibles de partage des contenus per-
sonnels. Nous pouvons voir des réactions quand il y a une violation de
données et de nombreuses poursuites ont été intentées contre Google,
Yahoo ou Target [176]. En conséquence, de nombreux gouvernements
et organisations proposent des moyens de réglementer la vie privée en
ligne [175].
Le problème de la protection de la vie privée des gens en ligne est difficile.
Chaque jour, nous découvrons de nouvelles attaques de la confidentialité
en ligne contre des gens et nous n’avons pas encore une vue claire de
toutes les attaques possibles. Ainsi, il est difficile de savoir quelles sont
les mesures à prendre et à quel point elles sont globales. Généralement,
une grande partie de l’attention des gouvernements et des organisations
se concentre sur comment les grands sites tels que Facebook ou Google et
les annonceurs comme DoubleClick voient nos schémas de navigation à
114 CHAPTER 7. CONCLUSIONS AND PERSPECTIVES
travers les cookies. Les défenseurs de la vie privée surveillent également
les changements dans les propriétés des sites individuels, tels que les
paramètres de partage sur Facebook et le nouveau Google les termes de
service.
Ce qui a été négligé jusqu’à présent est une plus large menace d’attaquants
corrélant informations personnelles au delà des limites des sites. En ef-
fet, nous pouvons en apprendre beaucoup plus sur un utilisateur lorsque
nous connaissons ses comptes sur plusieurs réseaux sociaux. Sur Face-
book, nous pouvons apprendre des détails sur un individu, par exem-
ple, le jour de son anniversaire, ses films préférés, et où il est allé à
l’école. Nous pouvons également déduire certains renseignements. Par
exemple, sur Twitter nous pouvons déduire les intérêts d’une personne
en analysant le texte de ses tweets ou qui il suit [127]. Sur LinkedIn,
nous avons tous les contacts professionnels présents et passés d’un util-
isateur, nous pouvons apprendre les sociétés pour qui il a travaillé et
quelles sont ses compétences. Sur Yelp, nous pouvons apprendre quel
genre de cuisine l’utilisateur veut et où il veut aller. Par conséquent,
il est encore plus difficile de protéger la confidentialité des utilisateurs
en ligne lorsque les attaquants peuvent mettre en corrélation des infor-
mations de différents sites et inférer de nouvelles informations sur les
utilisateurs. La première étape pour atténuer cette menace est d’être
capable de mesurer l’empreinte en ligne d’un utilisateur. Comprendre
comment nous pouvons facilement faire correspondre les comptes d’un
individu sur différents réseaux sociaux peut fournir aux utilisateurs des
outils permettant de mesurer leur empreinte en ligne et de mieux com-
prendre les risques d’entrave à la vie privée.
Notre discussion a porté jusqu’à maintenant sur la protection de la vie
privée menace de regrouper des utilisateurs des informations à travers
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les réseaux sociaux. Une autre classe de menaces pour l’utilisateur en
ligne image provient d’imitateurs. Il y a de plus en plus anecdotiques
témoigne des célébrités et personnes importantes être usurpée [126,160]
mais d’autres personnes sont potentiel d’usurpation d’identité objec-
tifs trop. Depuis un fraudeur peut sérieusement affecter l’image en
ligne de l’utilisateur, il est très important de détecter de telles attaques.
Jusqu’ici, cependant, la plupart de l’attention des chercheurs et de réseau
social les administrateurs a mis l’accent sur la détection faux comptes
ou spam [17,25,196,200], il n’existe aucun cadre pour détecter automa-
tiquement imitateurs et la seule solution est que les victimes à signaler
manuellement les comptes qui usurpent leur [75].
Contributions
Dans cette thèse, nous développons et analysons des méthodes pour
identifier les comptes qui correspondent à la même personne sur dif-
férents réseaux sociaux et à l’intérieur d’un même réseau social. Nous
exploitons les techniques pour corréler des comptes correspondant à la
même personne à l’intérieur d’un réseau social pour détecter les usurpa-
teurs d’identité en ligne. Plus précisément, les contributions de la thèse
sont les suivantes.
Corrélation des comptes sur des réseaux sociaux fiable à grande
échelle
Il y a beaucoup d’intérêt et de préoccupation, tant dans le domaine
de la recherche que dans l’industrie, pour d’éventuelles corrélations des
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comptes d’un utilisateur sur plusieurs réseaux sociaux. Nous mettons
l’accent sur le défi de la conception de méthodes pour corrélation de
comptes exploitant des donnes publiquement visibles pour atteindre une
haute fiabilité, c’est-à-dire, un faible taux d’erreur même lorsqu’il est
appliqué à grande échelle dans des réseaux avec des centaines de mil-
lions d’utilisateurs. Le principal défi dans la réalisation d’une corréla-
tion fiable provient du bruit inhérent des données publiquement acces-
sibles. Nous avons identifié quatre propriétés importantes – la disponi-
bilité, la cohérence, la non-impersonabilité et discriminabilité (ACID) –
afin d’évaluer la qualité des différents attributs dans la comparaison de
comptes. Les attributs publics comme le nom, l’emplacement, photo de
profil, et amis satisfont les propriétés ACID à des degrés divers, ce qui
rend la détection simple des comptes corrélés utilisant directement des
techniques simples de classifications inexactes lorsqu’elle est appliqué à
grande échelle.
Nous montrons qu’il est possible de tirer parti de plusieurs attributs
pour créer un schéma fiable et évolutif correspondant à une classifica-
tion en trois étapes : d’abord filtrer les comptes qui sont clairement
différents, puis désambiguer le vrai compte correspondant d’un ensem-
ble de comptes similaires, et enfin assurer la fiabilité en mesurant à
quel point le compte le plus corrélé est distinct des autres comptes sim-
ilaires. Les techniques précédentes de matching d’entités ne sont pas
efficaces pour la comparaison de comptes en raison des contraintes et
spécificités de notre scénario : (1) nous avons à traiter de très grands
ensembles de données; (2) nous ne disposont que d’un nombre restreint
d’attributs pour discriminer le compte correspondant parmi plus d’un
milliard d’autres comptes ; et (3) nous sommes sûrs qu’il ne peut y avoir
qu’un seul vrai compte correspondant dans un réseau social. Nous éval-
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uons les performances de matching de comptes sur Facebook et Twitter,
deux des plus grands le monde réel les réseaux sociaux. Nos résultats
montrent que la corrélation de comptes à grande échelle est difficile.
Malgré tout, nos techniques peuvent matcher 30% de Twitter avec leur
comptes Facebook correspondants, avec 92% de précision. Nos constata-
tions reflètent le potentiel ainsi que les limites de la comparaison fiable
de comptes à l’échelle en utilisant uniquement les attributs des comptes
d’utilisateur. Outre les contributions analytiques, nous avons également
développé un service en ligne qui prend en entrée un compte Twitter et
recherche en temps réel le compte correspondant sur Facebook, qui peut
être trouvé à http://matchingaccounts.app-ns.mpi-sws.org/.
Dans la poursuite de l’édification d’un schéma de matching fiable et évo-
lutif, nous avons également fait certaines contributions méthodologiques.
Premièrement, nous avons développé une méthode objective pour rassem-
bler les données “ground truth” de la correspondance de comptes. Nous
pensons que cette méthode donne un échantillon représentatif d’utilisateurs
en général. Deuxièmement, nous proposons une évaluation systématique
des schémas de matching qui nous montre que la précision d’un schémas
de matching à petite échelle n’est pas indicative de la précision du sys-
tème à grande échelle. Enfin, nous avons évalué comment les humains
peuvent matcher des comptes. La précision des humains est un standard
plus réaliste de la précision que nous pouvons espérer atteindre par un
schéma de matching automatique.
Corrélation de comptes en exploitant les activités d’utilisateurs
Nous étudions comment les pirates potentiels peuvent identifier les comptes
sur différents réseaux sociaux qui appartiennent au même utilisateur,
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en exploitant seulement l’activité des utilisateurs. Nous examinons
trois caractéristiques spécifiques sur Yelp, Flickr, et Twitter : la géo-
localisation jointe aux posts d’utilisateurs, le timestamp des posts, et le
style d’écriture capturé par modèles de langage. Nous montrons que,
parmi ces trois caractéristiques l’emplacement des posts est l’attribut
le plus puissant pour identifier les comptes qui appartiennent au même
utilisateur dans différents sites. Lorsque nous combinons les trois at-
tributs, la précision de l’identification des comptes Twitter qui appar-
tiennent à un ensemble d’utilisateurs Flickr est comparable à celui des
attaques existantes qui exploitent les noms d’écran. Notre attaque peut
identifier 37% de comptes en plus par rapport aux schémas basés sur
le nom d’écran lorsque nous cherchons plutôt les correspondance entre
Yelp et Twitter. Nos résultats ont d’importantes conséquences pour la
protection de la vie privée : ils présentent une nouvelle classe d’attaques
qui exploitent le fait que les utilisateurs ont tendance à supposer que,
si ils maintiennent des personnages différents avec des noms différents
sur différents réseaux sociaux, les comptes ne peuvent pas être matchés
ensemble; tandis que nous démontrons que les posts eux-mêmes peuvent
fournir suffisamment d’informations pour faire la correspondance.
Détection et caractérisation des usurpateurs d’identité
Les gens sont conscients que les attaquants imitent des comptes de
réseaux sociaux. En dehors de quelques témoignages anecdotiques, toute-
fois, il n’y a pas eu de qualification approfondie de l’usurpation d’identité
aujourd’hui dans les réseaux sociaux. Nous proposons une technique en
deux étapes qui détecte les comptes usurpateurs. La première étape
retourne les comptes qui dépeignent la même personne dans un réseau
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social. La deuxième étape détecte quel compte est un imposteur. Les
méthodes traditionnelles pour détecter les faux comptes marchent mal
pour détecter les usurpateurs d’identité. Nous montrons que pour la dé-
tection d’usurpateurs, nous devons à bâtir des méthodes qui exploitent
des attributs qui caractérisent des paires de comptes plutôt que des
comptes uniques comme cela a été fait jusqu’à présent. Nous faisons
une étude de caractérisation d’environ 5 693 cas d’attaques d’usurpation
d’identité que nous avons détecté sur Twitter. Nous avons constaté
que les attaques d’usurpation d’identité ne ciblent pas uniquement les
célébrités mais aussi des utilisateurs moins populaires sur Twitter. En
outre, leur principal objectif est d’échapper à la détection de faux comptes
de Twitter plutôt que d’utiliser les comptes pour des attaques d’ingénierie
sociale. Nos résultats révèlent un nouveau type d’attaques d’usurpation
d’identité que peut avoir un impact négatif sur l’image en ligne de
n’importe quel utilisateur, et pas seulement celles des célébrités.
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